

MARCUS AURELIUS
ANTONINUS
THE
ROMAN EMPEROUR,
HIS
MEDITATIONS

Concerning HIMSELF:
Treating of a Natural Man's
Happinefs; Wherein it confifteth, and
of the Means to attain unto it.

Translated out of the Original GREEK;
with NOTES:

BY

MERIC CASAUBON, D. D. and Prebendary
of *Chrift-Church, Canterbury.*

The Fourth Edition.

ECCLUS. 18.8.

What is man, and wherein serveth he?

What is his good, and what is his evil?

LONDON,

Printed for, and are to be fold by *Charles Harper* at the
Flower-de-Luce over againft *St. Dunstons Church*
in *Fleet-street*, 1673.

W. Percival

TO THE
Most Reverend Father in GOD,

WILLIAM

By the Divine Providence,
Lord Archbishop of *Canterbury*;
Primate of all *ENGLAND*, and
Metropolitan; One of the Lords
of his Majesties most Honourable
Privy Council, and Chancellour
of the University of *Oxford*; My
very Honourable good Lord.

May it please your Grace,

I Present here unto you
the Writings of a King
I have presumed that
You would honour that
sacred Name even in
a Heathen so far, as to accept of the
Work, were it but for the Author's
sake. For as it may well be esteemed
(in such an Age as this) none of Your
Grace's least commendations, that

The Epistle Dedicatory.

you are truly φιλοβασιλεύς; so I suppose
Your self account it no small happi-
ness, that You live to serve so Great
and Gracious a King. But if the bare
Name of a King would not serve, I
could adde, that they are the Wri-
tings of the Wisest, the Learned'st,
the Best that ever was among Hea-
then Kings, if Historians may be cre-
dited. It is observed by some of them
as a great argument of the Divine
Providence, that such a Prince was
provided against such times, when all
things seemed to tend to ruine and
confusion, and all humane ordinary
means were thought too little to keep
the Empire standing: the happy pre-
servation whereof they generally ad-
scribe to the singular and extraordi-
nary Wisdom of this One; both in
his Wars abroad; and in his Civil
Government, at home. Hence it is,
that as of a man of whom there is no
hope,

The Epistle Dedicatory.

hope, we commonly say, *Ne Salus quidem*: so was it used as a Proverb in after-ages by some of them, of a State irrecoverably gone, and declined, *Ne Marcus quidem*. As for his Learning, I could wish Your Grace had the leisure to peruse the Historians own words, lest mine may seem too hyperbolical, and yet come far short of their expressions. What shall I say then of his Integrity, which is so commended by them, as it alone might well be thought sufficient without any other commendation, to make him Incomparable? And indeed I fear I have spoken but improperly, when I have mentioned his Wisdom, Learning, and Integrity, as three several Excellencies, since that (as he Himself professed, and they report of him) all the Learning he was ambitious of, was but to be Wise; and all the Wisdom, but to be Good. The Writings of such a one,

The Epistle Dedicatory.

I know Your Grace would respect, although he had been no King. And yet another reason, which hath made me the bolder to present them to Your Grace is, because in reading them You shall often read Your self, and though perchance Your Modesty will not suffer You to make the application, yet others will, I am sure, that shall read him; and I could not but have respect unto it. Upon these reasons I have presumed. If beyond reason; I can excuse my boldness no otherwise, but as I am,

YOUR GRACE'S

Humbly devoted Chaplain,

Meric Casaubon.

Some few Testimonies concerning *Antoninus*, and these his Books.

Out of *SUIDAS*.

MARCUS the Roman Emperour, whom it is easier to admire in silence, than to praise, it being altogether impossible to equal his merits with any expression of words. For from his youth having betaken himself to a composed, and settled course of life, he was never seen to alter his countenance, through either fear, or pleasure. He most approved the Stoicks, and was their follower, not onely in their order and discipline of life, but also in their course and method of Learning. He therefore from his younger years, became so famous and illustrious, that *Adrianus* intended oftentimes to settle the Empire upon him: but having after a more legal way first settled it upon *Antoninus Pius*, he nevertheless reserved the succession of it unto *Marcus*. He thought good also by marriage to ally him unto *Anton. Pius*, that so by succession of blood also he might come to the Empire. As for *Marcus*, he still continued in the same private course of life, and in the like subjection as other Romans did, and was in nothing altered by this adoption, and new affinity. And when he

was come to the Empire, and had the absolute power in his hands, [or, and was an absolute Monarch:] he was never known to do any thing insolently; but as in matters of bounty he was always most free, and exuberant; so in his government, he was no less meek and moderate.

Again out of the same.

MARCUS ANTONINUS a Roman Emperour, having deserved in all things the commendation of a perfect Philosopher, &c. He hath written concerning the course of his own life, twelve Books.

Athenagoras, a Philosopher of *Athens*, in his *Apology* for the Christians addressed unto *Marcus Antoninus*, and his Son *Commodus*, by way of humble Mediation and Intercession.

I Know well enough, that ye do not more surpass others in royal power and prudence, than in the exact perfection of all manner of Learning: so that even they that have singled out, and wholly applyed themselves to any one part, have not attained to that happy perfection in that one, which ye have attained unto in all parts of Learning.

Jul. Capitol. in vita Marci.

ERAT enim ipse tanta tranquillitatis, ut vultum nunquam mutaverit moerore vel gaudio,
Philoso-

Philosophiæ deditus Stoicæ, quam & per optimos quosque magistros acceperat, & undique ipse collegerat.

Vulcatius Gallicanus, in Avidio Cassio.

NEc defuere qui illum [*Cassium*, scil.] Catilinam vocarent; cum & ipse gauderet se ita appellari, addens futurum se Sergium, si *Dialogistam* occidisset, Antoninum hoc nomine significans; qui tantum enituit in Philosophia, ut iturus ad bellum Marcommanicum, timentibus cunctis ne quid fatale proveniret, rogatus sit, non adulatione sed serid, ut præcepta Philosophiæ ederet, &c.

Aurelius Victor, in Breviario.

Tantum Marco sapientiæ, innocentia, ac literarum fuit, ut is Marcommanos cum filio Commodo, quem Casarem suffecerat, petiturus, Philosophorum obtestantium [*vi*] circumfunderetur, ne se expeditioni aut pugnae prius committeret, quam sectarum ardua & occulta explavisset. Ita incerta belli (*in*) ejus salute doctrinæ studiis metuebantur; tantumque illo imperante florere artes bonæ, ut illam gloriæ etiam temporum putem.

Is. C. Exercit. in Bar. pag. 85.

Multa in hanc sententiam scribit M. Antoninus Imperator, in suis illis divinis libris, &c.

Idem

Idem ad ista Julii Capiti: ridens res humanas,
 &c. Non ridere, sed ritè, ac suo pretio aestima-
 re res humanas solitus hic vir sapientissimus:
Hoc ille nos docet, divinis illis suis libris: ve-
 lut cum ait in 11. non enim tempero mihi, quin
 mellitissimi doctoris verba adscribam, &c.

Canterus Nov. Lect. lib. 7. cap. 1.

MARCUS ANTONINUS Antoninus, Imperator op-
 timus, atque idem Philosophus tantus, ut
 hoc meruerit proprium cognomen, duodecim
 conscripsit *de officio suo* libros, maximæ pietatis,
 humanitatis, temperantiæ, eruditionis, aliarum
 rerum præclararum testes plenissimos; & cum
 quibus multorum Philosophorum operosa præ-
 cepta collata, meritò sordere possint. Quocir-
 ca nemo, spero, malè collocatum tempus puta-
 bit, quod in ejus operis lectionem studiosè
 quondam impendimus, cùm ex eà præter cæte-
 ra, fructum hunc retulerimus, quod ex multis
 vitiosis locis duo saltem dextro, si dicere licet,
 Æsculapio sanavimus. Ac primum sub finem
 primi lib. ait, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ πλείον με σεργιᾶσαι ἐν
 ῥητορικῇ καὶ ποιητικῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁππιδεύμασι, re-
 petitur autem ἀπο κοινῆ, παρὰ ἧς δεῶν ἔλαβον,
 sed pro μὲν, ego μὲν legendum affirmare non
 dubito. Nam ideo mox subjungit hæc, ἐν οἷς
 ἵπως ἐν κατεργάζειν, εἰ ἡδόμεν ἡμᾶν ἐν οἷς
 περιόοντα. Quid si, inquit, in poetiis & orato-
 riis studiis feliciter progressus fuisset; nemo me
 inde retrahere, & ad majora perducere facile
 potuisset. Quocirca Diis gratias ago, quod in
 studiis illis non nimis magnum feci profectum,
 nec

Lib. I.
 num.
 XIV.

nec ea nimis adamare cœpi. Nec injuria, Imperator. Nam ut in homine privato tolerari fortassis queat, si natura jubente, suppetente otio, aspirante fortuna, jucunda Musarum studia paulo diutius colat, & amœnissimas firenas, quæ tamen non dent sine mente sonum, attentius ac pertinacius auscultet: Ita non potest is, quem ad res maximas gerendas, ac totius Universi curam natura progeniit, aliò cogitationes omnes suas, quàm ad eum scopum dirigere, & ut illum assequatur quàm citissimè, non omnem operam dare. Sed jam ad alterum pergamus locum. In fin. lib. sexti, hanc adfert similitudinem, *οἱ κυβερνῶντες οἱ ναῦς ἢ ἰατροὺς οἱ κείμεντες κακῶς ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ πρὶ αὐτῶν προστίζον; ἢ πῶς αὐτὸς ἐπερρίη τὸ τοῖς ἐμπλέουσι σωτήριον, ἢ τὸ τοῖς δευαποδομένοις ὑμεινόν;* Quemadmodum, inquit, si nauta gubernatori, aut aegroti medico maledicerent, non facile alium auscultarent, nec vel ille vectorum salutem, vel hic aegrotantium sanitatem procurare posset: ita cum quis alius nunquam alteri bene & recte monenti parere consilium capit, is non temere vel rectum vitæ cursum tenere, vel post errorem in viam possit redire. Verum quod pene oblitus eram, * pro *κυβερνῶντες* & *ἰατροὺς*, legendum est *κυβερνῶντα* & *ἰατρούς*. Quod cum non advertisset interpretes, alioqui doctissimus, quique paucos hac ætate pares habet, alienum planè sensum commentus est. Sed profecto homines omnes sumus, & erramus facillime: nec reperitur hoc sæculo quisquam, qui securus possit medium Momo digitum ostendere.

Lib. VI.
num. L.

* There is no need of this. The sense is better, as the words are printed. See there.

Many

Many more Testimonies might be added if need
 were : but of all late Writers I know not any that
 hath had more to do with Antoninus than Barthe-
 lemy in his *Adversaria* ; I will not say to what pur-
 pose, because I will not preoccupy the Reader's
 judgement, the Book being every where to be had.
 In lieu of it, I will add that here, which I know
 will be of very good use to the Learned : and that
 is, a brief Collection of those passages of Anto-
 ninus, (of all I will not say, but of most I dare)
 that are any where cited by Suidas ; with reference
 to the particular books and places of Antoninus
 from whence they are taken : whereby many places
 both in the Text of Suidas it self, and in the late
 learned Interpreter's Translation of the said Suidas,
 may easily be corrected and supplied by them that will
 take the pains to compare them.

Suidas. Ἀντιπαιδὸν παρὰ Διογνήτῳ, &c. An-
 ton. B. I. n. III. Of Diogenes, &c.

Suidas. ἀξίεσθαι. ἐν τῷ Μάρκῳ Ἀντωνίνῳ συγγρα-
 φῇ. καὶ περιχίλια ἔτι βιώσειναι μέλλει καὶ πενταχίλια
 μύρια, ὅμως μέμνηται, &c. Anton. B. II. n. XII. If
 thou shouldst live 3000. or as many 10000. of
 years, &c.

Suidas. Σπουδαίνειν. ἔστι περὶ αὐτὸ μόνον εἶδός, καὶ τὸ
 μερισμὸν τῆς ἐνοίας διαλύσει τὰ ἄμφοτερόμενα αὐτῷ,
 &c. Anton. B. II. n. X. As also what is it to dye,
 and how if a man shall consider, &c.

Suidas. ἀχολῶ. ὁ μὴ ἐνκαιρῶν, &c. μὴδὲ χάρις
 ἀνάγκης λέγειν πρὸς πᾶνα, ἢ ἐν ἐπισημῇ γραφῇ, ὅτι
 ἀχολῶς εἰμι. μὴδὲ διὰ τούτου τρέπτω, &c. Anton. B. I.
 n. IX. not often, nor without great necessity, &c.

Suidas. ἀψιγνέειν. εἰ δὲ ἰδιωτικὸν παράπληγμα,
 &c. Anton. B. IX. n. III. But if thou desirest a
 more popular, &c.

Suidas.

Suidas. ἀφίκοιτο, συμπεβλήθη, &c. συντηρεῖ
πλὴν δὲ ἢ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, καὶ μετὰ ἀφίκοιτο.
Anton. B. I. n. XII. His care to preserve his
friends, &c.

Suidas. ἱράτο· ἡράτο· ἡ δυσμία, &c. πᾶς
ἡράτοι μὴ ὀργίζε. Anton. B. V. n. XXII. Be not
angry, &c.

Suidas. δαίμων. ἡ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι, &c. ἡ δαίμων
τὸ πᾶν τὸ κῶλον· ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἡρώων
ἐν δαίμονι, καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, &c. An-
ton. B. II. n. II. There is nothing more wretched
than that soul which in a kind of cirenia compass-
eth all things, &c.

Suidas. ἐπιδεικνύμενος. ἡ ἐπιδεικνύμενος. μὴ ἐ-
νδεδεικνύμενος ἐπιδεικνύμενος τῷ βυβαίον ἡ οὐλοισιν, &c.
Anton. B. I. n. VII. And not reproachfully to re-
prehend any other, &c.

Suidas. εὐλοῖτο. Μάρκο· Ἀντωνίου· εὐλοῖτο, ἔως
ἀναμνήτων τῶν ἀνακλιπτικῶν, ἐν τῷ βίῳ εὐλοῖτο, &c. An-
ton. B. III. n. V. As one that expected, as it were,
nothing but the sound of the Trumpet, &c.

Suidas. εὐμαρξία. ἡ εὐμαρξία. λέγει· τὸ καὶ εὐμαρξία
παρὰ Μάρκῳ Ἀντωνίῳ. Anton. B. IV. n. III. ἐν τῷ
εὐμαρξίᾳ εὐδὺς γίνεται. τὸ καὶ εὐμαρξία ἡ δὲ λέγει
ἡ εὐμαρξία. By tranquillity I understand a decent
orderly disposition and carriage, &c.

Suidas. ὀρθὸς λέγει· καὶ ὀρθοῖτο. Μάρκο, ὀρθοῖτο
τὸ καὶ μὴ ὀρθοῖτο. Anton. B. III. n. VI. Rather
like one that is straight of himself, &c.

Suidas. ὀρθὸς, τὸ καὶ βίαι καὶ ὀρθοῖτο. μὴ ὀρθοῖτο
καὶ καὶ βίαι πρὸς θάνατον ἔχει. Anton. B. IX.
n. III. It is therefore the part of a wise man in
matter of death, not in any wise to carry him-
self, &c.

Suidas.

Suidas. ὀρυζόκοπος, πυδία πτε, &c. μηδὲ ὀρυζόκοπον, μηδὲ πτε ταῦτα ἐπὶ ἡδαι. Anton. B. I. n. III. *Not to keep quails for the game, &c.*

Suidas. Παράτμια, κανών, &c. εἰ ὃ ἰδιωτικὸν παράτμια. Anton. B. IX. n. III. *See before in ἀφικέρηθ.*

Suidas. τρασιάνθ. ὅτι τρασιάνθ λέγεται καὶ βασιανθ, καὶ παλμελάριθ, καὶ σκυτάριθ παρὰ Μαρκῷ Ἀντωνίνῳ. Anton. B. I. n. II.

Suidas. προσοχή, ἀκρίβης ὅπμι. &c. τὰ ἰδίῃ σώματι ἐπιμελειῶς δεῖ ἔχειν ἐμμέτροι. ἔτι ὡς ἂν πτε φιλόζωθ, ἔτι πρὸς κνημισμόν, &c. Anton. B. I. n. XIII. *His care of his body within bounds and measure, &c.*

Suidas. Συμβαίνοντα, συμφανέντα. τὸ συμβαίνειν λέγονται, ὡς τὰς πετραγάνους λίθους ἐν τοῖς τοίχοις, &c. Anton. B. V. n. VIII. *As of square stones, when either in walls, &c.*

Suidas. Τερατία, ψαδολογία. Ψαδολογία, τοῖς ἰσὺς ἢ περαιομένοις, καὶ ῥήτων πτε ἐπωδῶν, &c. Anton. B. I. n. III. *Those things which are spoken by such as take upon them, &c.*

Suidas. τὸ παρὸν εὖ τίθει. There is no more now in Suidas than so : which certainly is out of Antoninus, B. VI. n. II. ἀρετῇ ἢ καὶ ὅτι ταύτης τὸ παρὸν εὖ τίθει, *That thou dost well acquit thyself of that present duty.*

Divers other words there be, as καλαμώνες, ἐν-συνιδνίθ, &c. in the exposition of which, I am perswaded that Suidas had a reference to Antoninus ; yet because he neither cites the passage, nor names the Author, I would not bring such in this number.

TO THE READER.

THis Book (of what worth I say not ; but more men, I fear, will commend it, than will know how to make use of it :) after it had for so many ages undeservedly been buried in darkness, is now first, if I may not say brought unto light, yet at least made common and intelligible. Twice, it is true, within these 80. years it hath already been set out in its own Original Greek : and set out both times with a Latin Translation, much revised and corrected in the latter Edition. Yet such are those Editions both of them, so confused ; and so corrupt ; and such is the Translation in both the Editions, so imperfect often, and impertinent, that I say not so absurd and erroneous ; as that it is not easie to determine, whether it be harder to understand *Antoninus* his meaning by the Greek that is printed ; or the Greek that is printed, by the Translation of it : but that of both we may boldly and peremptorily conclude ; of the one, that it cannot possibly be understood, as it is printed ; and of the other, that it would be more for the credit of the Author (a man otherwise acknowledged very learned :) if we did take no notice of it at all. I must adde besides, that there hath been many years agoe a certain Book, first written in Spanish, and since translated into Italian, French, English, and how many Tongues more I know not ; pretended by the Title to be a Translation of *M. Aurel. Antoninus*. But that the Author of it, (a learned Spaniard)

To the READER.

Spaniard) was in good earnest, I could never have believed, and would have thought I had done him great wrong to say it, had not I read his Prefaces, where he so earnestly by reasons, such as he could finde, goes about to make his Title good, and as earnestly expostulates with men for their incredulity, who did not take his reasons for current and clear ones. I cannot but commend his intention, which certainly was to doe good; but his way I much abhorre, and wonder as much at his judgement and discretion. Sure I am that by his whole Book it doth not appear, that he had ever so much as seen that himself, which his Title doth promise unto others, *M. Aurel. Antoninus* his Book: which either must be this here, or none. For besides this, there is not any other, that ever was extant. For as for those other Writings of his, which either be himself in his second Book, or *Capitolinus* in his Life, or *Nicephorus* in his Ecclesiastical History (lib. 3. cap. 31.) or any others mention, they mention them as Books written, and composed by him, but not as ever publickly extant, which if they had, *Snidas*, or whosoever they be, whom *Snidas* in his Dictionary, in the word *Marcus*, doth alledge, would not have omitted them. Thus much I thought good here briefly to acquaint the Reader with; who, if he please, may receive further satisfaction by the ensuing Discourse.

A DIS

A DISCOURSE

By way of

PREFACE:

CONCERNING

The Use and Subject of this Book :
The Author ANTONINUS; And
this Translation of it.

OF all the several sects and professions of Philosophers that ever were known or heard of in the world, there was not any that ever did hold maxims and opinions so contrary to flesh and blood; never any that was judged even by the learned Heathens themselves (witness learned Plutarch, who hath written a whole Book of this very subject :) so grossely and manifestly to oppose nature, and to overthrow all grounds and principles of humane sense or reason, as the Stoicks did. And yet of all sects and professions, never any that either with the best was of more credit, or with the vulgar more plausible. So plausible and popular, that there have been times, when the number of the Stoicks alone, did exceed all the followers and professors of all other sects being put together. A thing the more to be wondered at, because that for that very reason, Christianity (though nothing so harsh in comparison :) hath ever by them of con-

Lucian. in
Hermoti-
mo, & l. 3
C. ad ista
Pers. Si
Cynico bar-
bam peti-
lans, &c.
p. 165.

B trary.

THE PREFACE.

trary professions, been much opposed and contradicted. Of this a main reason I conceive to have been, that the Stoicks, though by their particular Tenets and Opinions, they might seem of all others most to oppose nature, yet that which they proposed unto themselves as the end of their lives, and the ground of all their Philosophy; that which they did ever sound in the ears of men and press them with, was τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν, to live according to nature. Μένειν δὲ ἢ φιλοσοφία μόνον δίδασκε, καὶ φύσις οὐκ δίδασκε. Remember that philosophy requireth no more at thy hands, than what thine own nature doth require, and leads thee unto: saith Antoninus.

B. V. n. IX.

B. VI. n. XXV.

τῶς ὡμὸν ἐστὶ μὴ ἐκτρέφειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμμελὲς ἐν τῷ φαινόμενῳ αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἔστι καὶ συμπεριεσθῆναι; What a cruel and unnatural thing would it be to restrain men from the pursuit of those things, which they conceive to themselves and their own nature, most proper and convenient?

See Ant.

B. V. n. I.

So they all speak, and that which they all generally did most beat upon, was this. Now whether the particular means which they did commend and propose, were indeed proper and natural unto that end, unto which they did propose them, I will not here dispute. For the end, whether true or pretended, is that which men usually take most notice of. As for the means, how direct or indirect to that end, is not so easily discerned. Their end therefore, being of it self so plausible and acceptable, I conceive it to have been the thing especially, which made their doctrine and Philosophy so sed. And I am as verily persuaded, that a conceit and opinion many Christians

stians have, that most of those things which are reproved in them as sins and vices, agree best with their natures; and many, if not most, of those duties that are required of them as Christians, are against, not depraved and corrupted only, which is not properly nature; but absolutely against the nature of man: and in general, that divine law and humane sense and reason, are things contrary and opposite; is that as much as any thing that doth discourage them from the intent practice, and study of those things which they by their profession cannot but acknowledge themselves bound unto. For it is not more natural to a man to love his own flesh, (which the Apostle witnesseth, no man ever hated:) than to love nature, and what he conceives to be according to nature. Though it be not so, yet if he conceive it so, he affects it naturally, and in time it becomes natural unto him indeed.

Now concerning Christianity, I know it is the opinion of many, that, matters of Faith and the Sacraments only excepted, there is nothing in the whole Gospel which is not juris naturalis, and most agreeable to humane reason. For my part, as I would not take upon me, to maintain their opinion precisely true in all points, and circumstances; so I must needs say, if we esteem that natural, which natural men of best account, by the meer strength of humane reason, have caught and taken upon them to maintain as just and reasonable, I know not any Evangelical precept, or duty belonging to a Christian's practice, (even the hardest, and those that seem to ordinary men most contrary to flesh and blood, not excepted,) but

See Hugo
Grot. de
jure Belli
ac P lib. 1.
cap. 2.
sect. 6.

THE PREFACE.

upon due search and examination, will prove of that nature. I say upon due search and examination. Many have touched upon this point, rather to shew the way unto others, than by way of undertaking themselves: among others, of late, the best able that I know now living to perform this, or any thing else that belongs to a general and compleat Scholar, Mr. Hugo Grotius, in his collection and Translation of the Greek sentences. There be too, I know, that have undertaken much in this kinde: but of whom (as many as I have seen:) I may boldly say (and the more boldly because I name none:) that in many respects they have performed but little. I wish it with all my heart, that some able and judicious man would think it worth his labour and pains: were it but to this end, that the harshness which many Christians (though Christians, yet flesh and blood they will say) do conceive to be in many divine precepts, might be mollified and lessened, when it shall appear that the very same things did not seem harsh to them, who (in comparison of them whom God hath called by more special and supernatural illumination:) were nothing but flesh and blood. That they who as men can so hardly prevail upon themselves to strive against nature, and to yield to those things which they conceive against all humane sense and reason, might be of another mind, when they shall see that meer natural men, who in humane sense and reason, of all others most excelled, have both esteemed themselves bound by nature, and others most unnatural that refused, to follow or to forbear those very things: *ut quivis arbitretur* (saith Minutius F. though upon another occasion) *aut nunc Christianos philo-*
sophos

The PREFACE.

5

Iosophos esse, aut philosophos fuisse jam tunc
 Christianos. But not to prosecute this general any
 further at this present : Of all Books in this kind
 that ever have been written by any Heathens, I
 know not any which either in regard of it self, (for
 the bulk thereof ;) or in regard of the Author, de-
 serves more respect, than this of Marcus Antoninus ;
 son by nature of Annius Verus (a man of great
 quality in Rome) and adopted son of Antoninus
 Pius, a Roman Emperour, whom also he succeeded
 in the Empire about the year of our Lord 162, or
 163. The chiefest subject of the Book is, the vanity of
 the world and all worldly things, as wealth, honour,
 life, &c. and the end and scope of it, to teach a man
 how to submit himself wholly to God's providence,
 and to live content and thankful in what estate
 or calling soever. But the Book, I doubt not, will
 sufficiently commend it self, to them who shall be
 able to read it with any judgement, and to com-
 pare it with others of the same subject, written
 either by Christians or Heathens : so that it be
 remembered that it was written by a Heathen :
 that is, one that had no other knowledge of any
 God, than such as was grounded upon natural
 reasons meerly ; no certain assurance of the Im-
 mortality of the soul ; no other light where-
 by he might know what was good or bad, right
 or wrong, but the light of nature, and hu-
 mane reason. Which though it were, (such as
 it was) from God the Author of nature (as
 what is not ?) yet in regard it was not by
 any revelation, or any other extraordinary
 means, is therefore called humane and natural.
 As for the Book then, to let it speak for it self.

The PREFACE.

In the Author of it two main things I conceive very considerable, which because by the knowledge of them, the use and benefit of the Book may be much greater than otherwise it would be, I would not have any ignorant of. The things are these: first, that he was a very great man, one that had good experience of what he spake; and secondly, that he was a very good man, one that lived as he did write, and exactly (as farre as was possible to a natural man,) performed what he exhorted others unto.

For the first, I have alwayes thought that it was not without God's especial Providence, that of all them that once were the peculiar people of God, he was chosen to write against the vain pleasures and delights of this world, who of all the rest had had most knowledge and experience of these things, that he did write against. A poor man may from his heart perchance declaim against the vanity of wealth, and pleasures; and a private man, against the vanity of honour, and greatness; both of them it may be from their hearts, but it is ever suspicious, and therefore of less power and efficacy. Suspicious I mean, that they are angry with that they would fain, and cannot get themselves; yea, and perchance inveigh of purpose, that by inveighing (an ordinary thing in the world:) they may get that which they inveigh against. But at the best, that they make a virtue of necessity; that they speak against they know not what; and though they mean sincerely, as now; yet if they were in place themselves, God knows what minde they would be of. And the event, indeed, doth justify these

these suspicions but too often. But when a man shall hear such a one as Salomon was, speaking in this manner: I said in my heart, Go to now, I will prove thee with mirth, &c. I made me great works, &c. I made me gardens and orchards, &c. I made me pools of water, &c. I got me servants and maidens, &c. I gathered me silver and gold, &c. So I was great, &c. And whatsoever mine eyes desired, I kept not from them, I withheld not my heart from any joy, &c. Then I looked on all the works that my hands had wrought, and on the labour that I had laboured to doe; and behold, all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and there was no profit under the Sun: Is there any man so benighted, and besotted with worldly wealth and pleasure, whom such a confession from such a one, will not move, for a while at the least? And if this of Salomon, who at first had received such a measure of Grace and illumination from God, that it may be more justly wondered, that he ever did any thing contrary to this profession, then what he should profess so much; how much more should that confession of Antoninus move us, dilated here by him, and enlarged into XII. books, and briefly expressed and summed up in these words of his eighth Book, *μεγαλὸν μοι πόνον παραδίδεις, ἡμῶν εὐδαιμονία τὴν ἐν ζῳῃ.* B. VIII.
ἐν τῷ Συλλογισμῷ, ἐν τῷ πλῆθει, ἐν τῷ δόξῃ, ἐν τῷ n. I.
ποταμῷ, ἡμῶν? Thou hast already had sufficient experience, that of those many things about which thou hast hitherto wandered, thou couldst not finde happiness in any of them: not in syllogisms, and Logical subtilties; not in wealth, not in honour and reputation; not

in pleasure: in none of all these. Of *Antoninus* I say, a meer Heathen, led by humane reason only; *Antoninus*, a man for worldly estate and greatness so farre greater than *Salomon*, as Lord and Master I dare say of more great Kingdoms, than *Salomon* was of great towns in all his Kingdom; *Antoninus*, a man for his goodness and wisdom, by all men during his life, had in that honour and reputation; as never man either before him was, or (that we know of) ever after him.

But his goodness was the second consideration. It hath ever been the complaint of all ages: There hath ever been store enough of men that could speak well, and give good instructions: But great want of them that either could, or so much as endeavoured to do as they spake, and taught others to do. And what is the good that such can do? The only good I can conceive, is, that they persuade men as much as in them lies (and they got very effectually about it:) that *ἡ εὐσέβεια τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀγαθόν ποιεῖ*, καὶ τὸν θεόν ἡμεῖς ἀγαπᾷμεν, καὶ τὸν πληροῦς ἐστὶν ἀγαθῶν, ἀρετῶν καὶ σοφίας, ἡ δὲ αἱμαρτία, ἐν ᾗ οὐβὼν καὶ ἐμίσσηται ἅπλῃ ἀδικίᾳ. That all this that we call virtue and godliness, so much spoken of amongst men, are but words and empty sounds; that there is no such thing really existent indeed, as piety and justice, but that it is a meer figment of some cunning jugglers and impostors, or at the best a pretty device of Law-makers, and founders of Common-wealths, to keep silly people in awe and fear. Can any man think otherwise (if otherwise he be not bitterly grounded:) that shall hear them speak, and then look upon their actions? Such therefore in my judgement

judgement might deserve farre more thanks if they did forbear, and would rather lose the commendations of either a smooth tongue, or a ready pen, than to incurre both the just suspicion of being Atheists themselves, and the certain guilt and crime of having made many others so. Be it therefore spoken to the immortal praise and commendation of this famous Antoninus, that as he did write, so he did live. Never did Writers so conspire to give all possible testimony of goodness, uprightness, innocency, and whatsoever could among Heathens be most commendable, as they have done to commend this One. They commend him, not as the best Prince only, but absolutely as the best man, and best Philosopher that ever was. And it is his proper commendation, that being so commended, he is commended without exception. If any thing hath ever been talked against him, the Historians mention it but as a talk: not credited by them, nor by any that ever were of any credit. Thus the Heathens of Him. The Christians had but little reason to speak well of him, as having suffered many cruel persecutions under him: And in this case how free they have been (some of them:) even with all extremity to inveigh against other Emperours, though much commended and magnified by the Heathens, is not unknown. Yet I finde not that ever they could fasten any thing upon our Antoninus, whereby to stain his reputation; that ever they did so much as object unto Him, those many and grievous persecutions, which they did suffer under him, as his own act, or charge him therefore of cruelty. And though it be granted, that Antoninus gave way to those persecutions, which certainly he could not altogether

ther be ignorant of ; yet to them that know the state of those dayes, it can be no wonder, that such a thing should happen in the dayes of such a Prince as Antoninus was. When Christians, besides the infamy of many horrible crimes, as common incest, homicide, &c. which (such was the power of calumny :) lay upon them ; were generally accounted no better, than meere Atheists and Epicures. For indeed Atheists, Christians, and Epicures, were commonly joyned together as names, if not of the same signification, yet of very great affinity, and hardly distinguished by the vulgar, but that of the three, the Christian was thought the worst. Let it be then Antoninus his commendation, the greater and the more incredible in this age, the more the age is full of dissimulation and hypocrisie, that he was not (as now they rightly style themselves, whom the common received Names of Christians, and Protestants will not content, such is their Zeal and purity, they think :) a Professor : as he spake and wrote, so he did. His meditations were his actions. His deeds (so still you remember Him a man, and a Heathen) did agree with his sentences. "Οὐδ' ἔργων αἰσίου, ἀλλ' ἔξ ἀγῆστον μέρμερον ἔργων, πρῶτον, &c. And again, ὡς ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνὴρ εἰμι, καὶ ἵδμεν ἡγεμονίαν ἔχειν, &c. That he did not only as he spake, but what he did, he did it out of meere love to vertue. That it was a clear case, which no man doubted of, that he was in very deed a good man ; so incapable was he of any dissimulation. So Dio of him, and so others.

And now that I have spoken so much of Antoninus his life, it will not be amiss to say somewhat of that

that surname, the Philosopher, which by many hath been given and appropriated to this Emperour. In-
 somuch as Xylander, though he found it not at all
 (as he confesseth) in his MS. yet thought it fit-
 ting to add it in the Title, and Inscription of
 these books, as his proper and usual Cognomen.
 But sure enough it is (as hath been observed by
 learned men :) that this Title of Philosopher
 was never taken by Antoninus himself, nor given
 unto him by others, as a proper surname, as his fa-
 ther Antoninus was surnamed P I U S, and others
 otherwise, but only as a deserved Elogium and
 testimony, at the discretion of them that either
 did speak unto Him, or wrote of Him. And so in-
 deed it was very commonly, and even by those learn-
 ed and pious Christians, that directed Apologies
 unto Him for the Christians, adscribed unto him
 as an Elogium, and Testimony : just indeed and
 deserved, but arbitrary, and not proper unto Him
 by way of a Cognomen or surname. But, an Elo-
 gium and testimony of what think you ? of his
 great learning (as we take learning now :) and
 progress in the Sciences ? Read him himself, and
 judge how much he would have esteemed such a
 commendation. A man would think, if Hea-
 thens, through their ignorance of the true God, and
 of his truth, had been mistaken in the true appli-
 cation of words of praise or dispraise ; that we, by
 the help of a better light, might have rectified
 them, and not followed their examples. But now
 it is fallen out quite contrary. Who they be that
 the holy Scriptures usually call wise ; who they,
 to whom they ascribe knowledge and understand-
 ing ; and who they are, who by them are termed
 fools,

fools, blinde, ignorant, and the like, is not unknown unto any. So spake the ancient Heathens, when they would speak properly. He that was an honest, upright, vertuous man, without dissimulation and hypocrisie, though he were such a one as had never been brought up to learning, yea such a one as could neither read nor write, was their *αὐτὸς*, *παιδαγωγός*, *φιλόσοφος*, their good scholar, their learned man, their Philosopher. His life and his actions, were all that they stood upon; though indeed they were of opinion, that it was very difficult, if not altogether impossible, for a man to come to the knowledge of that which is right and wrong, just or unjust, and by consequent of true vertue, without much study and pains taking. On the other side, an unjust man, a cunning, an intemperate, in generall, a vicious man, was their *ἀνιδίωτος*, *ἄσους*, *ἰδιώτης*, their Illiterate, their Ignorant, their Idiot. The most ordinary distinction was, of an Idiot, and a Philosopher. Neither was this the proper language of the Stoicks (which sect our Antoninus was much addicted unto:) but of the Platonicks likewise, and of most others. But the main and principal property, whereby they did distinguish a Philosopher from all other men, was that he did all things *μετὰ τὴν ἀναστροφήν*, with a relation unto God and his Providence; *ἀπορῶν τὸν θεόν ἐν πᾶσι μακρῶ καὶ μικρῶ*, as Epictetus (in Arrianus) speaketh. This you shall finde that Antoninus doth much stand upon. For indeed they did esteeme it the very character and essentiall note of a Philosopher. Insomuch as that if any man seemed never so just and upright in his actions, yet if it were not *μετὰ τὴν ἀναστροφήν*, with reference to God,

and

and our dependances on Him, as the Supreme Cause, and Moderator of all things: they esteemed him little more than a meer Idiot.

Much more I had here to say concerning this matter, both in defence of Plato (whose name hath much suffered through some mens ignorance of the true sense of this word Philosophus) and for the clearing of many obscure places of Antoninus, which otherwise I think will hardly be understood. But because I fear it would make the body of this Preface to swell too much beyond the proportion of the rest, and that in the Notes it will come in well enough; I will reserve it unto that place. See notes upon B. VIII. n. I.

Now for this my Translation of Antoninus, which is the last thing we are to speak of, were it so that this Book were as commonly known, and as easie to be got as many others of less worth are, I should be well content to spare the labour of this account, and refer it wholly to the judgement of the Reader. But for as much as by my own experience I know the Book, (though twice printed,) to be so rare, that it is not to be found in many private studies, and sometimes not for many years together, in any Book-sellers-shop: (I was beholding to learned Mr. Holdsworth's well-furnished Library for the first sight, and long use of the latter and better Edition; as also for the use of many other Books:) and that the Latin Translation of Xylander, hath been commended and approved by the most learned (doctissimus; eruditissimus Interpres; vir profundæ eruditionis, &c. So they speak of him:) I do think it very necessary, both that I should give the Reader that satisfaction, that I do not actum agere, and do my self that right, that whereas I take upon me

to translate Marcus Aurel. Antoninus Augustus, I may not be suspected to have translated Gulielmus Xylander Augustanus. Indeed what might be expected from Xylander's Interpretation, may be collected by his own ingenuous intimation, both in his Preface, where he is fain to Apologize for it, that he durst undertake it, professing that in quibusdam he was constrained, *divinare & audacter à codice Græco aut usu communi recedere*; as also in his Notes, where his words are, *Sunt autem passim permulta, in quibus ariolo magis, quam interprete opus sit*: And that he doth so indeed, it doth but too manifestly appear by his Translation. For I dare boldly say, and do him no wrong, that sometimes in a whole page, he hath not two lines of Antoninus his sense, and meaning. Besides the liberty that he takes unto himself to supply of his own head, to leave out sometimes words, sometimes lines, to change and alter at his will; without any reason given for it, or so much as making the Reader acquainted with it. And whereas Xylander puts the fault of all this upon the corruption and imperfection of the Copy, I cannot altogether allow of it. For as I confess the faules and corruptions of it, if in the printed copies they have not been made more, than they were in the Manuscript (which I do not believe:) to be many; so of those many, I know none or very few, that may be termed incurable. And as for the Lacunæ of it, I hope that they neither in this Translation (and what ancient book is there almost but both some?) will not be found many. As for any greater hiatus, as perchance of many leaves together, if any shall suspect the Copy to have been defective

in

in that kind, the method and composition of the book being such, that it doth for the most part consist of certain Aphorisms and Canons, (they called them *κατάλογος*, *διαγράμματα*, *ἀφωρίσματα*, *καταμίσματα*, &c.) without any certain order or series, either in regard of the whole (but that they all tend to one purpose;) or in regard of the parts themselves: as it is not possible by the matter it self for any man, to determine how much more in this kind may have been written by Antoninus; so if there were never so much extant, yet how this that we have here, could thereby be made more perfect than it is, I do not see. Their conceit, who by reason of this independance of matters, would have the whole book, to be but excerpts and *Συλλαβή* of a greater, and better compacted work; there being so many other books both sacred and prophane written in the same kind; and Epictetus (the Pattern of all latter Stoicks:) his *Enchiridion* among the rest; it can at the best pass but for a meer conceit, and needs I hope no other refutation.

To tell you then what I have done, and that you may be the better satisfied that I except not against Xylander's Interpretation without cause, it remains that for a Specimen I produce some few passages, by which it will be easie for any to judge of the rest. But first I must faithfully profess that my purpose in all this is not any wayes to detract, either from Xylander himself, or from the judgement of those learned men, by whom he hath been highly commended, but rather to follow (after my best ability:) Xylander's own example; whom for his great pains, and labour in his lifetime to further and promote learning, I acknowledge.

ledge to have deserved much honour and respect from all that love learning. I might adde that I shall deal with him more ingenuously too, than some others have done, who take upon them to correct some corrupt places of Antoninus, which Xylander in his Translation, whereof they take no notice, had already plainly corrected. But now to Antoninus.

Where Antoninus in his first Book saith, that he learned by his Father's example, that it is not impossible for a man that lives at the Court, ἡγυῖται τοῖς ἰδιώταις οὐσιδαὶν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ νῦν διὰ (read νῦν διὰ, καὶ διὰ τῶν :). ἵστανται πάντοτε καὶ ἐπαυσιότερον ἔχοντες τὰ πρὸς τῶν κοινῶν ὑπακουῖας πρὸς ἑαυτῶν δόξαν. To live almost a private mans life, for matter of worldly pomp and magnificence, and all outward shew and appearance (expressed by him before more at large :) and yet for all that, not to be a whit the more base and pusillanimous, or less stout or resolute in any publick affairs that shall require the power and authority of a Prince and Commander : he translates it, Sed licere ei proximum privato homini habitum sumere : imò verò eum splendorem, eos qui principes rempublicam gerere velint, demissiores, segniorésque efficere. Which neither of it self affords any tolerable sense, and is as wide from Antoninus his meaning, as any thing that could have been conceived.

Baf. Edit.
247.

In the eighth book Antoninus saith that ἡ κοινὴ φύσις—ἵστανται καὶ κατὰ ἀξίαν τὰς μετριοτέρων χρεῶν, ἐσθίας, αἰνίας, ἐνσυνείας, οὐκ ἐκείνων, ἐνδοξοῦ ποσότητος : That the common Nature (which was one of the many Synonyma's, by which the Stoicks did express God :) doth

doth distribute all things in equality, as matter, form, duration, and the like; and then adds, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ, μὴ εἰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἴσιν ἀριθμῶν ἐπὶ παντί; This equality thou shalt observe, not if absolutely thou shalt goe to compare all the particulars of any one thing by themselves, with the particulars of another by themselves: ἀλλὰ εἰ συνδιβδν τὰ πάντα τῷδε, (it is. printed, τὰ πάντα τῷδε, &c.) πρὸς ἀλλήλα τὰ τῷ ἴσιν; that is, but if thou consider all the particulars of any one thing together, with all the particulars of another together likewise. His meaning is, that every natural thing in his own kind, that is, after a Geometrical, though not Arithmetical equality, is equally perfect: an Ant as perfect in her quantity, as an Elephant and Whale, so great and vast, in theirs. As strong for her little proportion of body, and other circumstances of her nature; and as long lived, as any other creature; and so of all other things, if all things be well considered. And this doth not only extend to things of several kinds and natures; but even to those that are of the same. It is a very pleasant and useful speculation, as it may be prosecuted and applied, and it is very fully expressed by Antoninus. After this (as his manner is,) abruptly passing to another matter, Ἀναγινώσκων ἐν ἑαυτῷ, saith he to himself (for so must the words be distinguished, which in the Greek are viciously joyned and confounded—τὰ πάντα τῷδε δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλα τὰ τῷ ἴσιν ἀναγινώσκων ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀλλὰ, &c.) by way of objection, and then immediately answers, ἀλλὰ ὕβειν ἀνέριπνιν ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλὰ ἰσθύνων καὶ πόνων καὶ ἀναισθησίαν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ποζείτω ὑπὸ τῷ αἵματι ἑαυτῷ, &c. Thou hast no

B. VIII.
n. VI.

time nor opportunity to read books; What then? Hast thou not time and opportunity to practise thy self, to forbear contempt and contumely: (towards thy self, I understand it; that is, thy soul, according to Plato's doctrine, followed and expressed by Antoninus, in those words at the beginning of the second book, ὑπερῆς, ὑπερῆς ἑαυτῆς, καὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, &c. And again at the end of the same book more at large :) to resist and overcome all pains and pleasures, to contemn honour and vain-glory, and not only not to be angry with those whom thou dost find unsensible, and unthankfull towards thee, but also to have a care of them still, and of their welfare? Conferre this with other like passages of Antoninus, both for form and matter, and you will think that nothing could be plainer. All this is expressed by Xylander: Considera autem æqualitatem eam inventurum te si singulas res examines; sin unam cum universis conferas, non item. And then he leaves a blank, and begins a new line; Atqui licet libidinem arcere, voluptatibusque & doloribus superiorem esse, itemque gloriola: licet etiam stupidis & ingratis non irasci.

See B. V.
n. V. B.
VII. n.
XXXVIII.

B. VII. n.
XVIII.
Bas. edit.
234.

Some three or four pages from the beginning of the seventh Book, τὸ ἐπικρατὸν τῷ προσώπῳ (saith Antoninus:) κίαν ὅσα οὖν, ἔστιν πολλὰς ἐκαστομένης ἢ πείρα. ἢ [γὰρ ἢ] τὸ πλεοναῖον ἀποβῆναι, ὥστε ὅπως ἐξαρθῆναι μὴ δύνασθαι. ἡμῶν γὰρ τέτρω * ἐδραμεῖν, πῆρ, ὅτι παρὰ τὸν λόγον. εἰ γὰρ ἢ, ἢ συνάδουσι τῷ ἀμαρτάνειν [γὰρ τῷ μὴ ἀμαρτάνειν] οἰχόνται, τίς ἐπὶ τῷ ζῆν αἰτία; That an angry countenance, (saith he) is much against nature, hence maist thou gather, because

* See note
2. upon
B. II.

because oftentimes it is the proper countenance of them that are at the point of death; [*and a fore-runner of death as it were.*] But were it so that all anger and passion were so thoroughly quenched in thee, that it were altogether impossible that it should be kindled any more, yet [*herein must not thou rest satisfied; but*] further endeavour by good consequence of true ratiocination perfectly to conceive and understand, that all anger and passion is against reason: For if thou shalt not be sensible of thine innocency, as it is innocency; if that also shall be gone from thee, [*the comfort of a good conscience, that thou doest all things to thy utmost power according to Reason:*] what shouldest thou desire to live any longer for? *All this is by Xylander contracted into these few words;* Irati vultus omnino est contra naturam, quando sapius immoriendi fit prae-textus, aut ad extremum extinctus est, ut omnino inflammari non potuerit. Hoc ipso intelligere labora, iram à ratione esse alienam. Nam si etiam sensus peccati nullus erit, quæ erit vivendi causa?

See B. III.
n. VII. X.
XIII.
B. VIII. p.
II.
Pag. 251.

At the end of the fifth book, Antoninus having spoken of some vanities, adds, ἄνθρωπε, ἀπλάδῃ τί πύτυα ἔν; καὶ ἀλλὰ τέτις μεμψέδων. O man, hast thou forgotten what things these are? yea, but howsoever, they are things that other men much care for; saith he, by way of objection; then answers, διὰ τὸτο ἔν αἰ οὐ μωρὸς γάρ; ἀνθρώπου ποτί. Wilt thou therefore be a fool also? it is enough that thou hast already been one so long. And then passes to another matter: Οὐδὲν ποτὶ κατὰ λόγον, αὐμωρὸν ἄνθρωπον.

The PREFACE.

τὸ δὲ εὖμαις, ἀγαθὴν μοῖραν σταντῶ ἀπονείμας. ἀγαθαὶ δὲ μοῖραι, ἀγαθαὶ τροπαὶ ψυχῆς, ἀγαθαὶ ὅρμαι, ἀγαθαὶ περὶ ζῆς. Let death surprise a man where and when it will : It is more than it can do to make him therefore unhappy. He is an happy man, who (in his life-time) dealeth unto himself a happy lot and portion. A happy lot and portion is ; good inclinations of the soul, good motions and desires, good actions. *This passage cannot well be translated, because we have never a word answerable to the Greek εὖμαις, which Antoninus here elegantly and acutely plays upon, which may signifie, either in general a happy man, or in particular one that dies happily : but properly signifies one that hath obtained a good part or portion. Howsoever, to render it as it may be rendred, the sense is very tolerable.* Now Xylander having found the words somewhat confused, and incorrect, (for it is printed, ἐγνώμην ποτὶ ὁπερ᾽ ἦν ποτὶ καταλειφθεὶς εὖμαις ἀνθρώπου τὸ δὲ, &c.) translates them : Propterea tu quoque stultus es factus ? Aliquando utcumque relictus, factus sum sc̄elix : Felicitas autem est, &c. 4 R.

At the end of the seventh Book, Antoninus his words are, ἢ τὰ ὅλα φύσις ὅτι πλὴν κοσμοποιίας ὥρμησιν. εὖν δὲ ἦτοι πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον καὶ ἐπακαλύθιστον γίνεται, ἢ τὰ λογικά [it is printed, ἢ ἀλόγιστα] καὶ τὰ κυριώτατα ἐστίν, ἐπ' αὐτῶν ποιεῖται ἰδίαν ὁρμὴν τὸ τὰ κόσμῳ ἡγεμονικόν. εἰς πολλὰ τε γαλινότερον πειθήσεται μνημονεύμενον. That the place must be so read and corrected (if any man make a question of it :) I will be judged by Antoninus himself B. VI. n. 39. B. VII. n. 44. not to mention others, as Arrianus lib. 1. cap. 12. Ven. Edit. pag. 21.

The

The nature of the Universe, *saitb* he, did once certainly deliberate and resolve upon the creation of the world. Whatsoever therefore, since that, is, and happens in the world, is either but a consequent of that first and one deliberation; (*by which all things by a necessary and uninterrupted series of causes, were ordained and appointed to be:*) or if so be that this Ruling rational part of the world takes any thought and care of things particular, They are surely his reasonable and principal creatures, that are the proper object of his particular care and providence. This often thought upon, will much conduce to thy tranquillity. *I take κυριώτατα here, as spoken of the same that λογιστά; to which purpose he hath other passages, that reasonable creatures are the chiefest creatures. Yet if any man would rather have it, ἢ ἂν λογιστά, τὰ κυριώτατά ἐστιν, ἐπ' αὐτῶν, &c. reasonable creatures are his chiefest objects, I will not be against it, and it will be all one thing. But who could bear with Xylander his Interpretation? Universi natura olim ad mundum fabricandum se contulit: nunc autem vel omnia quæ fiunt, consequentia fiunt sua: vel etiam in præcipuis eorum, ad quæ se mundi gubernatrix natura confert, rationi nullum locum esse & consilio, tenendum est. Hoc si memoriâ teneas, multis in rebus animo ut sis tranquilliori, efficiet.*

An easie matter it were to adde to these many more such passages, if I thought it as necessary as it would be easie. They that shall take the pains (and it will be worth their pains I dare promise them) to compare diligently the Translations with

Antoninus himself, will, I doubt not, before they have gone one or two Books over, be of my minde. I have of purpose made choise of such places especially, where I have made bold somewhat to correct the Text. I say bold; but no bolder, I will maintain, than any reasonable man must, and ought, that doth undertake any such work. For I have not (to my knowledge :) by my Translation altered any one place in this kinde in the whole book, but such as by certain proofs and demonstrations from Antoninus himself, I can maintain. Those places that I thought any thing doubtfull, I have given account of them to the Reader in my Notes. And if I have left any for desperate, as either imperfect or not intelligible by me, I may truly say, that had I taken to myself but the tenth part of the liberty, which Xylander doth usually throughout the whole book, I needed not to have left any such places at all. And I make no questions but that in so doing, I might have given to many content and satisfaction good enough. But considering how much this liberty is commonly abused, and how prejudicial it proves to good Authors, I have rather chosen sometimes to say less than I might, than to give unto others an example of this bold kind of dealing with ancient Authors. The chiefeft ground of all the obscurity in the Book, is, that Antoninus having been all his life an indefatigable student, and so read a world of Writers of all sorts, his manner is in these his books, as he read any thing that made for his present purpose, closely and briefly to allude unto it, by some short meditation upon it: sometimes barely to excerpt some words, which either he had an especial liking unto, or afterward intended further

to meditate upon, without any mention of the place or Author from whence they are taken. Now many of these Authors being quite perished, many of his allusions so close and obscure, that though the Authors be yet extant, yet it is not easie to find from whence, or of whom, nor to what intent or purpose: it must not be wondered, if not only many places seem obscure, but some also of little worth and use; because, it doth not appear, what further use Antoninus had of them in his minde. Howsoever to them that are anything versed in the writings of ancient Philosophers, Stoicks especially, there will not occurre many such places. If a man take but Arrianus and Seneca, and compare them diligently with Antoninus, he will find a marvellous consent, and many obscure short places of Antoninus, illustrated and explained by their larger discourse. I have done it in some few places, which I thought could not well otherwise be understood. And for the rest, I leave them to every diligent Readers industry. Neither indeed would I have put my self to the labour of writing any Notes at all, if the book could as well have wanted them, as I could easily have found as well, or better to my mind, how to bestow my time. However as I thought some would be needfull, so did I think also, that if in the former Books, I did give satisfaction to the Reader, I might afterwards be spared, and either be trusted my self, or trust to the Readers diligence and ability for the rest. Wherefore by supplying a word or two in the Text, I thought I could help the sense, and illustrate the matter sufficiently; to spare my self a Note, and for the ease of the Reader, I have done

THE PREFACE.

it. All such additions to the Text, you shall find within two such [] marks included. And where-as these former passages by me produced, wherein I except against the Latine Translation, are all such as could not be well translated without some correction of the Text; that it may not be thought, that in such places only it is amiss, I have for the further satisfaction of the Reader (the books, as hath already been said, being so scarce and hard to be come by :) taken occasion in my Notes, now and then to instance in some other passages, wherein there can be no such exception.

In the Author himself I fear exception will be taken, at many places, as mere repetitions; at some others, wherein he seemeth to contradict what he had said before. But if the Readers consider, first, that what Antoninus wrote, he wrote it not for the publick, but for his own private use; and secondly, that Antoninus his words are so intermingled every where with his Excerpta, that it doth not well appear what is his own, and what is not: as in regard of the first consideration they will, I doubt not, allow him far more liberty than otherwise were fitting: so in regard of the second, I presume they will yield both those many suspected repetitions in the Books, and those few supposed contradictions, the one perchance to be but severall collections of one subject, and to one purpose from several Authors; and the others certainly, rather the different opinions of different Authors concerning the same thing, than the contradictions of one man, inconsistent to himself. And as for such places which may give offence, as repugnant to our Christian faith, and impious; as when he seemeth

to speak doubtfully of God, and his Providence, and to adscribe all things to Fatal necessity, and the like: I shall but desire the Reader to remember who he was that wrote, and I hope they will desire no other satisfaction in this point. For that any Christian should expect from any out of the Church, and without the Scriptures, perfect sound knowledge in these high points, would be no small wonder to me: it being both the happiness of every the meanest Christian, that he may know more in these mysteries, than the greatest Philosophers could ever with all their wit and learning attain unto; and the proper privilege of the Divine Scriptures, that from them only all solid truth in points of this nature is to be expected. However, that Antoninus may not want any just defence that his cause doth afford, the Reader must further be intreated not to judge of his opinions, by one or two short passages here and there occurrent, which whether they be his or no (as we have already said) is hard to determine; but to have a respect to other more large and peremptory passages concerning the same purpose elsewhere to be found. As for example concerning God and his Providence, to B. II. Num. VIII. B. VI. Num. XXXIX. &c. and concerning Fatal necessity not only to the same B. II. Num. VIII. but also to divers other places, as B. VIII. Num. 6. 27. 30. 32. 46. &c. by which places as it doth plainly appear, that he doth exclude all manner of Necessity from humane wills and actions: so doth it appear by other passages, as B. VIII. Num. 33. that he did not altogether exclude from the power of Providence nor even those actions of men that are most contrary to the will

of God : from which place moreover may appear what it is that he often calls *αἰμαίνων*, Fate, or Destiny ; which in his meaning is no other than Gods sovereign Power and Providence in ordering the matters of the world, not subject either to opposition or mutability : as by Hierocles in his *De Providentia*, by Plotinus, by Alexander Aphrodisias, and generally by all Aristotle his Greek Interpreters, as Simplicius, Themistius, Philoponus, and many others it is interpreted. To which purpose he doth also expound the word Fortune, B. I. n. XVII. by which, other places, which otherwise perchance might be mistaken (as B. I. n. XIV. last words) must be expounded. And herein, you must know that Antoninus takes no more liberty to himself in using this word in the sense he doth, than Plato did, who although he disputes at large in his *X. de Legib.* that even the least things happen by Providence, and thinks it great impiety for a man to doubt of it : yet where he speaks of the uncertainty and instability of all worldly affairs, even of those that are settled with the best wisdom and discretion of men, he useth these and the like expressions. *Ἰνὰ τὸν πόλιν μὴδὲν ποιεῖται μὴδὲν, τί-
λας δ' εἶναι χάρις ἀνθρώπων τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώπων :* that good laws oftentimes avail but little, for that in very deed it is chance and fortune, which for the most part is all in all in worldly affairs, &c. that is, in regard of us men, and of the secondary causes, not in regard of God. In which sense the use of the word even unto us Christians, is allowed by the best Schoolmen. Whether that also were Aristotles meaning in his *Physicks*, where he treats of chance and fortune, I leave to others to consider, and shall be glad my self to judge as favourably as any other,

Plat. de
leg. lib. 4.

Aqu. 2. q.
22. art. 3.
& c.
Arist. Phy-
sic. lib. 2.
c. 4. & 5.

other, upon any, though but probable ground of reason. On the other side, although Antoninus doth every where absolutely maintain this liberty of mans will, and that he was not acquainted with the mystery of original sin, and natural concupiscence; yet shall you not finde in him those blasphemies, in exaltation of this humane power and liberty, which you shall in Seneca, and other Stoicks: neither did he (it should seem, though but an Heathen:) so much rely upon it, but that he doth very piously commend prayers, as very powerfull and effectual unto vertue. See lib. IX. Num. XL.

Now if Antoninus himself, being a Roman, for the propriety and facility of his expressions (wherein the Latine tongue, in matter of Philosophy, comes as short of the Greek, as the English doth of the Latine:) did in the composing of these his Books preferre the Greek tongue before his own mother-tongue; no man I hope will expect, that all things should in this Translation run so smoothly, as in another kinde of Translation haply they might. But herein I must confess my fear is for Antoninus, more than for my self. For first whereas he, being (I think) as well acquainted with ancient Writers and Philosophers as ever any was, doth every where very strictly and carefully observe their proper choice words and terms, which both make the sense it self more current, and pleasing; and for a Scholar to know them, and to be acquainted with them, is in many respects very usefull; This in the Translation must needs be lost, and by consequent so much lost to Antoninus, of his due praise and commendation. And secondly, whereas in all these his XII. books there be not ma-
ny

my lines (if any,) which, if well considered, will not be found either to be taken out of some ancient Author, or at last by way either of Exception, Confirmation, Illustration, and the like, to either passage or opinion of some ancient to have some relation: as to the learned I know whatsoever is in this kinde, be it otherwise what it will, cannot but be acceptable and usefull; so so others I fear, many things for want of this use of it, which they are not capable of, will seem but dry and impertinent. In these two respects I cannot deny but I have done Antoninus some wrong to make him so vulgar, as I have done; and yet because I thought he might in other respects do good to any that should read him, if before the credit of one I have preferred the good of many, I have but done what Antoninus himself (as by these his books may appear,) would have me, or any others doe in the like case.

And now in the last place, if any shall by these my pains receive any content, my desire is that they would thank him, by whose encouragement especially I did undertake this little work, my Reverend kinde friend Doctor Lyndsell, the right worthy Bishop of Peterborough, a man for his singular worth and learning in all kinde of literature, not to be named by any that know him, without expression of all due respect and admiration; and one to whom my self, and my studies, of old, have been much beholding, as I shall ever most gladly acknowledge.

M. AUREL.

M. AUREL. ANTONINVS
THE ROMAN EMPEROUR,
HIS FIRST BOOK
 Concerning HIMSELF:

Wherein ANTONINVS recordeth, What and of whom, whether Parents, Friends or Masters, by their good examples, or good advice and counsel, he had learned:

Divided into Numbers, or Sections.

[A Ntoninus Book VI. Num. XLIII. Whensoever thou wilt rejoyce thy self, call to minde the severall gifts and vertues of those whom thou dost dayly converse with: as for example, the industry of one, the modesty of another, the liberality of a third; of another, some other thing. For nothing can so much rejoyce thee, as the resemblances and parallels of several vertues, eminent in the dispositions of them that live with thee, especially when all at once, as near as may be, they represent themselves unto thee. See therefore, that thou have them alwayes in a readinesse.]

Num. I.

OF my Grandfather Verus [I have learned] to be gentle and meek, and to refrain from all anger and passion. From the fame and memory of him that begot me [I have learned both] shamefacedness, and manlike behaviour. Of my Mother [I have learned] to be religious, and bountifull; and to forbear, not only to doe, but

but to intend any evil; to content my self with a spare diet, and to fly all such excess as is incidental to great wealth. Of my great Grandfather, ¹ both to frequent publick Schools and Auditories; and to get me good and able Teachers at home; and that I ought not to think much, if upon such occasions, I were at excessive charges.

II. Of him that brought me up, not to be fondly addicted to [*either of the two great factions of the Coursers in the Circus, called*] Praefini, and Veneti: nor [*in the Amphitheater*] partially to favour [*any of the Gladiators, or fencers, as either*] the Parrularii, or the Scurtoriani. Moreover, to endure labour; not to need many things; when I have any thing to do, to do it my self [*rather than by others*]; not to meddle with many businesses; and not easily to admit of any slander.

III. Of Diognetus, not to busie my self about vain things, and not ² easily to believe those things, which are [*commonly*] spoken by such as take upon them to work wonders, and by Sorcerers, [*or, prestigiators, and impostors*]; concerning the power of charms, and their driving out of Demons, [*or, evil spirits*]; and the like. Not to ³ keep cornices [*or, quails for the game*]; nor to be mad after such things. Not to be offended with other mens liberty of speech; and to apply my self [*or, to become familiar*] unto Philosophy. [*Him also I must thank,*] that ever I heard first Bacchius, then Tandafis, and Marcianus: and that I did write ⁴ Dialogues in my youth, and that I took
liking

liking to the [*Philosophers*] little couch and skins, and such other things, which by the Grecian discipline are proper [*to those who profess Philosophy.*]

IV. To Rusticus I am beholding, that I first See B. XI. entered into the conceit that my life wanted some ^{n. 27.} redress and cure. And then, that I did not fall into the ambition of [*ordinary*] Sophists, either to write tracts concerning the [*common*] Theorems, or to exhort men [*unto virtue and the study of Philosophy*] by [*publick*] orations; as also that I never by way of ostentation * did affect to shew my self an active able man, [*for any kind of bodily exercises.*] And that I gave over the study of Rhetorick and Poetry, and * of elegant neat language. That I did not use to walk about the house in my Senators robe, nor to do any such things. Moreover [*I learned of him*] to write letters without any affectation or curiosity; such as that was, which by him was written to my Mother from Sinoessa: and to be easie and * ready to be reconciled, and well pleased again with them that had offended me, as soon as any of them would be content to seek unto me again. To read with diligence; not to rest satisfied with a light and superficial knowledge, nor quickly to assent to things commonly spoken: whom also I must thank that ever I lighted upon Epictetus * his *Hypomnemata* [*or, moral commentaries and communefactions:*] which also he gave me of his own.

V. From Apollonius, true liberty, and unvariable steadfastness, and not to regard any thing at all, though never so little, but right and reason: and always, whesher in the sharpest pains, or
after

* ἀσκησιολογίας, not ἀσκησιολογίας: as was found by Xylander in his written Copy; and by him turned into ἀσκησιολογίας: which he was sorry for afterwards.
* ἐν δὲ λαλῶν: not (as printed) ἐν δὲ λαλῶντος.
6.

after the loss of a child, or in long diseases, to be the same man; who also was a present and visible example unto me, that it was possible for the same man to be both vehement and remiss: ^{7.} a man not subject to be vexed, and offended [*with the incapacity of his Scholars and Auditors*] in his lectures and expositions; and a true pattern of a man who, of all his good gifts and faculties, least esteemed in himself that his excellent skill and ability to teach and perswade others the common Theorems, [*and Maxims of the Stoick Philosophy.*] Of him also I learned, how to receive favours and kindnesses (as commonly they are accounted,) from friends, so that I might not become obnoxious unto them, for them, nor more yielding [*upon occasion, than in right I ought;*] and yet so that I should not pass them neither, as an unsensible and unthankfull man.

VI. Of Sextus mildness, and the pattern of a family governed with paternal affection; and a purpose to live according to nature: to be grave without affectation: to observe carefully the severall dispositions of my friends, not to be offended with Idiots, nor^s unseasonably to set upon those that are carried with the vulgar opinions, with the Theorems and Tenets of Philosophers: [*his conversation*] being an example how a man might accommodate himself to all men and companies; so that though his company were sweeter and more pleasing, than any flatterers cogging and fawning; yet was it at the same time most respected and reverenced: who also had a proper happiness, and faculty, rationally

tionally, and methodically to find out, and set in order all necessary *Dogmata* [or, *determinations*] and instructions for a mans life. A man without ever the least appearance of anger, or any other passion; * able at the same time * ἀνὰ πρῶτον most exactly to observe the Stoick *Aparchia*, *στυγν.* [or, *unpassionateness*] and yet to be most tender-hearted: ever of good credit, and yet almost without any noise, or rumor: very learned, and yet making little shew.

VII. From Alexander the Grammarian, to be unreprieveable my self, and not reproachfully to reprehend any man for a barbarisme, or a solecism, or any false pronunciation; but dexterously by way of answer, or testimony, or confirmation of the same matter (taking no notice of the word) to utter it as it should have been spoken; or by some other such close and indirect admonition, handsomly and civilly to tell him of it.

VIII. Of Fronto, to how much envy and fraud and hypocrisie the state of a Tyrannous King is subject; and how for the most part they who are * commonly called *ὑπαρχίδες* [or *patricii*, i. nobly born] are in some sort incapable [or, void] of natural affection. 9.

IX. Of Alexander the Platonick, not often nor without great necessity to say, or to write to any man in a letter, *I am not at leisure*; nor in this manner still to put off those duties, which we owe to our friends and acquaintances (to every one in his kind:) under pretence of urgent [or, instant] affairs.

X. Of Catulus, not to condemn any friend's

expostulation, though unjust, but to strive to reduce him to his former disposition: Freely and heartily to speak well of all my Masters [upon any occasion;] as it is reported of Domitius, and Athenodorus; and to love my children with true affection.

XI. From my Brother Severus, to love truth and justice, and to be kind and loving to all them of my house and family; by whom also I came to the knowledge of Thraseas, and Helvidius, and Cato, and Dio, and Brutus. He it was also that did put me in the first conceit and desire of an equal commonwealth, administered by Justice and equality; and of a Kingdom wherein should be regarded nothing more than the good and welfare [or, Liberty:] of the subjects. Of him also, to observe a constant tenour, (not interrupted with any other cares and distractions,) in the study and esteem of Philosophy: to be bountiful and liberal in the largest measure; always to hope the best; and to be confident that my friends love me. In whom I moreover observed open dealing towards those whom he reprov'd at any time, and that his friends might without all doubt or much observation know what he would, or would not; so open and plain was he.

See B.
VIII. num.
LVIII.
10.

XII. From ¹⁰ Claudius Maximus, in all things to endeavour to have power of my self, and in nothing to be carried about; to be chearfull and courageous in all sudden chances and accidents, as in sicknesses: to love mildness, and moderation, and gravity; and to do my business, whatsoever it be, throughly, and without querulousness.

lousness. Whatsoever he said, all men believed him that as he spake, so he thought, and whatsoever he did, that he did it with a good intent. His manner was, never to wonder at any thing; nor to be affrighted, [or, *astonished* :] never to be in hast, and yet never slow: nor to be perplexed, or dejected, or at any time unseemly, [or, *excessively*] to laugh: nor to be angry, or suspicious, but ever ready to do good, and to forgive, and to speak truth; and all this, as one that seemed rather of himself to have been straight and right, than ever to have been rectified, or redressed: neither was there any man that ever thought himself undervalued by him, or that could find in his heart; to think himself a better man than he. He would also be very pleasant and gracious.

XIII. In my Father, I observed his meekness; his constancy without wavering in those things, which after a due examination and deliberation, he had determined. How free from all vanity he carried himself in matter of honour and dignity, (as they are esteemed:) his labouriousness and assiduity, his readiness to hear any man, that had ought to say, tending to any common good: how generally and impartially he would give every man his due; his skill and knowledge, when rigour and extremity, or when remissness and moderation was in season; how he did abstain from all unchaste love of youths; * *his* * Gr. *not moderate condescending to other mens occasions as* *an ordinary man*, neither absolutely requiring of his friends, that they should wait upon him at his ordinary meals, nor that they should of necessity

cessity accompany him in his journies ; and that
 whensoever any business upon some necessary
 occasions was to be put off and omitted be-
 fore it could be ended, he was ever found when
 he went about it again, the same man that he
 was before. His accurate examination of things
 in consultations, and ¹¹ patient hearing of others.
 He would not hastily give over the search of
 the matter, as one easie to be satisfied with
 sudden notions and apprehensions. His care to
 preserve his friends ; how neither at any time he
 would carry himself towards them with disdain-
 full neglect, and grow weary of them ; nor yet
 at any time be madly fond of them. His con-
 tented minde in all things, his chearfull coun-
 tenance, his care to foresee things as farre off,
 and to take order for the least, without any noise
 or clamour. Moreover, how all acclamations
 and flattery were repressed by him : how care-
 fully he observed all things necessary to the go-
 vernment, and ¹² kept an account of the common
 expences, and how patiently he did abide, that he
 was reprehended by some for this his strict and
 rigid kind of dealing. How he was neither a su-
 persitious worshipper of the gods, nor an ambi-
 tious pleaser of men, or studious of popular ap-
 plause ; but sober in all things, and every where
 observant of that which was fitting ; no affecter
 of novelties : in the use of those things which
 conduced to his ease and convenience, (plenty
 whereof his fortune did afford him,) without
 pride and bragging, yet with all freedom and
 liberty : so that as he did freely enjoy them
 without any anxiety or affectation when they
 were

were present; so when absent, he found no want of them. Moreover, that he¹³ was never commended by any man, as either a learned acute man, or an obsequious officious man, or a fine Oratour; but as a ripe mature man, a perfect sound man; one that could not endure to be flattered; able to govern both himself and others. Moreover, how much he did honour all true Philosophers, without upbraiding those that were not so; his sociableness, his gracious and delightfull conversation, but never unto satiety; his care of his body within bounds and measure, not as one that desired to live long, or over-studious of neatness and elegancy; and yet not as one that did not regard it: so that through his own care and providence, he seldom needed any inward Physick, or outward applications: but especially how ingenuously he would yield to any that had obtained any peculiar faculty, as either Eloquence, or the knowledge of the laws, or of ancient customs, or the like; and how he concurred with them, in his best care and endeavour that every one of them might in his kind, for that wherein he excelled, be regarded and esteemed: and although he did all things carefully after the ancient customs of his forefathers, yet even of this was he not desirous that men should take notice, that he did imitate ancient customs. Again, how he was not easily moved and tossed up and down, but loved to be constant, both in the same places and businesses; and how after his great fits of head-ach, he would return

fresh and vigorous to his wonted affairs. Again, that secrets he neither had many, nor often, and such only as concerned publick matters : His discretion and moderation, in exhibiting of the *Spætaacula*, [or, *publick fights and shows for the pleasure and pastime of the people :*] in publick buildings, Congiaries, and the like. In all these things, ¹⁴ having a respect unto men only as men, and to the equity of the things themselves, and not unto the glory that might follow. Never wont to use the baths at unseasonable hours ; no great builder ; never curious or solicitous, either about his meat, or about the workmanship, or colour of his clothes, or about any thing that belonged to external beauty. ¹⁵ His homely Country apparel, and such ordinarily as mean Villages could afford him. How he carried himself when he was in the Country towards that custom-master, that excused himself, and desired some abatement [or, *desired him that he would forgive him.*] In all his conversation, farr from all inhumanity, all boldness and incivility, all greediness and impetuosity ; never doing any thing with such earnestness and intention, that a man could say of him, that he did sweat about it : but contrariwise, all things distinctly, as at leisure ; without trouble ; orderly, soundly, and agreeably. A man might have applied that to him, which is recorded of Socrates, that he knew how to want, and to enjoy those things, in the want whereof most men shew themselves weak ; and in the fruition, intemperate ; But to hold out firm and constant,

stant, and to keep within the compass of true moderation and sobriety in either estate, is proper to a man, who hath a perfect and invincible soul; such as he shewed himself in the sickness of Maximus.

XIV. From the gods [*I received*] that I had good Grandfathers, and Parents, a good Sister, good masters, good domesticks, loving kinsmen, almost all that I have; and that I never through haught and rashness transgressed against any of them, notwithstanding that my disposition was such, as that such a thing (if occasion had been) might very well have been committed by me, but that it was the mercy of the gods, to prevent such a concurring of matters and occasions, as might make me to incurre this blame. That I was not long brought up by the Concubine of my Father: that I preserved the flower of my youth. That I took not upon me to be a man before my time, but rather put it off longer than I needed. That I lived under the government of my Lord and Father who would take away from me all pride and vain-glory, and reduce me to that conceit and opinion, that it was not impossible [*for a Prince*] to live in the Court without a troop of guards and followers, extraordinary apparel, such and such torches and statues, and other like particulars of state and magnificence; but that a man may reduce and contract himself almost to the state of a private man, and yet for all that not become the more base and remiss in those publick matters and affairs, wherein power and authority is requisite. That I have

16:

had such a Brother, who by his own example might stirre me up to think of my self; and by his respect and love, delight and please me. That I have got ingenuous children, and that they were not born distorted, nor with any other natural [or, bodily] deformity. That I was no great proficient in the study of Rhetorick and Poetry, and of other faculties, which perchance I might have dwelt upon, if I had found my self to goe on in them with success. That I did betimes preferre those, by whom I was brought up, to such places and dignities, which they seemed unto me most to desire; and that I did not put them off with hope and expectation, that (since that they were yet but young:) I would do the same hereafter. That I ever knew Apollonius, and Rusticus, and Maximus. That I have had occasion often and effectually to consider and meditate with my self, concerning that life which is according to nature, what the nature and manner of it is: So that as for the gods and such suggestions, helps and inspirations, as might be expected from them, nothing did hinder, but that I might have begun long before to live according to nature; or that even now that I was not yet partaker and in present possession of that life, that I my self (in that I did not observe those inward motions and suggestions, yea and almost plain and apparent instructions and admonitions of the gods,) was the only cause of it. That my body in such a life, hath been able to hold out so long. That I never had to do with *Benedicta* and *Theodotus*, yea and afterwards
when

when I fell into some fits of love, I was soon cured. That having been often displeased with Rusticus, I never did any thing unto him, for which afterwards I had occasion to repent. That it being so that my mother was to die young, yet she lived with me all her latter years. That as often as I had a purpose to help and succour any that either was poor, or fallen into some present necessity, I never was answered [*by my Officers*] that there was not ready money enough to do it; and that I my self never had occasion to require the like succour from any other. That I have such a wife, so obedient, so loving, so ingenuous. That I had choice of fit and able men, to whom I might commit the bringing up of my children. That by dreams I have received help, as for other things, so in particular, how I might stay my casting of blood, and cure my dizziness; as that also that happened unto me at Cajeta, as * unto Chryses [*when he prayed by the sea-shore.*] * See the Notes.

And when I did first apply my self to Philosophy, that I did not fall into the hands of some Sophists, or spent my time either in reading the manifold volumes [*of ordinary Philosophers,*] nor in practising my self in the solution of arguments and fallacies, nor dwelt upon the studies of the Meteors, [*and other natural curiosities.*] All these things without the assistance of the gods, and * fortune, could not have been. * See n. XVII.

XV. In the Countrey of the Quadi at Grana, these.

Betimes in the morning say [or, fore-say:]
to

13.

to thy self, This day I shall have to do with an idle curious man, with an unthankfull man, a railer, a crafty, false, or an envious man; an unsociable uncharitable man. All these ill qualities have happened unto them, through ignorance of that which is truly good, and truly bad. But I that understand the nature of that which is good, that it [*only*] is to be desired; and of that which is bad, that it [*only*] is [*truly*] odious and shamefull: who know moreover, that this transgressor, whosoever he be, is my kinsman, not by the same blood and seed, but by participation of the same reason, and of the same *divine particle*; How can I either be hurt by any of those, since it is not in their power, to make me incurre any thing that is [*truly*] reproachfull? or angry, and ill affected towards him, who by nature is so near unto me? for we are all born to be fellow-workers, as the feet, the hands, and the eye-lids; as the rows of the upper and under teeth: for such therefore to be in opposition, is against nature; and what is it to chafe at, and to be averse from, but to be in opposition?

* πνευμα-
τιος.

XVI. Whatsoever I am, is either flesh, or life, or [*that which we commonly call*] the mistress and over-ruling part of man; [*Reason.*] Away with thy books, suffer not thy minde any more to be distracted, and carried to and fro; for it will not be; but as even now ready to die, think little of thy flesh: blood, bones, and a skin; a pretty piece of knit and twisted work, consisting of nerves, veins and arteries; [*think no more of it, than so.*] And as for thy life, consider what it is: a wind; not one constant

* See B.
III. n. XV.
19.

stant wind neither, but every moment of an hour let out, and suckt in again. The third, is thy ruling part; and here consider; Thou art an old man; suffer not that excellent part to be brought in subjection, and to become slavish: suffer it not to be drawn up and down with unreasonable and * *unsociable* lusts and motions, * *ἀσύναντον* as it were with wires and nerves; suffer it not See before Note 18. any more, either to repine at any thing now present, or to fear and fly any thing to come, which the Destiny hath appointed thee.

XVII. Whatsoever proceeds from the gods See B. III. num. XII. [*immediately,*] that [*any man will grant*] totally depends from their divine providence. As for those things that [*are commonly said to*] happen by Fortune, even those must be conceived to have dependance from nature, or from that first and general connexion and concatenation of all those things, which [*more apparently*] by the divine Providence are administered and brought to pass. All things flow from thence: And whatsoever it is that is, is both necessary, and conducing to the whole; part of which thou art: and whatsoever it is that is requisite and necessary for the preservation of the general, must [*of necessity*] for every particular nature, be good and behovefull. And as for the whole, it is preserved, as by the perpetual mutation and conversion of the simple Elements one into another, so also by the mutation and alteration of things mixed and compounded. Let these things suffice thee; Let them be always unto thee as thy general rules and precepts. As for thy thirst after books, away

way with it with all speed, that thou die not murmuring and complaining, but truly meek and well satisfied, and from thy heart thankfull unto the gods.

THE SECOND BOOK.



Remember how long thou hast already put off these things, and how often a certain day and hour as it were, having been set unto thee by the gods, thou hast neglected it. It is high time for thee to understand the true nature both of the world, whereof thou art a part; and of that Lord and Governour of the World, from whom, as a chanell from the spring, thou thy self didst flow: And that there is but a certain limit of time appointed unto thee, which if thou shalt not make use of to calm and allay the many distempers of thy soul, it will pass away and thou with it, and never after return.

II. Let it be thy earnest and incessant care as a Roman, and a man, to perform whatsoever it is that thou art about, with true and unfeigned gravity, natural affection, freedom and justice: and as for all other cares and imaginations, how thou mayest ease thy mind of them. Which thou shalt doe, if thou shalt go about every action as thy last action, free from all vanity, all passionate and wilfull aberration from right reason, and from all hypocrisie, and self-love, and dislike of those things, which by the
* fates

* fates [or, *appointment of God,*] * have hap- See Pref. fol. 26.
pened unto thee. Thou seest that the things are
but few, which for a man to hold on in a prosper-
ous course, and to live a divine life, are requi-
site and necessary; for the gods will require no
more of any man, that shall but keep and ob-
serve these things.

III. Doe, Soul, Doe; abuse and contemn See Pref. fol. 18. and Num. XIV. of this Bo.
thy self; yet a while, and the time for thee to
respect thy self will be at an end. Every mans
happinefs * depends from himself, but behold
thy life is almost at an end, whiles affording thy
self no respect, thou dost make thy happinefs
to consist in the souls and conceits of other
men. 1.

IV. Why should any of these things that hap-
pen externally, so much distract thee? Give thy
self leisure to learn some good thing; and cease
roving and wandring to and fro. Thou must also
take heed of [or, avoid:] another kind of
wandring, for they are idle in their actions,
who toil and labour in this life, and have no cer-
tain scope to which to direct all their motions,
and desires.

V. For not observing the state of another
mans soul, scarce was ever any man known to
be unhappy. But whosoever they be that * in- 2.
tend not, and guide not by reason and discretion
the motions of their own souls, they must of ne-
cessity be unhappy.

VI. These things thou must always have in
minde: What is the nature of the Universe, and
what is mine in particular: This unto that what
relation it hath: what kind of part, of what kind
of

of Universe it is : And that there is no body that can hinder thee, but that thou mayest always both do and speak those things which are agreeable to that Nature whereof thou art a part.

3. VII. *Theophrastus*, where he compares sin with sin (as after a ³ vulgar sense such things I grant may be compared :) says well and like a Philosopher, that those sins are greater which are committed through lust, than those which are committed through anger. For he that is angry seems with a kind of grief and close contraction of himself, to turn away from reason : but he that sins through lust, being overcome by pleasure, doth in his very sin bewray a more impotent and unmanlike disposition. Well then, and like a Philosopher doth he say, that he of the two is the more to be condemned, that sins with pleasure, than he that sins with grief. For indeed this latter may seem first to have been wronged, and so in some manner through grief thereof to have been forced to be angry ; whereas he who through lust doth commit any thing, did of himself meerly resolve upon that action.

VIII. Whatsoever thou dost affect, whatsoever thou dost project, so doe, and so project all, as one who, for ought thou knowest, may at this very present depart out of this life. And as for death, if there be any gods, it is no grievous thing to leave the society of men. The gods will do thee no hurt thou maist be sure. But if it be so that there be no gods, or that they take no care of the world, why should I desire to live in a world void of
gods,

gods, and of all divine providence? But gods there be certainly, and they take care for the world; and as for those things which be truly evil, as vice and wickedness; such things they have put in a mans own power, that he might avoid them if he would: and had there been any thing besides, that had been truly bad and evil, they would certainly have had a care of that also, that a man might have avoided it. But why should that be thought to hurt and prejudice a mans life in this world, which cannot any ways make man himself the worse in his own person? Neither must we think that the Nature of the Universe did either through ignorance pass these things, or if not as ignorant of them, yet * as unable either to prevent, or better to order and dispose them. It cannot be that she through want either of power or skill, should have committed such a thing, as to suffer all things both good and bad, equally and promiscuously to happen unto all, both good and bad. As * for life therefore, and death, honour and dishonour, labour and pleasure, riches and poverty, all these things happen unto men indeed, both good and bad, equally; but as things which of themselves are neither good nor bad; because of themselves, neither shamefull nor praise-worthy.

IX. Consider how quickly all things are dissolved and resolved: the bodies and substances themselves, into the matter and substance of the world; and their memories into the generall Age and Time of the world. Consider the nature of all worldly sensible things;

things; of those especially, which either in-
snare by pleasure, or for their irksomness are
dreadfull, or for their outward lustre and
shew are in great esteem and request, how
vile and contemptible, how base and cor-
ruptible, how destitute of all true life and being
they are.

6. X. It is the part of a man endowed with a
good understanding faculty, to consider what
they themselves are in very deed, ⁶ from whose
bare conceits and voices, honour and credit do
proceed: as also what it is to die, and how if
a man shall consider this by it self alone, *to die*,
and separate from it in his mind all those things
which with it usually represent themselves unto
us, he can conceive of it no otherwise, than as
of a work of nature, and he that fears any work
of nature, is a very child. Now death, it is
not only a work of Nature, but also conducing
to Nature.

7. XI. Consider with thy self how man, and by
what part of his, is joyned unto God, and how
that part of man is affected, ⁷ when it is said to
be *diffused*. There is nothing more wretched
than that soul, which in a kind of circuit compas-
seth all things, searching (as he saith) *even the
very depths of the Earth*; and by all signs and
conjectures prying into the very thoughts of
other mens souls; and yet of this is not sensible,
that it is sufficient for a man to apply him-
self wholly, and to confine all his thoughts
8. and cares to ⁸ the tendance of that Spirit,
which is within him, and truly and really
to serve him. His service doth consist in
this,

this, that a man keep himself pure from all violent passion, and evil affection, from all rashness and vanity, and from all manner of discontent, either in regard of the gods or men. For indeed whatsoever proceeds from the gods, deserves respect for their worth and excellency; and whatsoever proceeds from men, as they are our kinsmen, should by us be entertained, with love, alwayes; sometimes, as proceeding from their ignorance of that which is truly good and bad, (a blindness no less, than that by which we are not able to discern between white and black:) with ⁹ a kind of pity and compassion also.

XII. If thou shouldst live 3000, or as many 10000^s of years, yet remember this, ¹⁰ that man can part with no life properly, save with that little part of life which he now lives: and that which he lives, is no other than that which at every instant he parts with. That then which is longest of duration, and that which is shortest, come both to one effect. For although in regard of that which is already past there may be some inequality, yet that time which is now present and in being is equal unto all men. And that being it which we part with [*whensoever we die,*] it doth manifestly appear, that it can be but a moment of time that we then part with. For as for that which is either past or to come, a man cannot be said properly to part with it. For how should a man part with that which he hath not? These two things therefore thou must remember. First, that all things in the world from all eternity, by a perpetual re-

volution of the same times and things ever continued and renewed, are of one kind and nature ; so that whether for a 100. or 200. years only, or for an infinite space of time, a man see those things which are still the same, it can be no matter of great moment. And secondly, that that life which any the longest liver, or the shortest liver parts with, is for length and duration the very same ; for that only which is present, is that which either of them can lose, as being that only which they have : for that which he hath not, no man can truly be said to lose. *W. P.*

- II. XIII. Remember that all is but opinion and conceit ; " for those things are plain and apparent which were spoken unto Monimus the Cynick, and as plain and apparent is the use that may be made of those things, if that which is true and serious in them, be received as well as that which is sweet and pleasing.

XIV. A man's soul doth wrong and disrespect it self, first and especially, when as much as in it self lies it becomes an *Aposteme*, and as it were an excrescency of the world ; for to be grieved and displeased with any thing that happens in the world, is direct *Apostasie* from the Nature of the Universe ; part of which, all particular Natures of the world are. Secondly, when she either is averse from any man, or led by contrary desires and affections, tending to his hurt and prejudice ; such as are the souls of them that are angry. Thirdly, when she is overcome by any pleasure or pain. Fourthly, when she doth dissemble, and covertly and falsely, either doeth or saith any thing. Fifthly, when she
doth

doth either affect or endeavour any thing to no certain end, but rashly and without due ratiocination, and consideration, how consequent or inconsequent it is to the common end. For even the least things ought not to be done, without relation unto the end; and the end of the reasonable creatures is, to follow and obey him, who is the reason as it were, and the law of this *great City, and most ancient Commonwealth.

* See B.
X. n 34.

XV. The time of a man's life is as a point; the substance of it ever flowing, the sense obscure: and the whole composition of the body, tending to corruption. His soul is restless, fortune uncertain, and fame doubtfull; ~~as a stream, so are all things belonging to the body;~~ as a dream, or as a smock, so are ~~all things belonging~~ unto the soul. Our life is a warfare, and a weary pilgrimage. Fame after life is no better than oblivion. What is it then that will adhere and follow? One only thing, Philosophy. And Philosophy doth consist in this, for a man to preserve that Spirit which is within him, from all manner of contumelies and injuries, and above all pains or pleasures; never to doe any thing either rashly, or feignedly, or hypocritically: Wholly to depend on, [or, of] himself, and his own proper actions: all things that happen unto him, to embrace contentedly, as coming from Him from whom he Himself also came; and above all things, with all meekness and a calm cheerfulness, to expect death; as being nothing else, but the resolution of those Elements, of which every creature is composed.

And if the Elements themselves suffer nothing by this their perpetual conversion of one into another; why should that dissolution and alteration, which is so common unto all, be feared by any? Is not this according to Nature? But nothing that is according to Nature can be evil.

Whilest I was at Carnuntus.

THE THIRD BOOK.



Man must not only consider how daily his life waxeth and decreaseth, and that but a very little [or, the lesser] portion of it is now behinde; but this also, that if he live long, he cannot be certain, whether his understanding shall continue so able and sufficient, for either discreet consideration, in matter of businesses; or for contemplation, which is the thing whereon true knowledge of things both divine and humane doth depend. For if once he shall begin to dote, his respiration, nutrition, his imaginative, and appetitive; and other natural faculties, [may still continue the same:] he shall find no want of them. But how to make that right use of himself that he should, how to observe exactly in all things that which is right and just; how to redress and rectifie all [wrong, or sudden:] apprehensions and imaginations, and even

of

of this particular, to consider duly, whether he should live any longer or no; for all such things, wherein the best strength and vigour of the mind is most requisite, [*his power and ability*] will be already passed and gone. Thou must hasten therefore; not only because thou art every day nearer unto death than other, but also because that intellectual faculty in thee, whereby thou art inabled to know the true nature of things, and to order all thy actions by that knowledge, doth daily waste and decay: [*or, may fail thee before thou die.*]

II. This also thou must observe, that whatsoever it is that naturally doth happen to things natural, hath somewhat in it self that is pleasing and delightfull; [*or, attractive:*] as a [*great*] loaf when it is baked, some parts of it cleave as it were, and part asunder, [*and make the crust of it rugged and unequal,*] and yet those parts of it, though in some sort it be against the art and intention of baking it self, that they are thus cleft and parted, [*which should have been, and were first made all even and uniform,*] they become it well nevertheless, and have a certain peculiar property to stirre the appetite. So Figs are accounted fairest and ripest then, when they begin to shrink, and wither as it were. So ripe Olives, when they are next to putrefaction, then are they in their proper beauty. The hanging down of Grapes, the brow of a Lion, the froth of a foming wilde Bore, and many other like things, though by themselves considered, they are farr from any beauty, yet because they happen naturally, they both are comely and

delightfull; so that if a man shall with a profound mind and apprehension, consider all things in the world, even among all those things which are but mere accessories, and natural *appendices* as it were, there will scarce appear any thing unto him, wherein he will not find matter of pleasure and delight. So will he behold with as much pleasure the true *ricinus* of wild beasts, as those which by skilfull Painters, and other Artificers are imitated. So will he be able to perceive the proper ripeness and beauty of old age, whether in man, or woman: and whatsoever else it is that is beautifull and alluring * in whatsoever is, with chaste and continent eyes, he will soon find out and discern. Those and many other things will he discern, not credible unto every one, but unto them only who are truly and familiarly acquainted, both with nature it self, and all natural things [or, and all the works of nature.]

* See the
Latine
Notes.

III. Hippocrates having cured many sicknesses, fell sick himself and died. The Chaldeans [and Astrologians] having foretold the deaths of divers, were afterwards themselves surprised by the Fates. Alexander and Pompeius, and Caius Caesar, having utterly destroyed so many towns, and cut off in the field so many thousands both of horse and foot, yet they themselves at last, were faine to part with their own lives. Heraclitus having written so many natural tracts concerning the [last and general] conflagration of the world, died afterwards all filled with water within, and all bedawbed with dirt and dung without. Lice killed Democritus; and Socrates, another sort of vermine; [wicked ungodly men:]

men.] How then stands the case? Thou hast taken ship, thou hast sailed, thou art come to land, go out, if to another life, there also shalt thou finde gods, who are every where. If all life and sense shall cease, then shalt thou cease also to be subject to either pains, or pleasures; and to serve and tend this vile Cottage; so much the viler, by how much that which ministers unto it doth excell; the one being a rational substance, and a spirit, the other nothing but earth and blood.

IV. Spend not the remnant of thy dayes in thoughts and fancies concerning other men, when it is not in relation to some common good, when by it thou art hindred from some other [better] work. That is, [*spend not thy time*] in thinking, what such a man doth, and to what end: what he saith, and what he thinks, and what he is about, and such other things [or, *curiosities*] which make a man to rove and wander from the care and observation of that part of himself, which is rational, and over-ruling. See therefore in the whole *series* and connexion of thy thoughts, that thou be carefull to prevent [or, avoid] whatsoever is idle and impertinent: but especially, whatsoever is curious and malicious; and thou must use thy self to think only of such things, of which if a man upon a sudden should ask thee, what it is that thou art now thinking, thou mayest answer freely and boldly, *This*, and *That*; that so by thy thoughts it may presently appear that all in thee is sincere, and peaceable; as becometh one that is made for society, and regards not

pleasures, nor gives way to any voluptuous imaginations at all [or, *to any longing thoughts or desires at all*:] free from all contentiousness, envy and suspicion, and from whatsoever else thou wouldst blush to confess thy thoughts were set upon. He that is such, is he surely that doth not put off to lay hold on that which is best indeed, a very Priest and Minister of the gods, well acquainted and in good correspondence with Him especially that is seated and placed within himself, [as in a Temple and Sacrary:] To whom also he keeps and preserves himself neither spotted by pleasure, nor daunted by pain; free from any manner of wrong, or contumely, [by ^a himself offered unto himself:] not capable of any evil [from others:] a wrestler of the best sort, and for the highest prize, that he may not be cast down by any passion or affection of his own; deeply died and drenched in righteousness, embracing and accepting with his whole heart whatsoever either happeneth or is allotted unto him. One who not often, nor without some great necessity tending to some publick good, mindeth what any other either speaks, or doeth, or purposeth: for those things ^{onely} that are in his own power [or, *that are truly his own*;] are the objects of his employments, and his thoughts are ever taken up with those things, which of the whole Universe are by the Fates [or, *Providence*] destinated and appropriated unto Himself. Those things that are his own and in his own power, he himself takes order for that they be good:

^a See B II.
num. XIV.

^b See P. IV.
num. VII.

good : and as for those that happen unto him, he believes them to be so. For that lot and portion which is assigned to every one * as it is unavoidable and necessary, so is it always profitable : [or, is partly from without, unavoidable : and partly from within, depending of the will.] He remembers besides that whatsoever partakes of reason, is of kin unto him, and that to care for all men *generally*, is agreeing to the nature of a man : But as for honour and praise, that they ought not *generally* to be admitted and accepted of from all, but from such onely who live according to nature. As for them that do not, what manner of men they be at home, or abroad, day, or night, how conditioned themselves, with what manner of conditions [or, *with men of what conditions*] they moil and pass away the time together, he knoweth, and remembers right well : he therefore regards not such praise and approbation, as proceeding from them, who cannot like and approve themselves.

* See the
Latine
Notes.

V. Do nothing against thy will, nor contrary to the community, nor without due examination, nor with reluctancy. Affect not to set out thy thoughts with curious neat language. Be neither a great talker, nor a great undertaker. Moreover, let thy god that is in thee to rule over thee, find by thee, that he hath to doe with a man ; an aged man ; a sociable man ; a Roman ; a Prince ; one that hath ordered his life, as one that expecteth, as it were, nothing but the sound of the trumpeter, sounding a retreat to depart out of this life with all readiness
and

and expedition; as one who needs neither the oath [*which ordinary souldiers take,*] nor any witnesses, [*to be the more strongly bound to this obedience and service; but of himself is ready to run at the first call of the trumpeter.*]

VI. A magnificent thing it is, [or, most comfortable,] as much as any thing; [*so to compose thy self,*] as to stand in no need [*to enjoy thy happiness:*] either of other mens help or attendance, or of that rest and tranquillity, which thou must be beholding to others for. Rather like one that is straight of himself [or, *has* *ever been straight*] than one that hath been rectified.

See B. I n.
XII.

VII. If thou shalt finde any thing in this mortal life better than righteousness, than truth, temperance, fortitude: and in general, better than a minde contented both with those things which according to right and reason are done by thee through her help; and in those, which without her will and knowledge happen unto thee by the Providence; If, I say, thou canst finde out any thing better than this; apply thy self unto it with thy whole heart, and that which is best wheresoever thou dost finde it, injoy [*freely.*] But if thou shalt finde nothing worthy to be preferred before that Spirit which is within thee; if nothing better than to subject unto thee thine own lusts and desires, and not to give way to any fancies or imaginations before thou hast duely considered of them; nothing better than to withdraw thy self (to use Socrates his words) from all sensuality, and submit thy self unto the gods, and to have care
of

of all men in general : If thou shalt finde that all other things in comparison of this, are but vile, and of little moment ; then give not way to any other thing, which being once, [*though but*] affected and inclined unto, it will no more be in thy power, without all distraction [*as thou oughtest*] to preferre and to pursue after that good, which is thine own and thy proper good. For it is not lawfull, that any thing that is of another [*and inferiour*] kinde and nature, be it what it will, as either popular applause, or honour, or riches, or pleasures ; should be suffered to confront and contest as it were, with that which is rational, and operatively good. For all these things, if once, though but for a while, they begin to please, they presently prevail, and pervert a mans minde, [*or, turn a man from the right way.*] Do thou therefore, I say, absolutely and freely make choice of that which is best, and stick unto it. Now, that [*they say*] is best, which is most profitable. If they mean profitable to man as he is a rational man, stand thou to it, and maintain it ; but if they mean profitable, as he is a creature [*only,*] reject it ; and from this thy Tenet and Conclusion keep off carefully all plausible shews, and colours of external appearance, that thou maist be able to discern things rightly.

Greek
ἀνθρώπου
εὐλασάν.
See B. VI.
num. XI.

VIII. Never esteem of any thing as profitable, which shall ever constrain thee either to break thy faith, or to lose thy modesty ; to hate any man, to suspect, to curse, to dissemble, to lust after any thing, that requireth the secret of walls, or veils. But he that preferreth before
all

all things his Rational part and Spirit, and the sacred mysteries of vertue which issue from it; he shall never lament and exclaim; never sigh, he shall never want either solitude or company: and which is chiefest of all, he shall live without either desire or fear. And as for life, whether for a long or short time he shall enjoy his soul thus compassed about with a body, he is altogether indifferent. For if even now he were to depart, he is as ready for it, as for any other action, which may be performed with modesty and decency. For all his life long, this is his only care, that his minde may always be occupied in such intentions and objects as are proper to a rational sociable creature.

IX. In the minde that is [*once truly*] disciplined and purged, thou canst not finde any thing, either foul or impure, or as (it were) festered: nothing that is either servile, or affected: no [*partial*] tie; no [*malicious*] averfeness; nothing obnoxious; nothing concealed. The life of such an one, Death can never surprize as imperfect; as of an Actour that should die before he had ended, or the play it self were at an end, a man might speak.

X. Use thine opinative faculty with all honour and respect, for in her [*indeed*] is all: that thy opinion do not beget in thy understanding any thing contrary to either Nature, or the proper constitution of a Rational creature. The end and object of a Rational constitution, is, to do nothing rashly, to be kindly affected towards men, and in all things willingly to submit unto the gods. Casting therefore all other things

things aside, keep thy self to these few, and remember withall that no man properly can be said to live more than that which is now present, which is but a moment of time. Whatsoever is besides, either is already past, or uncertain. The time therefore that any man doth live is but a little, and the place where he liveth is but a very little corner of the earth, and the greatest fame that can remain of a man after his Death, even that is but little, and that too, such as it is whilest it is, is by the succession of silly mortal men preserved, who likewise shall shortly die, and [*even whiles they live*] know not what in very deed they themselves are: and much less can know one, who long before is dead and gone.

XI. To these fore-spoken ever-present helps, and *mementoes*, let one more be added, Ever to make a particular description and delineation as it were of every object that presents it self to thy mind, that thou mayst wholly and thoroughly contemplate it, in its own proper nature, bare and naked; wholly, and severally; divided into its several parts and quarters: and then by thy self in thy minde, to call both it, and those things of which it doth consist, and into which it shall be resolved, by their own proper true Names and appellations. For there is nothing so effectual to beget true Magnanimity, as to be able truly and methodically to examine and consider all things that happen in this life, and so to penetrate into their natures, that at the same time, this also may concur in our apprehensions: What is the true use of it: and what is the true nature of this Universe, to which it is usefull?

See B. VI.
num. XI.

usefull? How much in regard of the Universe may it be esteemed? how much in regard of man, a Citizen of the supreme City, of which all other Cities in the World are as it were but houses and families?

See B. I.
n. XVII.

XII. What is this that now my fancy is set upon? of what things doth it consist? how long can it last? which of all the vertues, is the proper vertue for this present use? as whether meekness, fortitude, truth, faith, sincerity, contentation, or any of the rest? Of every thing therefore thou must use thy self to say, This [*immediately*] comes from God, This by that fatall connexion and concatenation of things, or (which almost comes to one:) by some coincidental casualty. And as for this, it proceeds from my neighbour, my kinsman, my fellow: through his ignorance indeed, because he knows not what is truly natural unto him: But I know it, and therefore carry my self towards him according to the natural law of fellowship; that is, kindly, and justly. As for those things that of themselves are altogether indifferent, as in my best judgement I conceive every thing to deserve more or less, so I carry my self towards it.

See B. VI.
2. 30. VIII.
30. IX. 5.
34. X. 13.
33.

XIII. If thou shalt intend that which is present, following the rule of right and reason carefully, *solidly*, meekly, and shalt not intermix any other businesses, but shalt study this [*only*] to preserve thy Spirit impolluted, and pure, and as one that were even now ready to give up the ghost, shalt cleave unto Him without either hope or fear of any thing, in all things that thou shalt

shalt either do or speak, contenting thy self with Heroical truth, thou shalt live happily; and from this there is no man that can hinder thee.

XIV. As Physicians [*and Chirurgeons*] have always their instruments ready at hand for all sudden cures; so have thou always thy *Dogmata* in a readiness for the knowledge of things, both *divine* and *humane*: and whatsoever thou doest, even in the smallest things that thou doest, thou must ever remember that mutual relation and connexion that is between these two [*things divine, and things humane.*] For without relation unto God, thou shalt never perform aright any thing humane; nor on the other side any thing divine [*without some respect had to things humane.*]

XV. Be not deceived; For thou shalt never live to read thy moral Commentaries, nor the Acts of the ancient [*famous*] Romans and Grecians; nor those *Excerpta* from several Books; all which thou hadst provided and laid up for thy self, against thine old age. Hasten therefore to an end, and giving over all vain hopes, help thy self [*in time*] if thou carest for thy self, as thou oughtest to doe.

XVI. To ^asteale, to ^bson, to buy, to be ^cat rest, to ^dsee what is to be done (which is not seen by the eyes, but by another kind of sight:) what these words mean, and how many ways to be understood, they do not understand. *The Body, the Soul, the Understanding.* [*As*] the senses [*naturally,*] belong to the *body*, and the desires and affections to the *soul*, so do the *dogmata* to the *understanding*.

* See B. X.
n. XV.
B. XI. n.
XVI.
b See B. IV.
n. XXIX.
c See B. IV.
n. III.
d See B. IV.
n. XXIV.
B. VIII. n.
XXXVI.

XVII. To

See Pref.
pag. 11.
and notes
upon Book
VIII. 1.

XVII. To be capable of fancies and imaginations, is common to man and beast. To be violently drawn and moved by the lusts and desires [*of the soul,*] is proper to wilde beasts and monsters; such as Phalaris and Nero were. To follow reason for ordinary duties and actions, is common to them also, who believe not that there be any gods, and [*for their advantage would make no conscience*] to betray their own Country; and who, when once the doors be shut upon them, dare do any thing. If therefore all things else be common to these likewise, it follows, that for a man to like and embrace all things that happen and are destinated unto him, and not to trouble and molest that Spirit which is seated in the temple of his own breast, with a multitude of [*vain*] fancies and imaginations, but to keep him propitious, and to obey him as a god, never either speaking any thing contrary to truth, or doing any thing contrary to Justice; is the only true property of a good man. And such an one, though no man should believe that he liveth as he doth, either sincerely and conscionably, or chearfully and contentedly; yet is he neither with any man at all angry for it, nor diverted by it from the way that leadeth to the end of his life, at which it be-
hooves a man to arrive with all quietness, purity, and alacrity; in all things without any manner of compulsion, fitted and accommodated to his proper lot and portion.

THE FOURTH BOOK.



That inward mistress part [*of man,*] if it be in its own true natural temper, is towards all worldly chances and events ever so disposed and affected, that it will easily turn and apply it self to that which may be, and is within its own power to compass, [*when that cannot be which at first it intended.*] For it never doth absolutely addict and apply it self to any one object, but whatsoever it is that it doth now intend and prosecute, it doth prosecute it with ** exception and ** *Gr. μὴ reservation*; so that whatsoever it is that falls *ὡς ἐκ τῆς* out contrary [*to its first intentions,*] even that afterwards it makes its proper object. Even as the fire when it prevails upon those things that are in his way; by which things indeed a little fire would have been quenched, but a great fire doth soon turn to its own nature, and so consume whatsoever comes in his way: yea, by those very things it is made greater and greater.

II. Let nothing be done rashly and at random, but all things according to the most exact and perfect Rules of Art.

III. They seek for themselves private retiring-places, as Countrey villages, the sea-shoar, mountains; yea, thou thy self art wont to long much after such places. But all this [*thou must know*] proceeds from simplicity in the highest degree.

* Gr. ἐν-
μυρίαν.

degree. At what time soever thou wilt, it is in thy power to retire into thy self, and to be at rest. For a man cannot retire any whither for to be more at rest, and freer from all busi-
ness, than to his own soul. He especially who is before-hand provided of such things within, which whensoever he doth withdraw himself to look in, may presently afford unto him perfect ease and tranquillity. By * tranquillity I understand a decent orderly disposition and carriage, free from all confusion and tumultuousness. Afford then thy self this retiring continually, and thereby refresh and renew thy self. Let those [precepts] be brief and fundamental, which as soon as thou dost call them to minde, may suffice thee to purge thy soul thoroughly, and to send thee away well pleased with those things, whatsoever they be, which now again [after this short withdrawing of thy soul into her self:] thou dost return unto. For what is it that thou art offended at? Can it be at the wickedness of men, when thou dost call to mind this conclusion, that all reasonable creatures are made one for another? and that it is part of justice to bear with them? and that it is against their wills that they offend? and how many already, who [once likewise] prosecuted their enmities, suspected, hated, and fiercely contended, are now [long ago] stretcht out, and reduced unto Ashes? It is time for thee to make an end. As for those things which among the common chances of the world happen unto thee as thy particular lot and portion, canst thou be displeased with any of them, when thou dost

dost call that [our ordinary] *Dilemma* to mind, *Either a Providence, or [Democritus his] Atomes*; and with it, whatsoever we brought to prove, that the whole world is as it were one City? And as for thy body, what canst thou fear, if thou dost consider that thy Mind and Understanding, when once it hath recollected it self, and knows its own power, hath in this life and Breath, (whether * it run smoothly and gently, or whether harshly and rudely,) no interest at all, but is altogether indifferent: and whatsoever else thou hast heard and assented unto concerning either pain or pleasure? But the care of thine honour and reputation will perchance distract thee. How can that be, if thou dost look back, and consider both how quickly all things that are, are forgotten, and what an immense *chaos* of eternity was before, and will follow after all things; and the vanity of praise, and the inconstancy and variableness of humane Judgements and opinions, and the narrowness of the place wherein it is limited and circumscribed? For the whole earth is but as one point; and of it, this inhabited part of it is but a very little part; and of this part, how many in number, and what manner of men are they that will commend thee? What remains then, but that thou often put in practice this kind of retiring of thy self to this little part of thy self; and above all things, keep thy self from distraction, and * intend not any thing vehemently; but be free and consider all things, * as a man, [whose proper object is virtue,] as a

* See R.V.
num.XX.
B. VI.
XXXVII.
B.IX.XI.L

* Gr. *μα*
εὐταπεινῶς.
* Gr. *ὡς*
ἀνὴρ.

* Gr. *ὡς ἄνθρωπος*.
See note
14. and 18.
upon B. I.
and B. V.
num. VI.

* *man*, [whose true nature is to be kind and sociable :] as a Citizen ; as a mortal creature ? Among other things, which to consider and look into thou must use to withdraw thy self, let those two be among the most obvious and at hand. One, that the things or objects themselves reach not unto the soul, but stand without still and quiet, and that it is from the opinion only which is within, that all the tumult and all the trouble doth proceed. The next, that all these things, which now thou seest, shall within a very little while be changed, and be no more : and ever call to mind, how many changes and alterations in the world thou thy self hast already been an eye-witness of in thy time. This world is mere change, and this life, opinion.

IV. If to understand and to be reasonable be common unto all men, then is that reason, for which we are termed reasonable, common unto all. If reason in general, then is that reason also which prescribeth what is to be done and what not, common unto all. If that, then Law. If Law, then are we fellow-Citizens. If so, then are we partners in some one Common-weal. If so, then the world is as it were a City. For what other Common-weal is it that all men can be said to be members of ? From this Common City it is, that Understanding, Reason, and Law is derived unto us, for from whence else ? For as that which in me is earthly, I have from some [common] earth ; and that which is moist, from some other Element is imparted ; as my breath and life hath its proper fountain ; and that likewise which is dry and fiery in me : (for there

there is nothing which doth not proceed from something; as also there is nothing that can be reduced unto mere nothing:) so also is there some [*common beginning*] from whence my understanding hath proceeded.

V. As generation is, so also death, a secret of Nature's wisdom; a mixture of Elements, resolved into the same Elements again, a thing surely which no man ought to be ashamed of: in the *series* of other fatal events and consequences, which a rational creature is subject unto, not improper or incongruous; nor contrary to the natural and proper constitution of man himself.

VI. Such and such things from such and such causes, must of necessity proceed. He that would not have such things to happen, is as he that would have the figg-tree [*grow*] without any sap or moisture. In summe, remember this, that within a very little while, both thou and he shall both be dead, and after a little while more, not so much as your names and memories shall be remaining.

See B. VI.
num. I II.
B. VII.
num. XIII.

VII. Let opinion be taken away, and no man will think himself wronged. If no man shall think himself wronged, then is there no more any such thing as *wrong*. That which makes not man himself the worse, cannot make his life the worse, neither can it hurt him either inwardly or outwardly. It was expedient in nature that it should be so, and therefore necessary.

VIII. Whatsoever doth happen in the world, doth happen justly, and so, if thou dost well take heed, thou shalt find it. I say not only in right order by a *series* of inevitable consequences,

but according to Justice, and as it were by way of equal distribution, according to the true worth of every thing. Continue then to take notice of it, as thou hast begun, and whatsoever thou doest, do it not without this *proviso*, that it be a thing of that nature that a good man (as the word *good* is properly taken) may do it. This observe carefully in every action.

IX. Conceit no such things as he that wrongeth thee conceiveth, or would have thee to conceive, but look into the matter it self, and see what it is in very truth.

X. These two rules thou must have always in a readiness. First, do nothing at all, but what Reason, proceeding from that Regal and supreme part, shall for the good and benefit of men suggest unto thee. And secondly, if any man that is present shall be able to rectifie thee, or to turn thee from some [*errone* *in*] persuasion, that thou be always ready to change thy minde, and this change to proceed, not from any respect of any pleasure or credit thereon depending, but always from some probable apparent ground of Justice, or of some publick good thereby to be furthered; or from some other such inducement.

XI. Hast thou Reason? I have. Why then makest thou not use of it? For if thy Reason do her part, what more canst thou require?

XII. As a part hitherto thou hast had a particular subsistence; and now shalt thou vanish away into the common substance of him who first begot thee, or rather thou shalt be resumed again into that original rational substance, out
of

of which all others have issued and are propagated. Many small pieces of Frankincense are set upon the same Altar, one drops first [*and is consumed*] another after; and it comes all to one.

XIII. Within ten dayes [*if so it happen*] thou shalt be esteemed a god of them, who now if thou shalt return to the *Dogmata* and to the honouring of Reason, will esteem of thee no better than of a meer brute, and of an ape.

XIV. Not as though thou hadst thousands of years to live. Death hangs over thee; whilst yet thou livest, whilst thou mayest be good.

XV. How much time and leisure doth he gain, who is not curious to know what his neighbour hath said, or hath done, or hath attempted, but only what he doeth himself, that it may be just and holy? or to express it in Agatho's words, *Not to look about upon the evil conditions of others, but to run on straight in the line, without any loose and extravagant agitation?*

XVI. He who is greedy of credit and reputation after his death, doth not consider, that they themselves by whom he is remembred, shall soon after every one of them be dead; and they likewise that succeed those; untill at last all memory, which hitherto by the succession of men admiring, and soon after dying, hath had its course, be quite extinct. But suppose that both they that shall remember thee, and thy memory with them should be immortal, what is that to thee? I will not say to thee after thou art dead, but even to thee living. What is thy praise? but onely for a secret and politick consideration, which we call *οικονομία*, or Dispensation:

sation: [*Publick praises and commendations being ordinarily a strong motive to draw men to the love of vertue.*] For as for that, that it is the gift of nature [*whatsoever is commended in thee, what might be objected from thence,*] let that now that we are upon another consideration, be omitted as unreasonable. That which is fair and goodly, whatsoever it be, and in what respect soever it be, that it is fair and goodly, it is so of it self, and terminates in it self, not admitting praise as a part or member: that therefore which is praised, is not thereby made either better or worse. This I understand even of those things that are commonly called fair and good, as those which are commended either for the matter it self, or for curious workmanship. As for that which is truly good, what can it stand in need of [*to commend it*] more than either Justice or Truth; or more than either kindness or modesty? For which of all those either becomes good or fair, because commended; or dispraised suffers any damage? Doth the Emerald become worse in it self, or more vile, if it be not commended? Doth gold, or ivory, or purple? Is there any thing that doth, though never so common, as a knife, a flower, or a tree?

XVII. If so be that the souls remain after death [*say they that will not believe it,*] how is the aire from all eternity able to contain them? How is the earth [*say I,*] ever from that time able to contain the bodies of them that are buried? For as here the change and resolution of dead bodies into another kinde of subsistence, (whatsoever it be,) makes place for

for other dead bodies: so the souls after death transferred into the aire, after they have converted there a while, are either by way of transmutation, or transfusion, or conflagration, received again into that original rational substance, from which all others do proceed; and so give way to those souls, who before coupled and associated unto bodies, [*now begin to subsist single.*] This, upon a supposition that the souls after death do for a while subsist single, may be answered. And here, (besides the number of bodies so buried and contained by the earth,) we may further consider the number of several beasts, eaten by us men and by other creatures. For notwithstanding that such a multitude of them is daily consumed, and as it were buried in the bodies of the eaters, yet is the same place and body able to contain them, by reason of their conversion partly into blood, partly into aire and fire. What in these things is the speculation of truth? to divide things into that which is passive and material, and that which is active and formall.

XVIII. Not to wander out of the way, but upon every motion and desire to perform that which is just: and ever to be carefull to attain to the true natural apprehension of every fancy that presents it self.

XIX. Whatsoever is expedient unto thee, O World, is expedient unto me. Nothing can be unseasonable unto me as either coming before, or after its due time, which unto thee is seasonable. Whatsoever thy seasons bear, shall ever by me be esteemed as happy fruit, and
increase,

increase. O Nature ! from thee are all things, in thee all things subsist, and to thee all tend. Could he say of Athens, *Thou lovely City of Cecrops ?* and shalt not thou say of the World, *Thou lovely City of God ?*

XX. They will say commonly, *Meddle not with many things, if thou wilt live chearfully.* Certainly there is nothing better, than for a man to confine himself to necessary actions ; to such and so many only, as reason in a creature that knows it self born for society, will command and enjoyn. This will not only procure that chearfulness, which from the goodness ; but that also which from the paucity of actions doth usually proceed. For since it is so, that most of those things which we either speak or doe are unnecessary ; if a man shall cut them off, it must needs follow that he shall thereby gain much leisure, and save much trouble ; and therefore at every action a man must privately by way of admonition suggest unto himself, What ? may not this that I now go about be of the number of unnecessary actions ? Neither must he use himself to cut off actions only, but thoughts and imaginations also, that are unnecessary ; for so will unnecessary consequent actions the better be prevented and cut off.

XXI. Trie also how a good mans life (of one who is well pleased with those things whatsoever, which among the common changes and chances of this world fall to his own lot and share ; and can live well contented and fully satisfied in the justice of his own proper present action, and in the goodness of his disposition for
the

the future :) will agree with thee. Thou hast had experience of that other kind of life : make now triall of this also. Trouble not thy self any more henceforth, reduce thy self unto perfect simplicity. Doth any man offend ? It is against himself that he doth offend : [*Why should it trouble thee ?*] Hath any thing happened unto thee ? It is well, whatsoever it be, it is that which of all the common chances of the world from the very beginning in the *series* of all other things that have happened, or shall happen, was destinated and appointed unto thee. To comprehend all in few words ; Our life is short ; we must endeavour to gain the present time with best discretion and justice. Use recreation with sobriety.

XXII. Either this world is a *Kósmos*, or a *comely piece*, because all disposed and governed by certain order : or if it be a mixture, though confused, yet still it is a *Kósmos*, a *comely piece*. For is it possible that in thee there should be any beauty at all, and that in the whole world there should be nothing but disorder and confusion ? and all things in it too, [*by natural different properties*] one from another differenced and distinguished ; and yet through-disfused, and by natural Sympathy one to another united, as they are ?

See B. VI.
n. 38.

XXIII. A black [or, *maligne*] disposition, an effeminate disposition, an hard inexorable disposition, a wilde inhumane disposition, a sheepish disposition, a childish disposition ; a blockish, a false, a scurril, a fraudulent, a tyrannical : [*what then ?*] If he be a stranger in the world that

See before
n. XV.

knows

knows not the things that are in it; why not be a stranger as well, that wonders at the things that are done in it?

XXIV. He is a true *fugitive*, that flies from reason, by which men are sociable. He *blind*, who cannot see with the eyes of his understanding. He *poor*, that stands in need of another, and hath not in himself all things needfull for this life. He an *Aposteme* of the world, who by being discontented with those things that happen unto him in the world, doth as it were *Apostatize*, and separate himself from common Nature's rational Administration. For the same nature it is that brings this unto thee, whatsoever it be, that first brought thee into the world. He is a separatist from the City [of the whole world,] who [by irrational actions] withdraws his own soul from that One and common scul of all rational Creatures.

XXV. There is, who without so much as a Coat; and there is, who without so much as a book; doth put Philosophy in practice. I am half naked, neither have I bread to eat, and yet I depart not from Reason, saith one. But I say; I want the food of good teaching and instructions, and yet I depart not from Reason.

XXVI. What Art and Profession soever thou hast learned, endeavour to affect it, and comfort thy self in it; and pass the remainder of thy life as one who from his whole heart commits himself, and whatsoever belongs unto him, unto the gods; and as for men, carry not thy self either tyrannically, or servilely towards any.

XXVII, Con-

XXVII. Consider in thy minde, for examples sake, the times of Vespasian : Thou shalt see but the same things ; some marrying, some bringing up children, some sick, some dying, some fighting, some feasting, some merchandizing, some tilling, some flattering, some boasting, some suspecting, some undermining, some wishing to die, some fretting and murmuring at their present estate, some wooing, some hoarding, some seeking after Magistracies, and some after Kingdoms. And is not that their age quite over, and ended ? Again, consider now the times of Trajan. There likewise thou seest the very self-same things, and that age also is now over and ended. In the like manner consider other periods, both of times, and of whole nations, and see how many men, after they had with all their might and main intended and prosecuted some one worldly thing or other, did soon after drop away, and were resolved into the Elements. But especially thou must call to minde them, whom thou thy self [*in thy life-time*] hast known much distracted [*about vain things,*] and in the mean time neglecting to do that, and closely and unseparably (as fully satisfied with it,) to adhere unto it, which their own proper constitution did require. And here thou must remember, that thy carriage in every business must be according to the worth and due proportion of it ; for so shalt thou not easily be [*tired out*] and vexed, if thou shalt not dwell upon small matters longer than is fitting.

XXVIII. Those words which once were common and ordinary, are now become obscure and obsolete; and so the names of men once commonly known and famous, are now become in a manner obscure and obsolete names. *Cæwillus*, *Cæso*, *Volefius*, *Leonnatus*; and after a while, *Scipio*, *Cato*, then *Augustus*, then *Adrianus*, then *Antoninus Pius*: All these in a short time will be out of date, and [*as things of another world as it were,*] become fabulous. And this I say of them who once shined as the wonders of their ages; for as for the rest, no sooner are they expired, than with them all their fame and memory. And what is it then that shall always be remembered? all is vanity. What is it that we must bestow our care and diligence upon? even upon this only: That our mindes and wills be just; that our actions be charitable; that our speech be never deceitfull: or, [*that our understanding be not subject to error;*] that our inclination be alwayes set to embrace whatsoever shall happen unto us, as necessary, as usual, as ordinary, as flowing from such a beginning, and such a fountain, [*from which both thou thy self, and all things are.*] Willingly therefore and wholly surrender up thy self unto that fatal concinnation, yielding up thy self unto the Fates to be disposed of at their pleasure.

See the
Pref. to-
wards the
end.

XXIX. Whatsoever is now present, and from day to day hath its existence; all objects of memories, and the mindes and memories themselves, incessantly consider; all things that are, have their being by change and alteration. Use
thy

thy self therefore often to meditate upon this, that the Nature of the Universe delights in nothing more, than in altering those things that are, and in making others like unto them. So that we may say, that whatsoever is, is but as it were the seed of that which shall be. For if thou think that that only is seed, which either the earth or the womb receiveth, thou art very simple.

XXX. Thou art now ready to die, and yet hast thou not attained to that perfect simplicity? thou art yet subject to many troubles and perturbations; not yet free from all fear and suspicion of external accidents; nor yet either so meekly disposed towards all men, as thou shouldest; or so affected as one whose only study, and only wisdom is, to be just in all his actions.

XXXI. Behold and observe, what is the state of their rational part; and those that the world doth account wise, see what things they flee and are afraid of; and what things they hunt after.

XXXII. In another mans minde and understanding thy evil cannot subsist, nor in any proper temper or distemper of the natural constitution of thy body, which is but as it were the coat or cottage of thy soul. Wherein then, but in that part of thee, wherein the conceit and apprehension of any misery can subsist? Let not that part therefore admit any such conceit, and then all is well. Though thy body, which is so near it, should either be cut or burnt, or suffer any corruption or putrefaction, yet let that part to which it belongs to judge of these,
be

be still at rest; that is, Let her judge this, that, whatsoever it is, that equally may happen to a wicked man and to a good man, is neither good nor evil. For that which happens equally to him that lives according to Nature, [*and to him that doth not,*] is neither according to nature, nor against it; [*and, by consequent, neither good, nor bad.*]

See B VI.
n. XXIII.

XXXIII. Ever consider and think upon the world, as being but one living substance, and having but one soul, and how all things in the world are terminated into one sensitive power, [*or, terminate into one general sense,*] and are done by one general motion as it were, and deliberation [*of that one soul;*] and how all things that are, concur in the cause of one anothers being; and by what manner of connexion and concatenation all things happen.

XXXIV. What art thou, [*that better and divine part excepted*] but, as Epictetus said well, a wretched soul, appointed to carry a carcase up and down?

XXXV. To suffer change can be no hurt; as no benefit it is, by change to attain to being. The age and time of the world is as it were a flood and swift current, consisting of the things that are brought to pass in the world. For as soon as any thing hath appeared, and is passed away, another succeeds; and that also will presently out of sight.

XXXVI. Whatsoever doth happen in the world, is [*in the course of nature*] as usual and ordinary as a Rose in the Spring, and fruit in Summer. Of the same nature is sickness and death, slander,

flander, and lying in wait, and whatsoever else ordinarily doth unto fools use to be occasion either of joy or sorrow. That which succeeds, whatsoever it be, doth always very naturally, and as it were familiarly, follow upon that which was before. For thou must consider the things of the world, not as a loose independent number, consisting meerly of necessary events; but as a discreet connexion of things orderly and harmoniously disposed. There is then to be seen in the things of the world, not a bare succession, but an admirable correspondence and affinity.

XXXVII. Let that of Heraclitus never be out of thy minde, that the death of earth is water, and the death of water is aire, and the death of aire is fire; and so on the contrary. Remember him also who was ignorant whither the way did lead, and how that Reason being the thing by which all things in the world are administered, and which men are continually and most inwardly conversant with, yet is the thing which ordinarily they are most in opposition with; and how those things which daily happen among them, cease not daily to be strange unto them; and that we should not either speak or doe any thing as men in their sleep, [*by opinion and bare imagination* :] for then we think we speak and doe; and that [*we must not be*] as children, who follow their fathers [*example*,] for best reason alledging their bare *καθ' ὅτι πατριάρχων*; or, *As* [*by successive tradition from our fore-fathers*] *we have received it.*

See num.
XLII.

XXXVIII. Even as if any of the gods should tell thee, thou shalt certainly die to morrow, or next day, thou wouldst not (except thou wert extremely base and pusillanimous) take it for a great benefit, rather to die the next day after, than to morrow : (for alas, what is the difference !) so [*for the same reason*] think it no great matter to die rather many years after, than the very next day.

See notes.

* See B.V.
n. XXVII.
B. VII.
rum, III.

XXXIX. Let it be thy perpetual meditation, how many Physicians who once looked so grim, and so tetrically shrunk their brows upon their Patients, are dead and gone themselves. How many Astrologers, after that in great ostentation they had foretold the death of some others ; how many Philosophers, after so many elaborate tracts and volumes concerning either mortality, or immortality ; how many brave Captains and Commanders, after the death and slaughter of so many ; how many Kings and Tyrants, after they had with such horror and insolency abused their power upon mens lives, as though themselves had been immortal ; how many, that I may so speak, whole Cities [*both men and Towns,*] Helice, Pompeii, Herculanium, and others innumerable, are dead and gone ? Run them over also, whom thou thy self, one after another, hast known in thy time to drop away. Such and such a one took care of such and such a ones burial, and soon after was buried himself. So one, so another : and all things in a short time. * For herein lieth all indeed, ever to look upon all things that belong unto man, as things for their continuance [*that*

[*that last but*] from day to day; [*or, that are but for a day:*] and for their worth, most vile, and contemptible; as [*for example, What is man?*] That which but the other day [*when he was conceived*] was vile * *snivel*; and within few dayes shall be either an embalmed carcase, or mere ashes. Thus must thou according to [*truth and*] nature, thoroughly consider, how [*man's life.*] is but for a very moment of time, and so depart meek and contented: even as if a ripe Olive falling, should praise the ground that bare her, and give thanks to the tree that begat her.

See notes
* Greek
μυῖς ἀέριον.
See B. VI.
num. XI.

XL. Thou must be like a promontory of the sea, against which though the waves beat continually, yet both it self stands, and about it are those swelling waves stilled and quieted.

XLI. Oh, wretched I, to whom this mischance is happened! nay, happy I, to whom this thing being happened, I can continue without grief; neither wounded by that which is present, nor in fear of that which is to come. For as for this, it might have happened unto any man; but every man having such a thing befallen him, could not have continued without grief. Why then should that rather be an unhappiness, than this a happiness? But however, canst thou, O man, term that unhappiness, which is no mischance to the nature of man? canst thou think that a mischance to the nature of man, which is not contrary to the [*end, and*] will of his nature? What then hast thou learned to be the will of man's nature? Doth that then which hath happened unto thee, hinder

thee from being just? or magnanimous? or temperate? or wise? or circumspect? or true? or modest? or free? or from any thing else of all those things in the present enjoying and possession whereof the nature of man is fully satisfied, as then enjoying all that is proper unto her? Now to conclude; upon all occasion of sorrow remember henceforth to make use of this *Dogma*, that to undergo this, whatsoever it is that hath happened unto thee, is in very deed no such thing of it self as unhappiness; but that to bear it generously, is certainly great happiness.

XLII. It is but an ordinary course one, yet it is a good effectual remedy against the fear of death, for a man to consider in his mind the examples of such, who greedily and covetously (as it were) did for a long time enjoy their lives. What have they got more, than they whose deaths have been untimely? Are not they themselves dead at the last? as Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus, Lepidus, or any other who in their life-time having buried many, were at the last buried themselves. The whole space of any man's life is but little; and as little as it is, with what troubles, with what manner of dispositions, and in the society of how wretched a body must it be passed? Let it be therefore unto thee altogether as a matter of indifferency. For if thou shalt look backward, behold what an infinite Chaos of time doth present it self unto thee; and as infinite a Chaos, if thou shalt look forward. In that which is so infinite, what difference can there be between that which liveth but three days, and *that which liveth three ages?

XLIII. Let

* Gr. ὁ.
 ἀνὴρ. τὸ
 ἀνθρώπου
 φύσις. that
 is, properly,
 Nestor's
 age: which
 importeth
 many ages.

XLIII. Let thy course ever be the most compendious way. The most compendious is that which is according to nature: [*that is*] in all both words and deeds, ever to follow that which is most sound and perfect. For such a resolution will free a man from all trouble, strife, dissembling, and ostentation.

THE FIFTH BOOK.



IN the morning when thou findest thy self unwilling to rise, consider with thy self presently, it is to go about a man's work that I am stirred up. Am I then yet unwilling to go about that, for which I my self was born and brought forth into this world? Or was I made for this, to lay me down, and make much of my self in a warm bed? O but this is pleasing. And was it then for this that thou wert born, that thou mightest enjoy pleasure? Was it not in very truth for this, that thou mightest [*always*] be busie and in action? Seest thou not [*how all things in the world besides,*] how every Tree and Plant, how Sparrows and Ants, Spiders and Bees, how all in their kind are intent [*as it were*] orderly to perform whatsoever (towards the preservation of this orderly Universe; or, of *this Universe, which doth consist of Order*) naturally doth become and belong unto them? And wilt not thou do that which belongs unto a man to do? Wilt not thou run to doe that which thy nature doth
G ? require ?

require? But thou must have some rest. Yes, thou must. Nature hath of that also, as well as of eating and drinking, allowed thee a certain stint. But thou goest beyond thy stint, and beyond that which would suffice, and in matter of action, there thou comest short of that which thou mayest. It must needs be therefore, that thou dost not love thy self, for if thou didst, thou wouldst also love thy Nature, and that which thy nature doth propose unto her self as her end. Others, as many as take pleasure in their trade and profession, can even pine themselves at their works, and neglect their bodies and their food for it; and dost thou less honour thy nature, than an ordinary mechanick his trade, or a good dancer his art? than a covetous man his silver, and a vain-glorious man applause? These to whatsoever they take an affection, can be content to want their meat and sleep, to further that every one which they affect: and shall actions tending to the common good of humane society, seem more vile unto thee, or worthy of less respect and intention?

II. How easie a thing is it for a man to put off from him all turbulent adventitious imaginations, and presently to be in perfect rest and tranquillity?

III. Think thy self fit and worthy to speak or to doe any thing that is according to Nature, and let not the reproach, or report of some that may ensue upon it, [*ever*] deterre thee. If it be right and honest to be spoken or done, undervalue not thy self so much as to be discouraged from it. As for them, they have their own rational over-
ruling

ruling part, and their own proper inclination : which thou must not stand and look about to take notice of, but go on straight, whither both thine own particular and the common nature do lead thee ; and the way of both these is but one.

IV. I continue my course by actions according to nature, untill I fall and cease, breathing out my last breath into that air, by which continually breathed in I did live ; and falling upon that earth, out of whose gifts and fruits my father gathered his feed, my mother her blood, and my nurse her milk, out of which for so many years I have been provided, both of meat and drink. And lastly, which beareth me that tread upon it, and beareth with me that so many ways do abuse it, [*or, and so freely make use of it, so many ways to so many ends.*]

V. No man can admire thee for thy sharp acute language, [*such is thy natural disability that way.*] Be it so : yet there be many other [*good*] things, for the want of which thou canst not plead the want of natural ability. Let them be seen in thee, which depend wholly from thee ; sincerity, gravity, laboriousness, contempt of pleasures ; be not querulous, be content with little ; be kind, be free ; avoid all superfluity ; all vain prating ; be magnanimous. Dost not thou perceive, how many things there be, which notwithstanding any pretence of natural indisposition and unfitness, thou mightest have performed and exhibited, and yet still thou dost voluntarily continue drooping downwards ? Or wilt thou say, that it is through defect

of thy natural constitution, that thou art constrained to murmur, to be base and wretched to flatter; now to accuse, and now to please and pacifie thy body: to be vain-glorious, to be giddy-headed and unsetled in thy thoughts? nay (witnesses be the Gods) of all these thou mightest have been rid long agoe: Only this thou must have been contented with, to have born the blame of one that is somewhat slow and dull. Wherein thou must so exercise thy self, as one who neither doth much take to heart this his natural defect, nor yet pleaseth himself in it.

VI. Such there be, who when they have done a good turn to any, are ready to set them on the score for it, [*and to require retaliation.*] Others there be, who though they stand not upon retaliation, to require any, yet they think with themselves nevertheless, that such a one is their debtor, and they know [*as their word is*] what they have done. Others again there be, who when they have done any such thing, do not so much as know what they have done; but are like unto the Vine, which beareth her grapes, and when once she hath born her own proper fruit, [*is contented*] and seeks for no further recompence. As a Horse after a race, and a hunting-dog when he hath hunted, and a Bee when she hath made her hony, look not for applause and commendation; so neither doth that man [*that rightly doth understand his own nature*] when he hath done a good turn: but from one doth pro-

proceed to doe another, even as the Vine after she hath once born fruit in her own proper season; is ready for another time. Thou therefore must be one of them, who what they doe, barely do it without any further thought, and are in a manner unsensible of what they doe. Nay [*but, will some reply perchance*] this very thing a rational man is bound unto, to understand what it is that he doeth. For it is the property, say they, of one that is naturally sociable, to be sensible that he doth operate sociably: nay, and to desire, that the party himself that is sociably dealt with, should be sensible of it too. [*I answer,*] That which thou sayest is true indeed, but the true meaning of that which is said thou dost not understand. And therefore art thou one of those first whom I mentioned. For they also are led by a probable appearance of reason. But if thou dost desire to *understand truly* what it is that is said, fear not that thou shalt therefore give over any sociable action.

VII. The form of the Athenians prayer did run thus; *O rain, rain, good Jupiter, upon all the grounds and fields that belong to the Athenians.* Either we should not pray at all, or more absolutely and freely; [*and not every one for himself and his own only.*]

VIII. As we say commonly, The Physician hath *prescribed* unto this man, riding; unto another, cold baths; unto a third, to go barefoot: so it is alike to say, The Nature of the Universe hath *prescribed* unto this man sickness, or blindness, or some loss or damage, or some such thing. For as there, when we say of a Physician,

Physician that he hath prescribed any thing, our meaning is, that he hath appointed this for that, as subordinate and conducing to health: so here, whatsoever doth happen unto any, is ordained unto him as a thing subordinate unto the Fates, and therefore do we say of such things, that they do *συμβαίνειν*, that is, *happen*, or, *fall together*; as of square stones, when either in walls or pyramides in a certain position they fit one another, and agree as it were in an harmony, the masons say, that they do *συμβαίνειν*; as if thou shouldst say, *fall together*: so that in the generall, [*though the things be divers that make it*] yet the consent or harmony it self is but one. And as the whole world is made up of all the particular bodies in it, one perfect and compleat body, of the same nature that particular bodies are of; so is the Destiny of particular causes [*and events*] one general one, of the same nature that particular causes are. What I now say, even they that are meer Idiots are not ignorant of: for they say commonly *τὸν ἰστίον αὐτοῦ*, that is, *This his Destiny hath brought upon him*. This therefore is [*by the Fates*] properly and particularly brought upon this, as that unto this [*in particular*] is by the Physician prescribed. These therefore let us accept of in like manner, as we do those that are prescribed unto us by our Physicians: For them also in themselves shall we finde to contain many harsh things, but we nevertheless, in hope of health and recovery, accept of them. Let the fulfilling and accomplishment of those things which the common nature hath determined, be unto thee

thee as thy health. Accept then, and be pleased with whatsoever doth happen, though otherwise harsh and unpleasing, as tending to that end, to the health and welfare of the Universe, and to Jove's happiness and prosperity. For this whatsoever it be, should not have been ^a *produced*, had it not ^b *conduced* to the good of the Universe. For neither doth any ordinary particular nature bring any thing to pass, that is not to whatsoever is within the sphere of its own proper administration and government agreeable and subordinate. For these two considerations then thou must be well pleased with any thing that doth happen unto thee. First, because that for thee properly it was brought to pass, and unto thee it was prescribed; and that from the very beginning by the *series* and connexion of the first causes, it hath ever had a reference unto thee. And secondly, because the good success and perfect welfare, and indeed the very continuance of Him that is the Administrator of the whole, doth in a manner depend on it. For the *whole* (because *whole*, therefore entire and perfect:) is maimed and mutilated, if thou shalt cut off any thing at all, whereby the coherence and contiguity (as of parts, so) of causes is maintained and preserved. Of which certain it is, that thou dost (as much as lieth in thee,) cut off, and in some sort violently take somewhat away, as often as thou art displeased [*wish any thing that happeneth.*]

IX. Be not discontented, be not disheartned, be not out of hope, if often it succeed not so well with thee punctually and precisely to doe
all

all things according to the right *dogmata*, but being once cast off, *return unto* them again : and as for those many and more frequent occurrences [*either of worldly distractions, or humane infirmities,*] which as a man thou canst not but in some measure be subject unto, be not thou discontented with them ; but however, love and affect that [*only*] which thou dost *return unto* : [*a Philosopher's life, and proper occupation after the most exact manner.*] And when thou dost return to thy Philosophy, return not unto it [*as the manner of some is after play and liberty as it were,*] to their School-Masters and Pedagogues ; but as they that have sore eyes to their sponge and egge ; or as another to his cataplasme ; or as others to their fomentations : so shalt not thou make it a matter of ostentation at all to obey reason ; but of ease and comfort. And remember that Philosophy requireth nothing of thee, but what thy nature requireth ; and wouldest thou thy self desire any thing that is not according to nature ? for which of these [*sayest thou ; that which is according to Nature, or against it,*] is of it self more kinde and pleasing ? Is it not for that respect especially, that pleasure it self is to so many mens hurt and overthrow, most prevalent, [*because esteemed commonly most kinde and natural ?*] But consider well whether magnanimity rather, and true liberty, and true simplicity, and equanimity, and holiness ; whether these be not most kinde and natural. And prudence it self, what more kinde and amiable than it, when thou shalt truly consider with thy self, what it

is through all the proper objects of thy rational intellectual faculty, currently to goe on without any fall or stumble? As for the things of the world, their true nature is in a manner so involved with obscurity, that unto many Philosophers, and those no mean ones, they seemed altogether incomprehensible; and even to the Stoicks themselves, scarce, and not without much difficulty, comprehensible: so that all assent of ours is fallible; for who is he that is infallible [*in his conclusions?*] From the nature of things, pass now unto their subjects and matter: how temporary, how vile are they? such as may be in the power and possession of some abominable loose liver, of some common strumpet, of some notorious oppressour and extortioner. Pass from thence to the dispositions of them that thou dost ordinarily converse with, how hardly do we bear even with the most loving and amiable? that I may not say, how hard it is for us to bear even with our own selves. In such obscurity and impurity [*of things,*] in such [*and so continual*] a flux both of the substances and time, both of the motions themselves, and things moved, what it is that we can fasten upon; either to honour and respect especially, or seriously and studiously to seek after; I cannot so much as conceive. For indeed they are things contrary.

X. Thou must comfort thy self in the expectation of thy natural dissolution, and [*in the mean time*] not grieve at the delay; but rest contented in those two things. First, that nothing shall happen unto thee, which is not according to the nature of the Universe. Secondly,

condly, that it is in thy power, to doe nothing against thine own proper god, and [*inward*] Spirit. For it is not in any man's power to constrain thee to transgress against him.

XI. What is the use that now at this present I make of my soul? Thus from time to time and upon all occasions thou must put this question to thy self, What is now that part of mine which they call the rational mistress part, imployed about? Whose soul do I now properly possess? a child's? or a youth's? a woman's? or a tyrant's? some brute's, or some wilde beast's soul?

See the
notes.

XII. What those things are in themselves, which by the greatest part are esteemed *good*, thou maist gather even from this. For if a man shall hear things mentioned as *good*, which are really *good* indeed, such as are prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude; after so much heard and conceived, he cannot endure to hear of any more; for the word *good* is properly spoken of them. But as for those which by the vulgar are esteemed *good*, if he shall hear them mentioned as *good*, he doth hearken for more. He is well contented to hear, that what is spoken by the Comedian, is but familiarly and popularly spoken; so that even the vulgar apprehend the difference. For why is it else, that this offends not and needs not to be excused, [*when vertues are styled good* :] but that which is spoken in commendation of wealth, pleasure, or honour, we entertain it only as merrily and pleasantly spoken? Proceed therefore, and enquire further, whether it may not be that those things also, which being mentioned [*upon the stage*]

stage as the only things which made a man truly rich and happy,] were merrily [and with great applause of the multitude] scoffed at with this jest, that they that possessed them, had not in all the world of their own, (such was their affluence and plenty:) so much as a place where to void their excrements: Whether, I say, these ought [not] also in very deed to be much respected, and esteemed of as the only things that are truly good.

XIII. All that I consist of, is either form or matter. No corruption can reduce either of these unto nothing: for neither did I of nothing become a subsistent creature. Every part of mine then, will by mutation be disposed into a certain part of the whole world; and that in time into another part; and so *in infinitum*: by which kinde of mutation, I also became what I am, and so did they that begot me, and they before them, and so upwards *in infinitum*. For so we may be allowed to speak, though the age and government of the world be to some certain periods of time limited and confined.

XIV. Reason, and rational power, are faculties which content themselves with themselves, and their own proper operations. And as for their first inclination and motion, that they take from themselves. But their progress is right to the end and object, which is in their way, as it were, and lieth just before them: [that is, which is feasible and possible, whether it be that which at the first they proposed to themselves, or no.] For which reason also such actions are termed *unobscured*, to intimate the directness of

See B. IV.

n. I.

B. V. n.

XVII.

B. VI. n.

XLV.

of the way, [by which they are achieved.] Nothing must be thought to belong to a man, which doth not belong unto him as he is a man. These [the events of purposes] are not things required in a man. The nature of man doth not profess any such things. The final ends and consummations [of actions] are nothing at all to a mans nature. The end therefore of a man, or that *summum bonum* whereby that end is fulfilled, cannot consist in the consummation of actions [purposed and intended.] Again, concerning these [outward worldly] things, were it so that any of them did properly belong unto man, then would it not belong unto man to condemn them, and to stand in opposition with them. Neither would he be praise-worthy that can live without them; or he good, (if these were good indeed,) who of his own accord doth deprive himself of any of them. But we see contrariwise, that the more a man doth withdraw himself from these [wherein external pomp and greatness doth consist,] or any other like these, or the better he doth bear with the loss of these, the better he is accounted.

XV. Such as thy thoughts and ordinary cogitations are, such will thy minde be in time. For the soul doth as it were receive its tincture from the phantasies and imaginations. Dye it therefore and thoroughly soke it with the assiduity of these cogitations. As for example. Wheresoever thou mayest live, there it is in thy power to live well and happy: But thou mayest live at the Court, there then also mayest thou live well and happy. Again, that which every thing is made for, he is also made

made unto that, and cannot but naturally incline unto it. That which any thing doth naturally incline unto, therein is his end. Wherein the end of every thing doth consist, therein also doth his good and benefit consist. Society therefore is the proper good of a rational creature. For that we are made for society, it hath long since been demonstrated. Or can any man make any question of this, that, whatsoever is naturally worse and inferiour, is ordinarily subordinated to that which is better? and that those things that are best, are made one for another? and those things that have souls, are better than those that have none? and of those that have, those best that have rational souls?

XVI. To desire things impossible, is the part of a mad-man. But it is a thing impossible, that wicked men should not commit some such things. Neither doth any thing happen to any man, which in the ordinary course of nature as natural unto him doth not happen. Again, the same things happen unto others also. And truly, if either he that is ignorant that such a thing hath happened unto him, or he that is ambitious to be commended for his magnanimity, can be patient, and is not grievèd; is it not a grievous thing, that either ignorance, or a vain desire to please and to be commended, should be more powerfull and effectual than true prudence? As for the things themselves; they touch not the soul, neither can they have any access unto it: neither can they of themselves any ways either affect it or move it. For she her self alone can affect and move her self; and accor-

See note
upon B. A. I.
n III.

See B. VI.
n. 7.

ding as the *Dogmata* and opinions are, which she doth vouchsafe her self, so are these things which, as accessories, have any coexistence with her.

See B. IV. n. I. XVII. After one consideration, man is nearest unto us; as we are bound to doe them good, and to bear with them: but as he may oppose any of our true proper actions, so man is unto me but as a thing indifferent; even as the Sun, or the Winde, or some wilde Beast. By some of these it may be, that some operation or other of mine may be hindered; however, of my minde and resolution it self there can be no lett or impediment, by reason of that ordinary constant, both *Reservation* [*wherewith it inclineth,*] and ready *Conversion* [*of objects, from that which may not be, to that which may be; which in the prosecution of its inclinations, as occasion serves, it doth observe.*] For by these the minde doth turn and convert any impediment whatsoever, to be her aim and purpose. So that what before was the impediment, is now the principal object of her working; and that which before was in her way, is now her readiest way.

XVIII. Honour that which is chiefest and most powerfull in the world, and that is it which makes use of all things, and governs all things: [*God.*] So also in thy self, honour that [*thy spirit or understanding*] which is chiefest, and most powerfull; and is of one kinde and nature with that [*which we now spake of.*] For it is the very same, which being in thee, turneth all other things to its
OWN

own use, and by whom also thy life is governed.

XIX. That which doth not hurt the City it self, cannot hurt any Citizen. This rule thou must remember to apply and make use of upon every conceit and apprehension of wrong. * If the whole City be not hurt by this, neither am I certainly. And if the whole be not, why should I make it my private grievance? [*consider rather*] what it is wherein he is overseen [*that is thought to have done the wrong.*] [*Again*] often meditate how swiftly all things that subsist, and all things that are done in the world, are carried away, and as it were conveighed out of sight: For both the substances themselves, (we see) as a flood, are in a continual fluxe; and all actions in a perpetual change; and the causes themselves subject to a thousand alterations: neither is there any thing almost, that may ever be said to be now settled and constant. Next unto this, and which follows upon it, [*consider*] both the infiniteness of the time already passed, and the immense vastness of that which is to come, wherein all things are to be resolved, and annihilated. Art not thou then a very fool, who for these things, art either puffed up with pride, or distracted with cares, or canst finde in thy heart to make such moans, as for a thing that would trouble thee for a very long time? Consider the whole Universe, whereof thou art but a very little part; and the whole age of the world together, whereof but a short and very momentary portion is allotted unto thee; and all the Fates and Destinies together, of which how much is it that

* See the Latin notes. See n. 8. & 29. of this book; and in the Table, the world, as a City.

comes to thy part and share ! [*Again :*] Another doth trespass against me. Let him look to that. He is master of his own disposition, and of his own operation. I for my part am in the mean time in possession of as much as the common Nature would have me to possess : and that which mine own Nature would have me doe, I doe.]

XX. Let not that chief commanding part of thy soul be ever subject to any variation through any corporal either pain or pleasure, neither suffer it to be mixed with these, but let it both circumscribe it self, and confine those affections to their own proper parts and members. But if at any time they do reflect and rebound upon the mind and understanding, (as in an united and compacted body it must needs ;) then must thou not goe about to resist sense and feeling, it being natural. However let not thy understanding [*to this natural sense and feeling, which whether unto our flesh pleasant or painfull, is unto us nothing properly,*] adde an opinion of either good or bad, [*and all is well.*]

See notes.

XXI. *To live with the Gods.* He liveth with the Gods, who at all times affords unto them the spectacle of a soul both contented and well pleased with whatsoever is afforded or allotted unto her ; and performing whatsoever is pleasing to that Spirit, whom (being part of himself) Jove hath appointed to every man as his overseer and governour : which is, every man his intellect and reason.

XXII. Be not angry, neither with him whose
breath,

breath, neither with him whose *ala* [or *armeholes*] are offensive. What can he doe? such is his breath [naturally,] and such are his *ala*; and from such, such an effect and such a smell must of necessity proceed. O, but the man, (sayest thou,) hath understanding in him, and might of himself know, that he by standing near cannot chuse but offend. And thou also (God blefs thee,) hast understanding. Let thy reasonable faculty work upon his reasonable faculty; shew him his fault, admonish him. If he hearken unto thee, thou shalt cure him, and there will be no more occasion of anger.

XXIII. *Where there shall neither roarer be, nor barlot.* [Why so?] As thou dost purpose to live, when thou hast retired thy self [to some such place, where neither roarer nor barlot is:] so mayest thou here. And if they will not suffer thee, then mayest thou leave thy life [rather than thy calling,] but so as one that doth not think himself any ways wronged. Only as one would say, Here is a smoak; I will out of it. And what a great matter is this? Now till some such thing force me out, I will continue free; neither shall any man hinder me to doe what I will, and my will shall ever be by the proper nature of a reasonable and sociable creature, regulated and directed.

XXIV. That rational essence by which the Universe is governed, is for community and society; and therefore hath it both made the things that are worse for the best, and hath allied and knit together those which are best

See R. IV. n. III. and the notes upon this place.

as [it were] in an harmony. Seest thou not how it hath subordinated, and coordinated? and how it hath distributed unto every thing according to its worth? and those which have the preeminency and superiority above all, hath it united together into a mutual consent and agreement.

XXV. How hast thou carried thy self hitherto towards the Gods? towards thy Parents? towards thy Brethren? towards thy Wife? towards thy Children? towards thy Masters? thy foster-Fathers? thy Friends? thy Domesticks? thy Servants? Is it so with thee, that hitherto thou hast neither by word or deed wronged any of them? Remember withall through how many things thou hast already passed, and how many thou hast been able to endure; so that now the *Legend* of thy life is full, and thy charge is accomplished. Again, how many truly good things have certainly by thee been discerned? how many pleasures, how many pains hast thou passed over with contempt? how many things [externally] glorious hast thou despised? towards how many perverse unreasonable men, hast thou carried thy self kindly and discreetly?

XXVI. Why should imprudent unlearned souls trouble that which is both learned and prudent? And which is that that is so? she that understandeth the beginning and the end, and hath the true knowledge of that Rational essence, that passeth through all things subsisting, and through all ages [being ever the same,] disposing and dispensing (as it were) this

this Universe by certain periods of time.

XXVII. Within a very little while, thou wilt be either ashes, or a *skeleton*; and a Name, perchance; and perchance, not so much as a Name. And what is that but an [*empty*] sound, and a rebounding Eccho? Those things which in this life are dearest unto us, and of most account, they are [*in themselves*] but vain, putrid, contemptible. [*The most weighty and serious, if rightly esteemed, but*] as puppies biting one another: or untoward children, now laughing, and then crying. As for faith, and modesty, and justice, and truth, *they long since* [*as one of the Poets hath it*] *have abandoned this spacious Earth, and retired themselves into Heaven.* What is it then that doth keep thee here, if things sensible be so mutable and unsettled? and the senses so obscure, and so fallible? and our Souls nothing but an exhalation of blood? and to be in credit among such, be but vanity? What is it that thou dost stay for? an Extinction, or a Translation; for either of them with a propitious and contented mind. But till that time come, what will content thee? what else, but to worship and praise the gods, and to do good unto men; to bear with them, and to forbear to do them any wrong; and for all external things belonging either to this thy wretched body, or life, to remember that they are neither thine, nor in thy power?

XXVIII. Thou mayest always speed, if thou wilt but make coice of the right way; if in the course both of thine opinions and actions, thou wilt observe a true method. These two things

be common to the souls, as of God, so of men, and of every reasonable creature : first, that [*in their own proper work*] they cannot be hindered by any thing : and secondly, that their happiness doth consist in a disposition to, and in the practice of righteousness ; and that in these their desire is terminated.

See n. 19.
and E. X.
n. 6.

XXIX. If this [*that makes my friend to lament*] neither be my wicked act, nor an act any ways depending from any wickedness of mine, and that by it the publick [*or, Universe*] is not hurt ; what doth it concern me ? And wherein can the publick be hurt ? For thou must not altogether be carried by conceit [*and common opinion.*] As for help, thou must afford that unto them after thy best ability, and as their need shall require, though they sustain damage but in these middle [*or, worldly*] things ; but however do not thou conceive that they are truly hurt thereby : for that is not right. But as that old foster-Father [*in the Comedy*] being now to take his leave, doth [*with a great deal of Ceremony*] require this foster-Child's rhombus, [*or, rattle-top, that he was wont to play with, for a remembrance of him ;*] remembering nevertheless that it is but a rhombus, [*a rattle, or a bawbie :*] so here also [*doe thou likewise.*] For indeed what is all this solemn declaiming and exclaiming at the *Rostra* [*if it be rightly considered ?*] O man, hast thou forgotten what those things are ? yea, but they are things that others much care for, and highly esteem of. Wilt thou therefore be a fool too ? Once I was ; [*let that suffice.*]

XXX. Let

XXX. Let death surprize me when it will, and where it will, I may be *εὐμαρ* [or, a happy man] nevertheless. For he is a happy man, who [*in his life-time*] dealeth unto himself a happy lot and portion. A happy lot and portion is, good inclinations of the soul, good desires, good actions.

THE SIXTH BOOK.



THE MATTER it self of which the Universe doth consist, is of it self very tractable and pliable. That rational essence that doth govern it, hath in it self no cause to doe evil. It hath no evil [*in it self,*] neither can it doe any thing that is evil ; neither can any thing be hurt by it. And all things are done and determined according to its will and prescript.

II. Be it all one unto thee, whether half frozen or well warm ; whether only slumbering or after a full sleep ; whether discommended or commended thou doe thy duty ; or whether dying or doing somewhat else ; for that also *to die*, must among the rest be reckoned as one of the duties and actions of our lives. [*Whensoever then the time of that duty shall be,*] then also must it suffice thee [*to make thee happy*] that then thou dost well acquit thy self of that present duty ; [or, *that the present time is spent by thee upon a good action.*]

III. Look in, let not either the proper quality,
or

or the true worth of any thing pass thee, [*before thou hast fully apprehended it.*]

IV. All substances come soon to their change, and either they shall be resolved by way of exhalation, (if so be that all things shall be re-united into one substance) or [*as others maintain,*] they shall be scattered and dispersed. As for that Rational Essence by which all things are governed, as it best understandeth it self, both its own disposition, and what it doeth, and what matter it hath to do with, [*and accordingly doeth all things ; so we that do not, no wonder, if we wonder at many things, the reasons whereof we cannot comprehend.*]

V. The best kind of revenge is, not to become like unto them.

See B. V.
11. 16.

VI. Let this be thy only joy, and thy only comfort, from one sociable [*kind*] action [*without intermission*] to pass unto another, God being ever in thy mind.

VII. The rational commanding part, as it alone can stirre up and turn it self; so it maketh both it self to be, and every thing that happeneth, to appear unto it self as it will it self.

VIII. According to the nature of the Universe all things [*particular*] are determined, not according to any other nature, either about, compassing and containing; or within, dispersed and contained; or without, depending. Either this Universe is a mere confused mass, and an intricate context of things, which shall in time be scattered and dispersed again: or it is an Union consisting of Order, and administred by providence. If the first, why should I desire

to continue any longer in this *fortuit* confusion and commixtion? or why should I take care for any thing else, but that as soon as may be I may be Earth [*again?*] And why should I trouble my self any more [*whilest I seek to please the gods?*] Whatsoever I do, Dispersion is my end, and will come upon me whether I will or no. But if the latter be, then am not I religious in vain; then will I be quiet and patient, and put my trust in Him who is the Governour of all.

IX. Whensoever by some present hard occurrences thou art constrained to be as it were troubled and vexed, return unto thy self as soon as may be, and be not out of tune longer than thou must needs. For so shalt thou be the better able to keep thy part another time, and to maintain the harmony, if thou dost use thy self to this continually; once out, presently to have recourse unto it, and to begin again.

X. If it were that thou hadst at one time both a stepmother and a natural mother living, thou wouldst honour and respect her also; nevertheless to thine own natural mother would thy refuge and recourse be continually. So let the Court and thy Philosophy be unto thee. Have recourse unto it often, and comfort thy self in her, by whom it is that those other things are made tolerable unto thee, and thou also in those things not intolerable unto others.

XI. How marvellous usefull is it for a man to represent unto himself meats, and all such things that are for the mouth, under a right apprehension

prehension and imagination? as for example; This is the carcass of a fish, this of a bird, and this of a hog. And again more generally; This *Falernum*, [*this excellent highly commended wine,*] is but the bare juice of an ordinary Grape. This purple robe, but sheeps hairs, died with the blood of a shell-fish. So for *csitus*, it is but the attrition of an ordinary base entrail; and the excretion of a little **vile snivel*, with a certain kind of convulsion: [*according to Hippocrates his opinion.*] How excellent usefull are these lively phancies and representations of things, thus penetrating and passing through the objects, to make their true nature known and apparent! This must thou use all thy life long, and upon all occasions: and then especially, when matters are apprehended as of great worth and respect, [*thy art and care must be*] to uncover them, and to behold their vileness, and to take away from them all those serious circumstances and expressions, under which they made so grave a shew.

* Greek
μεγαλιν.
See B. IV.
39.

Gr. ὁ ῥήτορ. For outward pomp and appearance is a great jugler;
See B. III.
n. VII. and then especially art thou most in danger to be beguiled by it, when (to a mans thinking) thou most seemest to be employed about matters of moment.

XII. See what Crates pronounceth concerning Xenocrates himself.

XIII. Those things which the common sort of people do admire, are most of them such things as are very generall, and may be comprehended under things meerly natural, or naturally affected and qualified; as stones, wood, figs, vines, olives. Those that be admired by them that are
more

more moderate and restrained, are comprehended under things animated : as flocks and herds. Those that are yet more gentle and curious, their admiration is commonly confined to reasonable creatures only ; not in general as they are reasonable, but as they are capable of art, or of some craft and subtle invention: or perchance barely to reasonable creatures ; as they that delight in the possession of many slaves. But he that honours a reasonable soul in general, as it is reasonable and naturally sociable, doth little regard any thing else ; and above all things is careful to preserve his own, in the continual habit and exercise both of reason and sociableness : and thereby doth cooperate with him, of whose nature he doth also participate ; [*God.*]

XIV. Some things hasten to be, and others to be no more. And even whatsoever now is, some part thereof hath already perished. Perpetual fluxes and alterations renew the world, as the perpetual course of time doth make the age of the world (of it self infinite) to appear alwayes fresh and new. In such a flux and course of all things, what of these things that hasten so fast away should any man regard, since among all there is not any that a man may fasten and fix upon ? as if a man would settle his affection upon some ordinary Sparrow flying by him, who is no sooner seen, than out of sight. For we must not think otherwise of our lives than as a meer exhalation of blood, or of an ordinary respiration of aire. For what [*in our common apprehension*] it is, to breath in the aire, and to breath it out again, which we doe daily : so much is it and no more, at once to
breath

breath out all thy respirative faculty into that common aire from whence but lately (as being but from yesterday, and to day,) thou didst first breath it in, and with it, life.

XV. Not vegetative spiration, it is not surely (which plants have) that [*in this life*] should be so dear unto us; nor sensitive respiration, the proper life of beasts, both tame and wild; nor this our imaginative faculty; nor that we are subject to be led and carried up and down by the strength and violence of our sensual appetites; or that we can assemble and live together; or that we can feed: for that in effect is no better, than that we can void the excrements of our food? What is it then that should be dear unto us? to hear a clattering noise? if not that, then neither to be applauded by the tongues of men. For the praises of many tongues is in effect no better than the clattering of so many tongues. If then neither applause, what is there remaining that should be dear unto thee? This I think: that [*in all thy motions and actions*] thou be moved, and restrained, according to thine own true natural constitution and construction only. And to this even ordinary arts and professions do lead us. For it is that which every art doth aim at, that whatsoever it is that is by art effected and prepared, may be fit for that work that it is prepared for. This is the end that he that dresseth the Vine, and he that takes upon him either to tame Colts, or to train up Doggs, doth aim at. What else doth the education of Children, and all learned professions

essions tend unto? Certainly then it is that which should be dear unto us also. If in this particular it goe well with thee, care not for the obtaining of other things. But is it so, that thou canst not but respect other things also? Then canst not thou truly be free; then canst thou not have self-content; then wilt thou ever be subject to passions. For it is not possible but that thou must be envious and jealous, and suspicious of them who [*thou knowest*] can bereave thee of such things; and again, a secret underminer of them, whom thou seest in present possession of that which is dear unto thee. To be short, he must of necessity be full of confusion within himself, and often accuse the gods, whosoever stands in need of these things. But if thou shalt honour and respect thy minde onely, that will make thee acceptable towards thy self, towards thy friends very tractable, and conformable and concordant with the gods; that is, accepting with praises whatsoever they shall think good to appoint and allot unto thee.

See note 5.
upon the
II. B. out
of Epictet-
us, and n.
XXXVI. of
this VI. B.

XVI. Under, above, and about, are the motions of the Elements: but the motion of virtue is none of those motions, but is somewhat more excellent and divine. Whose way (to speed and prosper in it) must be through a way that is not easily comprehended.

See Job
28. 1, 2. to
12, 13.
&c.

XVII. Who can chuse but wonder at them? They will not speak well of them that are at the same time with them, and live with them: yet they themselves are very ambi-

ous,

ous, that they that shall follow, whom they have never seen, nor shall ever see, should speak well of them. As if a man should grieve that he hath not been commended by them that lived before him.

XVIII. Do not ever conceive any thing impossible to man, which by thee cannot, or not without much difficulty, be effected; but whatsoever in general thou canst conceive possible and proper unto any man, think that very possible unto thee also.

XIX. Suppose that at the *Palæstra* [or, *fencing-school*] some body hath all torn thee with his nails, and hath broken thy head. Well, thou art wounded. Yet thou dost not exclaim; thou art not offended with him. Thou dost not suspect him for it afterwards, as one that watcheth to do thee a mischief. Yea even then, though thou dost thy best to save thy self from him, yet not from him as an enemy. It is not by way of any suspicious indignation, but by way of gentle and friendly declining. Keep the same minde and disposition in other parts of thy life also. For many things there be, which we must conceit and apprehend, as though we had had to do with an antagonist at the *Pa'æstra*. For, as I said, it is very possible for us to avoid and decline, though we neither suspect nor hate.

XX. If any body shall reprove me, and shall make it apparent unto me, that in any either opinion or action of mine I do erre, I will most gladly retract. For it is the truth that I seek after, by which I am sure that
never

never any man was hurt; and as sure, that he is hurt that continueth in any error or ignorance whatsoever.

XXI. I for my part will doe what belongs unto me: as for other things, whether things unsensible or things irrational; or if rational, yet deceived and ignorant of the true way, they shall not trouble or distract me. For as for those creatures which are not indued with reason, and all other things and matters of the world whatsoever, I freely and generously, as one indued with reason, of things that have none, make use of them. And as for men, towards them, as naturally partakers of the same reason, my care is to carry my self sociably. But whatsoever it is that thou art about, remember to call upon the gods. And as for the time how long thou shalt live to do these things, let it be altogether indifferent unto thee; for even three such hours are sufficient.

XXII. *Alexander* of Macedon, and he that dressed his mules, when once dead, both came to one pass. For either they were both resumed into those original rational essences from whence all things in the world are propagated; or both after one fashion were scattered into Atoms.

XXIII. Consider how many different things, whether they concern our bodies, or our souls; in a moment of time come to pass in every one of us; and so thou wilt not wonder if many more things, or rather all things that are done, can at one time subsist, and coexist in that both *One* and *General*, which we call the *World*.

XXIV. If any should put this question unto thee, how this word *Antoninus* is written; wouldst thou not presently fix thine intention upon it, and utter out in order every letter of it? And if any shall begin to gain-say thee, and quarrel with thee about it; wilt thou quarrel with him again, or rather go on meekly as thou hast begun, untill thou hast numbred out every letter? Here then likewise remember, that every duty that belongs unto a man doth consist of some certain letters or numbers as it were, to which without any noise or tumult keeping thy self, thou must orderly proceed to thy proposed end, forbearing to quarrel with him that would quarrel and fall out with thee.

XXV. Is it not a cruel thing to forbid men to affect those things which they conceive to agree best with their own natures, and to tend most to their own proper good and behoof? But thou after a sort deniest them this liberty, as often as thou art angry with them for their sins. For surely they are led unto those sins, whatsoever they be, as to their proper good and commodity. But it is not so [*thou wilt object perchance; and they are deceived.*] Thou therefore teach them better, and make it appear unto them: but be not thou angry with them.

XXVI. Death is a cessation from the impressions of the senses, the tyranny of the passions, the errors of the mind, and the servitude of the body.

XXVII. If in this kind of life thy body be able to hold out, it is a shame that thy soul should

should faint first, and give over. Take heed, lest [of a *Philosopher*] thou become a [mere] Caesar in time, and receive a new tincture [from the Court.] For it may happen, [if thou dost not take heed.] Keep thy self therefore truly simple, good, sincere, grave, free from all ostentation, a lover of that which is just, religious, kind, tender-hearted, strong and vigorous to undergoe any thing that becomes thee. Endeavour to continue such as Philosophy [hadst thou wholly and constantly applyed thy self unto it,] would have made, and secured thee. Worship the gods, procure the welfare of men: this life is short. Charitable actions, and a holy disposition, is the only fruit of this earthly life.

XXVIII. Doe all things as becometh the Disciple of Antoninus [*Pius.*] Remember his resolute constancy in things that were done by him according to reason, his equability in all things, his sanctity; the chearfulness of his countenance, his sweetness, and how free he was from all vain-glory; how carefull to come to the true and exact knowledge of matters in hand, and how he would by no means give over till he did fully and plainly understand the whole state of the business: and how patiently and without any contestation he would bear with them that did unjustly condemn him: how he would never be overhasty in any thing, nor give ear to slanders and false accusations, but examine and observe with best diligence the several actions and dispositions of men. Again, how he was

no back-biter, nor easily frightened, nor suspicious, and in his language free from all affectation and curiosity: and how easily he would content himself with few things, as lodging, bedding, cloathing, and ordinary nourishment and attendance. How able to endure labour, how patient; able through his spare diet to continue from morning to evening without any necessity of withdrawing before his accustomed hours to the necessities of nature: his uniformity and constancy in matter of friendship. How he would bear with them that with all boldness and liberty opposed his opinions; and even rejoyce if any man could better advise him: and lastly, how religious he was without superstition. [*All these things of him remember,*] that whensoever thy last hour shall come upon thee, it may find thee, as it did him, [*ready for it*] in the * possession of a
 * Gr. *ἐν-
εὐταξίᾳ*. good conscience.

XXIX. Stirre up thy mind, and recall thy wits again [*from thy natural dreams and visions:*] and when thou art perfectly awoken, and canst perceive that they were but dreams that troubled thee, as one newly awakened [*out of another kind of sleep,*] look upon these wordly things with the same mind as thou didst upon those, [*that thou sawest in thy sleep.*]

XXX. I consist of body and soul: unto my body all things are indifferent, for of it self it cannot affect one thing more than another with apprehension of any difference; as for my mind, all things which are not
 within

within the verge of her own operation, are indifferent unto her, and for her own operations, those altogether depend of her; neither doth she busie her self about any, but those that are present; for as for future and passed operations, those also are now at this present indifferent unto her.

XXXI. As long as the foot doth that which belongeth unto it to do, and the hand that which belongs unto it, their labour, whatsoever it be, is not unnatural. So a man as long as he doth that which is proper unto a man, his labour cannot be against nature; and if it be not against nature, then neither is it hurtfull unto him. [*But if it were so that happiness did consist in pleasure,*] how came notorious robbers, impure abominable livers, parricides and tyrants, in so large a measure to have their part of pleasures?

XXXII. Dost thou not see, how even those that profess mechanick arts, though in some respect they be no better than mere Idiots, yet they stick close to the course of their trade, neither can they find in their heart to decline from it? And is it not a grievous thing that an Architect, or a Physician shall respect the course and mysteries of their profession, more than a man the proper course and condition of his own nature, Reason, which is common to him and the gods?

XXXIII. Asia, Europe, what are they, but as corners of the whole world? of which the whole Sea is but as one drop; and the great mount

no back-biter, nor easily frightened, nor suspicious, and in his language free from all affectation and curiosity: and how easily he would content himself with few things, as lodging, bedding, cloathing, and ordinary nourishment and attendance. How able to endure labour, how patient; able through his spare diet to continue from morning to evening without any necessity of withdrawing before his accustomed hours to the necessities of nature: his uniformity and constancy in matter of friendship. How he would bear with them that with all boldness and liberty opposed his opinions; and even rejoyce if any man could better advise him: and lastly, how religious he was without superstition. [*All these things of him remember,*] that whensoever thy last hour shall come upon thee, it may find thee, as it did him, [*ready for it*] in the * possession of a
 * Gr. *ἐν-
εὐσυνείδητι*. good conscience.

XXIX. Stirre up thy mind, and recall thy wits again [*from thy natural dreams and visions:*] and when thou art perfectly awaken, and canst perceive that they were but dreams that troubled thee, as one newly awakened [*out of another kind of sleep,*] look upon these wordly things with the same mind as thou didst upon those, [*that thou sawest in thy sleep.*]

XXX. I consist of body and soul: unto my body all things are indifferent, for of it self it cannot affect one thing more than another with apprehension of any difference; as for my mind, all things which are not
 within

within the verge of her own operation, are indifferent unto her, and for her own operations, those altogether depend of her; neither doth she busie her self about any, but those that are present; for as for future and passed operations, those also are now at this present indifferent unto her.

XXXI. As long as the foot doth that which belongeth unto it to do, and the hand that which belongs unto it, their labour, whatsoever it be, is not unnatural. So a man as long as he doth that which is proper unto a man, his labour cannot be against nature; and if it be not against nature, then neither is it hurtfull unto him. [*But if it were so that happiness did consist in pleasure,*] how came notorious robbers, impure abominable livers, parricides and tyrants, in so large a measure to have their part of pleasures?

XXXII. Dost thou not see, how even those that profess mechanick arts, though in some respect they be no better than mere Idiots, yet they stick close to the course of their trade, neither can they find in their heart to decline from it? And is it not a grievous thing that an Architect, or a Physician shall respect the course and mysteries of their profession, more than a man the proper course and condition of his own nature, Reason, which is common to him and the gods?

XXXIII. Asia, Europe, what are they, but as corners of the whole world? of which the whole Sea is but as one drop; and the great mount

See B. VII.
No XLIV.

Athos but as a clod, as all present time is but as one point of eternity. All, petty things; all, things that are soon altered, soon perished. And all things come from one beginning; either all severally and particularly deliberated and resolved upon, by the general ruler and governour of all; or all by necessary consequence. So that the dreadfull *hiatus* of a gaping Lion, and all poyson, and all hurtfull things, are but (as the thorn and the mire) the necessary consequences of goodly fair things. Think not of these therefore, as things contrary to those which thou dost much honour and respect; but consider in thy minde the true fountain of all.

XXXIV. He that seeth the things that are now, hath seen all that either was ever, or ever shall be; for all things are of one kind, and all like one unto another. Meditate often upon the connexion of all things in the world; and upon the mutual relation that they have one unto another. For all things are after a sort folded and involved one within another, and by these means all agree well together. For one thing is consequent unto another, by local motion, by natural conspiracy and agreement, and by substantial union, [or, *reduction of all substances into one.*]

XXXV. Fit and accommodate thy self to that estate and to those occurrences, which by the destinies have been annexed unto thee; and love those men whom thy fate it is to live with; but love them truly. An instrument, a tool, an utensil, whatsoever it be,
if

if it be fit for the purpose it was made for, it is as it should be, though he perchance that made and fitted it be out of sight and gone. But in things natural, that power which hath framed and fitted them, is, and abideth within them still: for which reason it ought also the more to be respected, and we are the more obliged (if we may live and pass our time according to her purpose and intention) to think that all is well with us, and according to our own minds. After this manner also, and in this respect it is, that He that is all in all doth enjoy his happiness.

XXXVI. What things soever are not within the proper power and jurisdiction of thine own will [*either to compass or avoid,*] if thou shalt propose unto thy self any of those things as either good, or evil; it must needs be that according as thou shalt either fall into that which thou dost think evil, or miss of that which thou dost think good, so wilt thou be ready both to complain of the gods, and to hate those men, who either shall be so indeed, or shall by thee be suspected, as the cause either of thy missing of the one, or falling into the other. And indeed we must needs commit many evils, if we incline to any of these things, more or less, with an opinion of any difference. But if we minde and fancie those things onely as good and bad, which wholly depend of our own wills, there is no more occasion why we should either murmur against the gods, or be at enmity with any man.

XXXVII. We all work to one effect, some willingly, and with a rational apprehension of what we doe; others without any such knowledge. As I think Heraclitus in a place speakeith of them that sleep, that even they do work in their kind, and do confer to the general operations of the World. One man therefore doth cooperate after one sort, and another after another sort: but he that doth murmur, and to his power doth resist and hinder; even he as much as any [*doth cooperate.*] For of such also did the World stand in need. Now do thou consider among which of these thou wilt rank thy self. For as for him who is the Administrator of all, he will make good use of thee [*whether thou wilt or no,*] and make thee (as a part and member of the whole) so to cooperate with him, that whatsoever thou doest, shall turn to the furtherance of his own counsels and resolutions. But be not thou [*for shame*] such a part of the whole, as that * vile and ridiculous verse (which Chrysippus in a place doth mention) is a part of the Comedy.

See B VIII.
n. XXXIII.

* See the
notes.

XXXVIII. Doth either the Sun take upon him to do that which belongs to the rain? or his son Esculapius that which unto the Earth doth properly belong? How is it with every one of the stars in particular? Though they all differ one from another, [*and have their several charges and functions by themselves,*] do they not all nevertheless concur and cooperate to one end?

See B. IV.
n. 12. B.
VII. n. 26.
last lines.

XXXIX. If so be that the gods have deliberated in particular of those things that should happen

happen unto me, I must stand to their deliberation, as discreet and wise. For that a god should be an imprudent god, is a thing hard even to conceive: and why should they resolve to do me hurt? for what profit either unto them or the Universe (which they specially take care for) could arise from it? But if so be that they have not deliberated of me in particular, yet certainly they have of the whole in general; and those things which in consequence and coherence of this general deliberation happen unto me in particular, I am bound to embrace and accept of. But if so be that they have not deliberated at all; (which indeed is very irreligious for any man to believe: for then let us neither sacrifice, nor pray, nor respect our oaths, neither let us any more use any of those things, which we being perswaded of the presence and [secret] conversation of the gods among us, daily use and practise:) but, I say, if so be that they have not indeed [either in general or particular] deliberated of any of those things that happen unto us in this world; yet [God be thanked, that] of those things that concern my self, it is lawfull for me to deliberate my self, and all my deliberation is but concerning that which may be to me most profitable. Now that unto every one is most profitable, which is according to his own constitution and Nature. And my Nature is, to be rational [in all my actions,] and as a good and natural member of a City and Common-wealth, towards my fellow-members ever to be sociably and kindly disposed and affected. My City and Country, as I am

Antoninus,

Antoninus, is Rome; as a man, the whole world. Those things therefore that are expedient and profitable to those Cities, are the only things that are good and expedient for me.

XL. Whatsoever in any kind doth happen to any one, is expedient to the whole. And thus much [*to content us*] might suffice, [*that it is expedient for the whole in general.*] But yet this also shalt thou generally perceive, if thou dost diligently take heed, that whatsoever [*doth happen*] to any one man or men * * * *. And now I am content that the word *expedient*, should more generally be understood of [*those things which we otherwise call*] middle things, [*or, things indifferent; as health, wealth, and the like.*]

XLI. As the ordinary shews of the Theatre and of other such places, when thou art presented with them, [*affect thee;*] as the same things still seen, and in the same fashion, make the sight ingratefull and tedious; so must all the things that we see all our life long affect us. For all things, above and below, are still the same, and from the same [*causes.*] When then will there be an end?

XLII. Let the several deaths of men of all sorts, and of all sorts of professions, and of all sorts of nations, be a perpetual object of thy thoughts, * * * * so that thou mayest even come down to Philestio, Phœbus, and Origion. Pass now to other generations. Thither shall we after many changes, where so many brave Oratours are; where so many grave Philosophers, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates.
Where

Where so many *Heroes* of the old times; and then so many brave captains of the latter times; and so many Kings. After all these, where Eudoxus, Hipparchus, Archimedes; where so many other sharp, generous, industrious, subtle, peremptory dispositions; and among others, even they that have been the greatest scoffers and deriders of the frailty and brevity of this our humane life; as Menippus, and others, as many as there have been such as he. Of all these consider, that they long since are all dead and gone. And what do they suffer by it? Nay, they that have not so much as a Name remaining, what are they the worse for it? One thing there is, and that only, which is worth our while in this *World*, and ought by us much to be esteemed; and that is, according to truth and righteousness, meekly and lovingly to converse with false and unrighteous men.

XLIII. Whensoever thou wilt rejoyce thy self, call to minde the several gifts and vertues of them whom thou dost daily converse with; as for example, the industry of the one, the modesty of another, the liberality of a third, of another some other thing. For nothing can so much rejoyce thee, as the resemblances and parallels of several vertues, visible and eminent in the dispositions of those who live with thee; especially when all at once, as near as may be, they represent themselves unto thee. See therefore that thou have them alwayes in a readiness.

XLIV. Dost thou grieve that thou dost weigh but so many pounds, and not 300. rather? Just
as

as much reason hast thou to grieve that thou must live but so many years, and not longer. For as for bulk and substance thou dost content thy self with that proportion of it that is allotted unto thee, so shouldst thou for time.

See R. V.
B. XIV.

XLV. Let us do our best endeavours to perswade them; but however, if Reason and Justice lead thee to it, do it, though they be never so much against it. But if any shall by force withstand thee, and hinder thee in it, convert [*thy vertuous inclination from one object unto another, from Justice*] to contented equanimity, and chearfull patience: so that what [*in the one*] is thy hinderance, thou mayest make use of it for the exercise of another vertue: and remember that it was with due exception and reservation, that thou didst at first incline and desire. For thou didst not set thy minde upon things impossible. Upon what then? that all thy desires might ever be moderated with this due kind of reservation. And this thou hast, and mayest alwayes obtain, [*whether the thing desired be in thy power or no. And what do I care for more, if*] that for which I was born, and brought forth into the world, [*to rule all my desires with reason and discretion,*] may be?

XLVI. The ambitious supposeth another mans act, [*praise and applause,*] to be his own happiness; the voluptuous his own sense and feeling; but he that is wise, his own action.

XLVII. It is in thy power absolutely to exclude all manner of conceit and opinion as concerning

cerning this matter; and by the same means, to exclude all grief and sorrow from thy soul. For as for the things and objects themselves, they of themselves have no such power, whereby to beget and force upon us any opinion at all.

XLVIII. Use thy self when any man speaks unto thee, so to hearken unto him, as that in the *interim* thou give not way to any other thoughts; that so thou mayest (as far as is possible) seem fixed and fastned to his very soul, whosoever he be that speaks unto thee.

XLIX. That which is not good for the Beehive, [or, *whole swarm*] cannot be good for the Bee.

L. Will either passengers, or patients, finde fault and complain, either the one if they be well carried, or the others if well cured? Do they take care for any more than this; the one, that their Ship-master may bring them safe to land; and the other, that their Physician may effect their recovery?

LI. How many of them who came into the world at the same time when I did, are already gone out of it?

LII. To them that are sick of the Jaundies, hony seems bitter; and to them that are bitten by a mad dogge, the water terrible; and to children, a little ball seems a fine thing. And why then should I be angry? or do I think that error and false opinion is less powerfull [*to make men transgress,*] than either choler [*immoderate and excessive*] to cause the Jaundies; or poison, to cause rage?


See B.VII.
n. 34. B.
VIII. 13.
&c.

LIII. No

LIII. No man can hinder thee to live as thy nature doth require. Nothing can happen unto thee, but what the common good of Nature doth require.

no LIV. What manner of men they be whom they seek to please, and what to get, and by what actions: how soon time will cover and bury all things; and how many it hath already buried.

THE SEVENTH BOOK.

 Hat is wickedness? It is that which many times and often thou hast already seen and known [*in the world.*] And so oft as any thing doth happen [*that might otherwise trouble thee,*] let this *memento* presently come to thy minde, that it is that which thou hast already often seen and known. Generally, above and below, thou shalt find but the same things. The very same things whereof ancient stories, middle-age stories, and fresh stories are full: whereof Towns are full, and Houses full. There is nothing that is new. All things that are, are both usual and of little continuance.

II. What fear is there that thy *Dogmata* [*or, Philosophical resolutions and conclusions,*] should become dead in thee, [*and lose their proper power and efficacy to make thee live happy,*] as long as those proper and correlative phancies, and representations of things on which they mutually

ally depend (which continually to stirre up and revive is in thy power,) are still kept fresh and alive? It is in my power concerning this thing [*that is happened, whatsoever it be,*] to conceit that which is right and true. If it be, why then am I troubled? Those things that are without my understanding, are nothing to it at all: [and that is it only which doth properly concern me.] Be always in this minde, and thou wilt be right.

III. [*That which most men would think themselves most happy for, and would preferre before all things, if the gods would grant it unto them after their deaths,*] thou mayest [*whilest thou livest*] grant unto thy self; to live again; see the things of the world again, as thou hast already seen them. For what is it else to live again? Publick shews and solemnities with much pomp and vanity, stage-plays, flocks and herds, conflicts and contentions, a bone thrown to a company of hungry cures, a bait for greedy fishes, the painfulness and continuall burden-bearing of wretched Ants, the running to and fro of terrified Mice, little Puppets drawn up and down with wires and nerves; [*these be the objects of the World.*] Among all these thou must stand stedfast, meekly affected, and free from all manner of indignation; with this right ratiocination and apprehension, that as the worth is of those things which a man doth affect, so is [*in very deed*] every mans worth [*more or less.*]

IV. Word after word, every one by it self, must the things that are spoken be conceived
and

See B. IV.
n. 37. B.V.
n. 27.

See B. III.
num. XVI.
B. IV. n.
XXIV.

and understood; and so the things that are done, purpose after purpose, every one by it self likewise. And as in matter of purposes and actions, we must presently see what is the proper [*use and*] relation of every one; so of words must we be as ready, to consider of every one, what is the true meaning and signification of it [*according to truth and Nature, however it be taken in common use.*]

V. Is my reason and understanding sufficient for this, or no? If it be sufficient, [*without any private applause, or publick ostentation*] I will make use of it for the work in hand, as of an Instrument which by nature I am provided of. If it be not, and that otherwise it belong not unto me particularly as a private duty, I will either give it over, and leave it to some other that can better effect it: or I will endeavour it; but with the help of some other, who, with the joynt help of my reason, is able to bring somewhat to pass that will now be seasonable and usefull for the common good. For whatsoever I doe either by my self, or with some other, the only thing that I must intend, is, that it be good and expedient for the publick. [*For as for praise, consider*] how many who once were much commended, are now already quite forgotten; yea they that commended them, how even they themselves are long since dead and gone. Be not therefore ashamed, whensoever thou must use the help of others. For whatsoever it be that lieth upon thee to effect, thou must propose it unto thy self, as the scaling of walls is unto a souldier. And what if thou
through

through [either], lameness [or some other impediment] art not able to reach unto the top of the battlements alone, which with the help of another thou mayest? [wilt thou therefore give it over; or goe about it with less courage and alacrity, because thou canst not effect it all alone?]

VI. Let not things future trouble thee. For if necessity so require that they come to pass, thou shalt (whensoever that is,) be provided for them with the same reason, by which whatsoever is now present is made both tolerable and acceptable unto thee. All things are linked and knit together, and the knot is sacred, neither is there any thing in the world that is not kind and natural in regard of any other thing. [Or, that hath not some kind of reference and natural correspondence with whatsoever is in the world besides.] For all things are ranked together, and by that decency of its due place and order that each particular doth observe, they all concur together to the making of one and the same *Kósmos* [or, World: as if you said, a comely piece, or an orderly composition.] For all things throughout, there is but one and the same order; and through all things, one and the same god, the same substance, and the same Law. There is one common Reason, and one common Truth, that belongs unto all reasonable creatures: for neither is there more than one perfection of all creatures that * are of the same kind, and partakers of the same reason.

* ὁμογενεῖς
γενεῖς.

VII. Whatsoever is material, doth soon vanish away into the common substance of the

K

whole;

whole; and whatsoever is *formal*, [or, *whatsoever doth animate that which is material*,] is soon resumed into the common Reason of the Whole, and the fame and memory of any thing is soon swallowed up by the general Age and duration of the whole.

VIII. To a reasonable creature, the same action is both according to nature, and according to reason.

IX. *Straight* [of it self] *not made straight*.

X. As several members in one body united, so are reasonable creatures in a body divided and dispersed, all made and prepared for one common operation. And this thou shalt apprehend the better, if thou shalt use thy self often to say to thy self, I am *μὲν*, or a member of the mass and body of reasonable substances. But if thou shalt say I am *μῆς*, or a part, thou dost not yet love men from thy heart. The joy that thou takest in the exercise of bounty is not yet grounded upon a due ratiocination, and right apprehension of the nature of things. Thou dost exercise it as yet upon this ground barely, as a thing convenient and fitting; not, as doing good to thy self, [when thou doest good unto others.]

XI. Of things that are external happen what will to that which can suffer by external accidents. Those things that suffer let them complain themselves, if they will; as for me, as long as I conceive no such thing, that that which is happened is evil, I have no hurt, and it is in my power not to conceive any such thing.

XII. What-

XII. Whatsoever any man either doeth or saith, thou must be good; [*not for any mans sake, but for thine own nature's sake :*] as if either Gold, or the Emerald, or Purple, should ever be saying to themselves, Whatsoever any man either doeth or saith, I must still be an Emerald, and I must keep my colour.

XIII. [*This may ever be my comfort and security :*] my understanding, that ruleth over all, will not of it self bring trouble and vexation upon it self. This I say; it will not put it self in any fear, it will not lead it self into any concupiscence. If it be in the power of any other to compell it to fear or to grieve, let him do it. But sure if it self do not of it self, through some [*false*] opinion or supposition, incline it self to any such disposition, [*there is no fear.*] For as for the body, why should I make the grief of my body to be the grief of my mind? If that it self can either fear or complain, let it. But as for the soul, which indeed can only be truly sensible of either fear or grief; to which only it belongs, according to its different imaginations and opinions, to admit of either of these, or of their contraries; [*thou mayest look to that thy self, that*] it suffer nothing. Induce her not to any such opinion or perswasion. The understanding is of it self sufficient unto it self, and needs not (if it self doth not bring it self to need) any other thing besides it self; and by consequent, as it needs nothing, so neither can it be troubled or hindered by any thing, if it self doth not trouble and hinder it self.

* See the
Latin
Notes.

XIV. What is *ἡδυσμωμία* [or, *happiness*,] but * *αἰαδὸς δαίμων*, [or, a good *Demon*, or, *Spirit* ?] What then dost thou doe here, O opinion? By the gods I adjure thee, that thou get thee gone as thou camest : for I need thee not. Thou camest indeed [unto me] according to thy ancient wonted manner. [*It is that that all men have ever been subject unto. That thou camest therefore*] I am not angry with thee ; only be gone, [*now that I have found thee what thou art.*]

XV. Is any man so foolish as to fear change, to which all things [*that once were not*] owe their being? And what is it that is more pleasing and more familiar to the nature of the Universe? How couldst thou thy self use thy ordinary hot baths, should not the wood [*that beateth them*] first be changed? How couldst thou receive any nourishment from those things that thou hast eaten, if they should not be changed? Can any thing else almost (that is usefull and profitable) be brought to pass without change? How then dost not thou perceive, that for thee also [*by death*] to come to change, is a thing of the very same nature, and as necessary for the nature of the Universe?

XVI. Through the Substance of the Universe, as through a torrent, pass all particular bodies, being all of the same nature, and all joynt workers with the Universe it self, as in one of our bodies so many members among themselves. How many such as Chrysippus, how many such as Socrates, how many such as Epictetus,

Epictetus, hath the Age of the world long since swallowed up and devoured? Let this come into thy minde upon every occasion, be it either men or businesles, that thou hast occasion to think of, [*to the end that thy thoughts be not distracted, and thy minde too earnestly set upon any thing.*] Of all my thoughts and cares one only thing shall be the object, that I my self do nothing which to the proper constitution of man (either in regard of the thing it self, or in regard of the manner, or of the time of doing,) is contrary. The time when thou shalt have forgotten all things is at hand. And that time also is at hand, when thou thy self shalt be forgotten by all. [*Whilest thou art, apply thy self to that especially*] which unto man as he is a man is most proper and agreeable; and that is, for a man even to love them that transgress [*against him.*] This shall be, if at the same time [*that any such thing doth happen,*] thou call to minde, that they are thy Kinsmen; that it is through ignorance and against their wills that they sin; and that within a very short while after, both thou and he shall be no more. But above all things, that he hath not done thee any hurt; for that by him thy minde and understanding is not made worse or more vile than it was before.

XVII. The nature of the Universe, of the common substance of all things, as it were of so much wax, hath now perchance formed a horse; and then destroying that figure, hath new tempered and fashioned the matter of it into the form and substance of a tree; then

that again into the form and substance of a man ; and then that again into some other. Now every one of these doth subsist but for a very little while. As for dissolution, if it be no grievous thing to the chest or trunk, to be joynd together ; why should it be more grievous to be put asunder ?

XVIII. An angry countenance is much against nature, and it is oftentimes the proper countenance of them that are at the point of death.

* See Suidas, and other ancients, who bear witness to Anton. that he was never seen to change his countenance through either anger, or joy.

* But be it so, that all anger and passion is so thoroughly quenched in thee, that it is altogether impossible to kindle it any more : [*yet herein must not thou rest satisfied ;*] but further endeavour, by good consequence of true ratiocination, perfectly to conceive and understand, that all anger and passion is against reason. For if thou shalt not be sensible of thine innocency ; if that also shall be gone from thee, [*the comfort of a good conscience, that thou doest all things according to reason :*] what shouldest thou live any longer for ? All things that now thou seest are but for a moment. That nature, by which all things in the world are administred, will soon bring change and alteration upon them, and then of their substances make other things [*like unto them ;*] and then soon after others again of the matter and substance of these : that so by these means the world may still appear fresh and new.

XIX. Whensoever any man doth trespass against thee, presently consider with thy self what it was that he did suppose to be good, what to be evil, when he did trespass. For this
when

when thou knowest, thou wilt pity him; thou wilt have no occasion either to wonder, or to be angry. For, either thou thy self dost yet [*live in that error and ignorance, as that thou dost*] suppose either that very thing that he doeth, or some other like [*worldly*] thing, to be good; and so thou art bound to pardon him, [*if he have done that which thou in the like case wouldest have done thy self.*] Or if so be that thou dost not any more suppose the same things to be good or evil that he doeth; how canst thou but be gentle unto him that is in an error?

See B. X.
n. 30.

XX. Phansie not to thy self things future, as though they were present: but of those that are present, take some aside, that thou takest most benefit of, and consider of them particularly, how wonderfully thou wouldest want them, if they were not present. But take heed withall, lest that whilest thou dost settle thy contentment in things present, thou grow in time so to overprise them, as that the want of them (whensoever it shall so fall out) should be a trouble and a vexation unto thee. Winde up thy self into thy self. Such is the Nature of thy reasonable commanding part, as that if it exercise justice, and have by that means tranquillity within it self, it doth rest fully satisfied with it self [*without any other thing.*]

XXI. Wipe off all opinion: Stay the force and violence of unreasonable lusts and affections: Circumscribe the present time: Examine whatsoever it be that is happened, either to thy self or to another: Divide all present objects, either in that which is formal or mate-

* Συμ-
μεμετρί-
ναι.

riall; Think of the last hour. That which thy neighbour hath committed, where the guilt of it lieth, there let it rest. * *Extend* thy minde to [or, *Examine in order*] whatsoever is spoken. Let thy mind penetrate both into the effects, and into the causes. Rejoyce thy self with true simplicity and modesty; and that all *middle things* between vertue and vice are indifferent unto thee. [*Finally,*] Love mankinde; obey God.

XXII. *All things* (saith he) *are by certain order and appointment.* And what if the Elements only * * *. It will suffice to remember, that all things in general are by certain order and appointment: or if it be but few * *. And as concerning death, that either Dispersion, or the Atomes, or Annihilation, or Extinction, or Translation [*will ensue.*] And as concerning pain, that that which is intolerable is soon ended by death; and that which holds long must needs be tolerable; and that the minde in the mean time [*which is all in all*] may * by way of *interclusion*, or *interception* [*by stopping all manner of commerce and sympathie with the body,*] still retain its own tranquillity. Thy understanding is not made worse by it. As for those parts that suffer, let them, if they can, declare their grief themselves. As for praise and commendation, view their minde and understanding, what estate they are in; what kind of things they flee, and what things they seek after: and that as in the sea-shore, whatsoever was before to be seen, is by the continual succession of new heaps of sand cast up one upon

* καὶ τοῦ αὐ-
τοῦ αὐ-
τοῦ αὐ-
See B. V.
n. 20. B.
IX. B. 41.
See note 6.
upon B. II.
and B. VII.
34.

another,

another, soon hid and covered; so in this life, all former things by those which immediately succeed.

XXIII. Out of Plato. He then whose minde is endowed with true magnanimity, who hath accustomed himself to the contemplation both of all times, and of all things in general; can this mortal life (thinkest thou) seem any great matter unto him? It is not possible, answered he. Then neither will such a one account death a grievous thing? By no means.

XXIV. Out of Antisthenes. It is a princely thing to do well, and to be ill spoken of. It is a shamefull thing that the face should be subject unto the minde, to be put into what shape it will, and to be dressed by it as it will; and that the minde should not bestow so much care upon her self, as to fashion her self, and to dress her self as best becometh her.

XXV. [Out of several Poets and Comicks.] It will but little avail thee, to turn thine anger and indignation upon the things themselves [that have fallen cross unto thee.] For as for them, they are not sensible of it, &c. Thou shalt but make thy self a laughing-stock both unto the gods and men, &c. Our life is reaped like a ripe ear of corn: one is yet standing, and another is down, &c. But if so be that I and my children be neglected by the gods, there is some reason even for that, &c. As long as right and equity is on my side, &c. Not to lament with them, Not to tremble, &c.

XVI. Out of Plato. My answer, full of justice and equity, should be this: Thy speech is not right, O man, if thou supposest that he that

is of any worth at all, should apprehend either life or death as a matter of great hazard and danger; and should not make this rather his only care, to examine his own actions, whether just or unjust; whether actions of a good, or of a wicked man, &c. For thus in very truth stands the case, O ye men of Athens. What place or station soever a man either hath chosen to himself, judging it best for himself, or is by lawfull authority put and settled in; therein do I think (all appearance of danger notwithstanding,) that he should continue, as one who feareth neither death, nor any thing else, so much as he feareth to commit any thing that is vicious and shamefull, &c. But, O noble Sir, consider, I pray, whether true generosity and true happiness do not consist in somewhat else rather, than in the preservation either of our, or other mens lives. For it is not the part of a man that is a man indeed, to desire to live long, [or to make much of his life whilst he liveth:] But rather (he that is such) will in these things wholly refer himself unto the gods, and believing that which every woman can tell him, that no man can escape death; the only thing that he takes thought and care for is this, that what time he liveth, he may live as well and as virtuously as he can possibly, &c. To look about, and with the eyes to follow the course of the starres and planets, as though thou wouldest run with them; and to minde perpetually the several changes of the Elements one into another. For such phancies and imaginations help much to purge away the dross and filth of this our earthly life, &c. That also is a fine passage of Plato's, where he speaketh of worldly things in these words: Thou must also
as

See B. IX.
29. B. XII.
13.

as from some higher place look down, as it were, upon the things of this world; as flocks, armies, husband-mens labours, marriages, divorces, generations, deaths, the tumults of Courts, and places of judicatures; desert places, the several nations of Barbarians, publick festivals, mournings, fairs, markets. How all things [upon Earth] are pell-mell; and how [miraculously] things contrary one to another, concur to the beauty and perfection of this Universe. See B. IV. n. 12.

XXVII. To look back upon things of former ages, as upon the manifold changes and conversions of several Monarchies and Common-wealths. We may also fore-see things future, for they shall all be of the same kind; neither is it possible that they should leave the tune, or break the consort that is now begun, as it were, by these things that are now done and brought to pass in the World. It comes all to one therefore, whether a man be a spectator of the things of this life but forty years, or whether he see them ten thousand years together: for what shall he see more? *And as for those parts that came from the Earth, they shall return unto the Earth again; and those that came from Heaven, they also shall return unto those heavenly places.* Whether it be a mere dissolution and unbinding of the manifold intricacies and intanglements of the confused Atomes; or some such dispersion of the simple and incorruptible Elements * * *. *With meats and drinks and divers charms, they seek to divert the channel, that they might not die. Yet must we needs endure that blast of winds that cometh from above,*

bove, though he soyle and labour never so much.

* Gr. καὶ βαλὼν
εἶς.

XXVIII. He hath * a stronger body, and is a better wrastler than I. [What then?] Is he more bountifull? is he more modest? Doth he bear all adverse chances with more equanimity; or with his neighbours offences with more meekness and gentleness than I?

XXIX. Where the matter may be effected agreeably to that Reason, which both unto the gods and men is common, there can be no just cause of grief or sorrow. For where the fruit and benefit of an action well begun and prosecuted according to the proper constitution of man may be reaped and obtained, [or, is sure and certain,] it is against reason that any damage should there be suspected. In all places, and at all times, it is in thy power religiously to embrace whatsoever [by God's appointment] is happened unto thee, and justly to converse with those men whom thou hast to doe with; and accurately to examine every phancy that presents it self, that nothing may slip and steal in, before thou hast rightly apprehended the true Nature of it.

XXX. Look not about upon other mens minds and understandings; but look right on forwards whither Nature, both that of the Universe, in those things that happen unto thee, and thine in particular, in those things that are to be done by thee, doth lead and direct thee. Now every one is bound to doe that which is consequent and agreeable to that end which by his true natural constitution he was ordained unto.

unto. As for all other things, they are ordained for the use of reasonable creatures: as in all things we see that that which is worse and inferiour, is made for that which is better. Reasonable creatures, they are ordained one for another. That therefore which is chief in every man's constitution, is, that he intend the common good. The second is, that he yield not to any lusts and motions of the flesh. For it is the part and privilege of the reasonable and intellectual faculty, that she can so bound her self, as that neither the sensitive nor the appetitive faculties may any wayes prevail upon her. For both these are brutish. And [therefore] over both she challengeth mastery, and cannot any wayes indure [if in her right temper,] to be subject unto either. And this indeed most justly. For by nature she was ordained to command all in the body. The third thing proper to man by his constitution is, to avoid all rashness and precipitancy; and not to be subject to error. To these things then let the mind apply her self, and go straight on [without any distraction about other things,] and she hath her end, [and by consequent her happiness.]

XXXI. As one who had lived, and were now to die by right, whatsoever is yet remaining, bestow that wholly as [a gracious] overplus upon a *virtuous life*. Love and affect that only, whatsoever it be that happeneth, and is by the Fates appointed unto thee. For what can be more *reasonable*? And as any thing doth happen unto thee [by way of cross or calamity,] call
to

Gr. κατὰ
τὴν φύσιν.
See Pref.

to mind presently and set before thine eyes the examples of some other men, to whom the self-same thing did once happen likewise. Well, what did they? They grieved, they wondred, they complained. And where are they now? All dead and gone. Wilt thou also be like one of them? Or rather leaving these fickle dispositions to men of the world, (*or, men of as fickle minds as fickle bodies; ever changing, and soon changed themselves:*) let it be thine onely care and study, how to make a right use of all such accidents. For there is good use to be made of them, and they will prove fit matter for thee to work upon, if it shall be both thy *care* and thy *desire*, that whatsoever thou doest, thou thy self mayest like and approve thy self for it. And both these see that thou remember well, according as the diversity of the matter of the action that thou art about shall require. Look within; within is the fountain of all good: Such a fountain, where springing waters can never fail, so thou digge still deeper and deeper.

XXXII. Thou must use thy self also to keep thy body fixed and steady; free from all loose fluctuant, either motion, or posture. And as upon thy face and looks, thy mind hath easily power over them to keep them to that which is grave and decent; so let it challenge the same power over the whole body also. But so observe all things in this kind, as that it be without any manner of affectation.

XXXIII. The art of true living in this world, is more like a wraffler's than a dancer's practice.

For

For in this they both agree, [*to teach*] a man, whatsoever falls upon him, that he may be ready for it, and that nothing may cast him down.

XXXIV. Thou must continually ponder and consider with thy self, what manner of men they be, and for their minds and understandings what is their present estate, whose good word and testimony thou dost desire. For then neither wilt thou see cause to complain of them that offend against *their wills*; or find any want of their applause, if once thou dost but penetrate into the true source and ground both of their opinions and of their desires. *No soul* (saith he) *is willingly bereaved of the Truth*; and by consequent, neither of justice, or temperance, or kindness, and mildness; nor of any thing that is of the same kind. It is most needfull that thou shouldest alwayes remember this: For so shalt thou be far more gentle and moderate towards all men. See B. VIII. n. 13.

XXXV. What pain soever thou art in, let this presently come to thy mind, that it is not a thing whereof thou needest to be ashamed; neither is it a thing whereby thy understanding, that hath the government of all, can be made worse. For neither in regard of the substance of it, nor in regard of the end of it, (which is, to intend the common good;) can it alter and corrupt it. This also of Epicurus mayest thou in most pains find some help of, that it is *neither intolerable, nor eternal*; so thou keep thy self to the true bounds and limits [*of reason,*] and adde not unto them the opinion [*of either good or evil.*] This also thou must consider, that many things

things there be, which oftentimes unsensibly trouble and vex thee, [*as not armed against them with patience, because they go not ordinarily under the name of pains,*] which in very deed are of the same nature as pain; as to slumber unquietly, to suffer heat, to want appetite: when therefore any of these things make thee discontented, check thy self with these words, Now hath pain given thee the foil; Thy courage hath failed thee.

XXXVI. Take heed lest at any time thou stand so affected, though towards unnatural evil men, as ordinary men are commonly one towards another.

XXXVII. How know we whether Socrates were so Eminent indeed, and of so extraordinary a disposition? For that he died more gloriously, that he disputed with the Sophists more subtilly, that he watched in the *Pagus* more assiduously, that being commanded to fetch [*innocent*] Salaminus, he refused to do it more generously; all this will not serve. Nor that

* Gr. ἐν
ταῖς ὁδοῖς
ἁβρηνδύ-
ατο. See
Suidas.

* *he walked in the streets with much gravity and majesty*; as was objected unto him by his adversaries: which nevertheless a man may well doubt of, whether it were so or no, [*or, which above all the rest, if so be that it were true, a man would well consider of, whether commendable, or discommendable.*] The thing therefore that we must inquire into is this; What manner of soul Socrates had; whether his disposition was such, as that all that he stood upon and sought after in this world, was barely this, That he might ever carry himself justly towards men, and ho-
lily

lily towards the gods, neither vexing himself to no purpose at the wickedness of others, nor yet ever condescending to any man's *evil fact*, or *evil intentions*; [through either fear, or engagement of friendship.] Whether of those things that happened unto him by God's appointment, he neither did wonder at any when it did happen, or thought it intolerable in the trial of it. And lastly, whether he never did suffer his mind to sympathize with the senses and affections of the body. For we must not think that Nature hath so mixed and tempered it with the body, as that she hath not power to circumscribe her self, and by her self to intend her own ends and occasions.

XXXVIII. *For it is a thing very possible, that a man should be a very divine man, and yet be altogether unknown.* This thou must ever be mindfull of, as of this also, that a man's true happiness doth consist in very few things. And that although thou dost despair, that thou shalt ever be a good either Logician or Naturalist, yet thou art never the further off by it from being either liberal, or modest, or charitable, or obedient unto God.

XXXIX. Free from all compulsion in all cheerfulness and alacrity thou mayest run out thy time, though men should exclaim against thee never so much, and the wild beasts should pull in sunder the poor members * of this masse of flesh that compasseth thee about. For what in either of these or the like cases should hinder the mind to retain her own rest and tranquillity, consisting both in the right judgement

* See
Notes.

Gr. τὴν
 κρίσιν τῆς
 ἀποστολῆς.
 τῆς Χρηστίας
 τῆς ἀποστολῆς.
 κρίσιν.

of those things that happen unto her, and in the ready use of all present matters and occasions? So that her *judgement* may say to that which is *befaln* her by way of cross; This thou art in very deed, and according to thy true nature; notwithstanding that in the judgement of opinion thou dost appear otherwise: and her *discretion* to the present object, Thou art that which I sought for. For whatsoever it be that is now present, shall ever be embraced by me as a fit and seasonable object, both for my reasonable faculty, and for my *sociable*, or *charitable* inclination to work upon. And that which is principal in this matter, is, that it may be referred either unto [the praise of] God, or to [the good of] men. For either unto God or man, whatsoever it is that doth happen in the world, hath in the ordinary course of nature its proper reference; neither is there any thing, that [in regard of nature] is either new, or reluctant and intractable, but all things both usual and easie.

XL. Then hath a man attained to the estate of perfection in his life and conversation, when he so spends every day, as if it were his last day: never hot and vehement in his affections, nor yet so cold and stupid as one that had no sense; and free from all manner of dissimulation.

XLI. Can the gods, who are immortal, for the continuance of so many ages bear without indignation with such and so many sinners as have ever been, yea not only so, but also take such care for them, that they want nothing? and dost thou so grievously take on, as one that
 could

could bear with them no longer; thou that art but for a moment of time; yea, thou that art one of those sinners thy self? A very ridiculous thing it is, that any man should dispense with vice and wickedness in himself, which is in his power to restrain; and should goe about to suppress it in others, which is altogether impossible.

XLII. What object soever our reasonable and *social* faculty doth meet with, that affords nothing either for the satisfaction of reason, or for the practice of charity, she worthily doth think unworthy of her self.

XLIII. When thou hast done well, and another is benefited by thy action, must thou like a very fool look for a third thing besides; as that it may appear unto others also that thou hast done well, or that thou mayest in time receive one good turn for another? No man useth to be weary of that which is beneficial unto him. But every action according to Nature is beneficial. Be not weary then of doing that which is beneficial unto thee, whilest it is so unto others.

XLIV. The nature of the Universe did once certainly deliberate, and so resolve upon the creation of the World [*before it was created; whatsoever it hath done since.*] Now since that time, whatsoever it is that is and happens in the world, is either but a consequent of that one and first deliberation: or if so be that this ruling rational part of the world takes any thought and care of things particular, they are surely

See B. VI.
n. XXXIII.
XXXIX.
B. IX.
XXVI.

his reasonable and principal creatures, that are the proper object of his particular care and providence. This often thought upon will much conduce to thy tranquillity.

THE EIGHTH BOOK.



His also, among other things, may serve to keep thee from vain-glory, if thou shalt consider, that thou art now altogether incapable of the commendation of one who all his life long, or from his youth at least, hath lived a Philosopher's life. For both unto others, and to thy self especially, it is well known, that thou hast done many things contrary to that perfection of life. Thou hast therefore been confounded in thy course, and henceforth it will be hard for thee to recover the Title and credit of a Philosopher. And to it also is thy calling and profession repugnant. If therefore thou dost truly understand what it is that is of moment indeed; as for thy fame and credit, take no thought or care for that: let it suffice thee if all the rest of thy life, be it more or less, thou shalt live as thy nature requireth, [*or, according to the true and natural end of thy making.*] Take pains therefore to know what it is that thy nature requireth, and let nothing else distract thee. Thou hast already had sufficient experience, that of those many things about which thou hast hitherto wandered, thou couldest not finde

finde happiness in any of them. Not in Syllogismes and Logical subtilties, not in wealth, not in honour and reputation, not in pleasure. In none of all these. Wherein then is it to be found? In the practice of those things which the nature of man, as he is a man, doth require. How then shall he doe those things? If his *Dogmata*, or moral Tenets and opinions (from which all motions and actions do proceed,) be right and true. Which be those *Dogmata*? Those that concern that which is good or evil: as that there is nothing truly good and beneficial unto man, but that which makes him just, temperate, couragious, liberal; and that there is nothing truly evil and hurtfull unto man, but that which causeth the contrary effects.

II. Upon every action that thou art about, put this question to thy self; How will this when it is done agree with me? Shall I have no occasion to repent of it? Yet a very little while and I am dead and gone, and all things are at an end. What then do I care for more than this, that my present action, whatsoever it be, may be the proper action of one that is reasonable; whose end is the common good; who in all things is ruled and governed by the same law [*of right and reason,*] by which God himself is?

III. Alexander, Caius, Pompeius; what are these to Diogenes, Heraclitus, and Socrates? These penetrated into the true nature of things; into all causes, and all subjects: and upon these did they exercise their power and authority: [*or, these were the objects of their power and jurisdiction:*]

dition :] But as for those, as the extent of their error was, [or, of their care and providence in worldly matters,] so farre did their slavery extend.

* Gr. Α-
νταγών,
bust thy
self, pro-
perly.

IV. *What they have done, they will still doe, al-
though thou shouldest * hang thy self.* First, Let
it not trouble thee. For all things [both good
and evil] come to pass according to the nature
and general condition of the Universe, and
within a very little while all things will be at
an end ; no man will be remembered : as now
of Hadrianus (for example) and Augustus, it
is already come to pass. Then secondly, Fix
thy minde upon the thing it self ; look into it,
and remembering thy self, that thou art bound ne-
vertheless to be a good man, and what it is that
thy nature requireth of thee as thou art a man,
be not diverted from what thou art about, and
speak that which seemeth unto thee most just :
only speak it kindly, modestly, and without hy-
pocrisie.

V. That which the nature of the Universe
doth busie her self about, is, that which is
here, to transfer it thither, to change it ; and
thence again to take it away, and to carry it to
another place. All things are but [successive]
changes [of one into another :] So that thou
needest not fear any new thing. For all things
are usual and ordinary ; and all things are dispo-
sed by equality.

VI. Every particular nature hath content,
when in its own proper course it speeds. A
reasonable nature doth then speed, when first in
matter of phancies and imaginations it gives
no

no consent to that which is either false or uncertain. Secondly, when in all its motions and resolutions it takes its level at the common good only, and desireth nothing, and flieth from nothing, but what is in its own power to compass or avoid. And lastly, when it willingly and gladly embraceth whatsoever is dealt and appointed unto it by the common Nature. For it is part of it; even as the nature of any one leaf is part of the common nature of all plants and trees. But that the nature of a leaf is part of a nature both unreasonable and unsensible, and which [*in its proper end*] may be hindered; [*or, which is servile and slavish:*] whereas the nature of man is part of a common nature which cannot be hindered, and which is both reasonable and just. From whence also it is, that according to the worth of every thing, she doth make such equal distribution of all things, as of duration, substance, form, operation, and of events and accidents. But herein consider, not whether thou shalt finde this equality in every thing absolutely and by it self; but whether in all the particulars of some one thing taken together, and compared with all the particulars of some other thing together likewise.

VII. Thou hast no time nor opportunity to read. What then? Hast thou not time and opportunity to exercise thy self, not to wrong [*thy self;*] to strive against [*all carnal*] pleasures and pains, and to get the upper hand of them; to contemn honour and vain-glory; and not only not to be angry with them whom

towards thee thou dost finde unsensible and unthankful, but also to have a care of them still, and of their welfare?

VIII. Forbear henceforth to complain of the troubles of a Courtly life, either in publick before others, or in private by thy self.

IX. Repentance is an inward and self-reprehension for the neglect or omission of somewhat that was profitable. Now whatsoever is good, is also profitable, and it is the part of an honest vertuous man to set by it, and to make reckoning of it accordingly. But never did any honest vertuous man repent of the neglect or omission of any [*carnal*] pleasure: no [*carnal*] pleasure then is either good or profitable.

X. This, what is it in it self, and by it self, according to its proper constitution? What is the substance of it? What is the matter, [*or, proper use?*] What is the form [*or, efficient cause?*] What is it for in this world, and how long will it abide? [*Thus must thou examine all things that present themselves unto thee.*]

XI. When thou art hard to be stirred up and awakened out of thy sleep, admonish thy self and call to mind, that, to perform actions tending to the common good, is that which thine own proper constitution, and that which the nature of man do require. But to sleep, is common to unreasonable creatures also. And what more proper and natural, yea what more kind and pleasing, than that which is according to Nature?

XII. As

XII. As every phancy and imagination presents it self unto thee, consider (if it be possible) the true nature and the proper qualities of it, and reason with thy self about it.

XIII. At thy first encounter with any one, say presently to thy self, This man, what are his opinions concerning that which is good or evil? as concerning pain, pleasure, and the causes of both; concerning honour and dishonour, concerning life and death; thus and thus. Now if it be no wonder that a man should have such and such opinions; how can it be a wonder that he should doe such and such things? I will remember then, that he cannot but doe as he doeth [*holding those opinions that he doth.*] And that as it is a shame for any man to wonder that a figge-tree should bear figges, so is it also to wonder that the World should bear any thing, whatsoever it is which in the ordinary course of nature it may bear. To a Physician also and to a Pilot it is a shame, either for the one to wonder that such and such a one should have an Ague; or for the other, that the winds should prove contrary.

XIV. Remember, that to change thy minde upon occasion, and to follow him that is able to rectifie thee, is equally ingenuous, [*as to finde out at the first what is right and just, without help.*] For of thee nothing is required that is beyond the extent of thine own deliberation and judgement, and of thine own understanding.

XV. If it were thine act and in thine own power, why wouldest thou doe it? If it were not, whom

whom dost thou accuse? the atomes, or the gods? For to doe either is the part of a mad-man. Thou must therefore blame no body, but, if it be in thy power, redress what is amiss; if it be not, to what end is it to complain? For nothing should be done but to some certain end.

XVI. Whatsoever dieth [*and falleth, however and wheresoever it die and fall,*] it cannot fall out of the world. If here it have its abode and change, here also shall it have its dissolution into its proper elements. The same are the world's Elements, and the elements of which thou dost consist. And they when they are changed, they murmur not; [*why shouldst thou?*]

XVII. Whatsoever is, was made for something: as a horse, a vine. Why wonderest thou? The Sun it self can tell thee, for what work he was made: and so [*hath*] every god [*its proper function.*] What then wert thou made for? to disport and delight thy self? See how even common sense and reason cannot brook it.

XVIII. Nature hath its end as well in the end and final consummation of any thing that is, as in the beginning and continuation of it.

XIX. As one that tosseth up a ball. And what is a ball the better, if the motion of it be upward; or the worse, if it be downwards, or if it chance to fall upon the ground? So for the bubble; if it continue, what is it the better? and if it dissolve, what is it worse? And so is it of a candle too. [*And so must thou reason with*

with thy self, both in matter of fame, and in matter of death. For as for the body it self, (the subject of death) wouldst thou know the vileness of it?] Turn it about, [that thou mayest behold it the worst side upwards as well as in its more ordinary pleasant shape:] how doth it look when it is old and withered? when sick and pained? when in the act of lust and fornication? [And as for fame,] This life is short. But he that praiseth, and he that is praised; he that remembers, and he that is remembered, [will soon be dust and ashes.] Besides, it is but in one corner of this part of the world [that thou art praised;] and yet in this corner thou hast not the joynt praises of all men, no nor scarce of any one constantly. And yet the whole earth it self, what is it but as one point, [in regard of the whole world?]

XX. That which must be the subject of thy consideration, is either the matter it self, or the *Dogma*, or the operation, or the true sense and signification.

XXI. Most justly have these things happened unto thee: [why dost not thou amend?] O but thou hadst rather *become* good to morrow, than to be so to day.

XXII. Shall I doe it? I will, so the end of my action be to doe good unto men. Doth any thing by way of cross or adversity happen unto me? I accept it, with reference unto the Gods, and [their providence;] the fountain of all things, from which whatsoever comes to pass doth hang and depend.

XXIII. [By one action judge of the rest.] This bathing

bathing [*which usually takes up so much of our time*] what is it? Oyle, sweat, filth; [*or the sordes of the body:*] water, an excrementitious viscosity, [*the excrements of oyle, and other ointments used about the body, and mixed with the sordes of the body:*] all base and loathsome. And such [*almost*] is every part of our life, and every [*worldly*] object.

XXIV. Lucilla [*buried*] Verus; then was Lucilla her self [*buried by others.*] So Secunda, Maximus; then Secunda her self. So Epitunchanus, Diotimus; then Epitunchanus himself. So Antoninus Pius, Faustina [*his wife;*] then Antoninus himself. This is the course of the world. First, Celer, Adrianus; then Adrianus himself. And those austere ones, those that foretold other mens deaths, those that were so proud and stately, where are they now? Those austere ones I mean, such as were Charax, and Demetrius the Platonick, and Eudamon, and others like unto those. They were all but for one day; all dead and gone long since. Some of them no sooner dead, than forgotten. Others soon turned into fables. Of others, even that which was fabulous is now long since forgotten. This therefore thou must remember, that whatsoever thou art compounded of, shall [*soon*] be dispersed, and that thy life and breath, [*or, thy soul,*] shall either be no more, or shall be translated, and appointed to some certain place and station.

XXV. The true joy of a man, is to doe that which properly belongs unto a man. That which is most proper unto a man, is, First, to be kindly affected

affected towards them that are of the same kind and nature as he is himself; to condemn all sensual motions and appetites; to discern rightly all plausible phancies and imaginations; to contemplate the nature of the Universe; both it, and all things that are done in it. [*In which kind of contemplation*] three several relations [*are to be observed.*] The first, to the appearing secondary cause. The second, to the first original cause, God, from whom originally proceeds whatsoever doth happen in the World. The third and last, to them that we live and converse with: [*what use may be made of it to their use and benefit.*]

XXVI. If pain be an evil, either it is in regard of the body, (and that cannot be, *because the body of it self is altogether insensible:*) or in regard of the soul. But it is in the power of the soul, to preserve her own peace and tranquillity, and not to suppose that pain is evil. For all judgement and deliberation, all prosecution or averfation is from within, whither the sense of evil [*except it be let in by opinion*] cannot penetrate.

Gr. *ἐν τῷ σώματι*
ἡσυχία
 Du. See E.
 VII. n. 134

XXVII. Wipe off all [*idle*] phancies, and say unto thy self incessantly, Now, if I will, it is in my power to keep out of this my soul all wickedness, all lust and concupiscences, all trouble and confusion: But on the contrary, to behold and consider all things according to their true nature, and to carry my self towards every thing according to its true worth. Remember then this thy power, that Nature hath given thee.

XXVIII.

XXVIII. Whether thou'speak in the Senate, or whether thou speak to any particular, let thy speech be alwayes grave and modest. But thou must not openly and vulgarly observe that sound and exact form of speaking [*concerning that which is truly good and truly evil; the vanity of the world, and of worldly men:*] which otherwise Truth and Reason doth prescribe.

XXIX. Augustus his Court, his Wife, his Daughter, his Nephews, his Sons in Law, his Sister, Agrippa, his Kinsmen, his domesticks, his Friends; Arcus, Mecenas, his *auspices* [*or slayers of beasts for sacrifice and divination:*] There thou hast the death of a whole Court together. Proceed now on to the rest [*that have been since that of Augustus*] Hath death dealt with them otherwise, [*though so many and so shortly whilst they lived,*] than it doth use to deal with any one particular man? Consider now the death of a whole kindred and family, as of that of the Pompeys, as that also that useth to be written upon some monuments, **HE WAS THE LAST OF HIS OWN KINDRED.** O, what care did his predecessors take that they might leave a successor! yet, behold, at last one or other must of necessity be **THE LAST.** Here again therefore consider the death of a whole kindred.

XXX. Contract thy whole life to the measure and proportion of one single action. And if in every particular action thou dost perform what is fitting to the utmost of thy power, let it suffice thee, [*or, think that thou hast lived long enough.*] And who can hinder thee, but that thou

thou mayest perform what is fitting? But there may be some outward let and impediment. Not any that can hinder thee, but that whatsoever thou doest, thou mayest doe it justly, temperately, and with the praise of God. Yea, but there may be somewhat whereby some operation or other of thine may be hindered. And then with that very thing that doth hinder, thou mayest be well pleased, and so by this gentle and equanimous conversion of thy mind unto that which may be [*in stead of that which at first thou didst intend,*] in the room of that former action there succeedeth another, which agrees [*as well*] with this contraction of thy life that we now speak of.

XXXI. Receive [*temporal blessings*] without ostentation, when they are sent; and [*thou shalt be able*] to part with them with all readiness and facility when they are taken from thee again.

XXXII. If ever thou sawest either a hand, or a foot or a head lying by it self, in some place or other, as cut off from the rest of the body, such must thou conceive him to make himself, as much as in him lieth, that either is offended with any thing that is happened, (whatsoever it be,) and as it were divides himself from it; or that commits any thing against the natural Law of mutual correspondence and society among men; or, [*he that commits any act of uncharitableness.*] Whosoever thou art that art such, thou art cast forth I know not whither out of the general unity, which is according to Nature. Thou wert born indeed a part, but now thou hast

hast cut thy self off. However, herein is matter of joy and exultation, that thou mayest be united again. God hath not granted it unto any other part, that once separated and cut off, it might be re-united and come together again. But, behold, that GOODNESSE [*how great and immense it is !*] which hath so much esteemed M A N. As at first he was so made, that he needed not, except he would himself, have rent or divided himself from the whole; so once divided and cut off, I T hath so provided and ordered it, that if he would himself, he might return, and grow together again, and be admitted into his former rank and place of a part, as he was before.

XXXIII. The Nature of the Universe as it hath imparted almost all her other faculties and properties unto every reasonable creature, so this in particular we have received from her, that as whatsoever doth oppose it self unto her, and doth withstand her in her purposes and intentions, she doth, though against its will and intention, *bring it about to her self, so serve her self* of it in the execution of her own destined ends; and so [by this though not intended cooperation of it with her self] makes it part of her self [whether it will or no;] So may every reasonable Creature, what crosses or impediments soever it meets with [in the course of this mortal life,] it may use them as fit and proper objects, to the furtherance of whatsoever it intended, and absolutely proposed unto it self [as its natural end and happiness.]

XXXIV.

XXXIV. Let not the general representation unto thy self of the wretchedness of this our mortal life trouble thee. Let not *thy mind wander up and down, and heap together in her thoughts* the many troubles and grievous calamities which thou art as subject unto as any other. But as every thing in particular doth happen, put this question unto thy self, and say, What is it that in this present matter seems unto thee so intolerable? For thou wilt be ashamed to confesse it. Then upon this presently call to minde, that neither that which is future, nor that which is past can hurt thee; but that onely which is present. (And that also is much lessened, if thou dost rightly circumscribe it.) And then check thy mind, if for so little a while (a mere instant) it cannot hold out with patience.

XXXV. What? are either Pantheas or Pergamus abiding to this day by their Master's tombs? or either Chabrias or Diotimus by that of Adrianus? O foolery! For what if they did? would their Masters be sensible of it? or if sensible, would they be glad of it? or if glad, were these immortal? Was not it appointed unto them also (both men and women,) to become old in time, and then to die? And these once dead, what would become of these former? [*And when all is done, what is all this for,*] but for a bagge of blood and corruption? [*or, a loathsome carcase?*]

XXXVI. *If thou beest quick-sighted, be so in matter of judgements, and best discretion,* saith he.

XXXVII. In the whole constitution of man, I

see not any vertue contrary to justice, whereby it may be resisted and opposed. But one whereby pleasure and voluptuousness may be resisted and opposed, I see, Continnence.

See before
n. XXVI.

XXXVIII. If thou canst but withdraw conceit and opinion concerning that which may seem hurtfull and offensive, thou thy self art as safe as safe may be. Thou thy self? and who is that? Thy Reason. Yea, but I am not Reason: Well, be it so. However, let not thy Reason [or *understanding*] admit of grief; and if there be any thing in thee that is grieved, let that (whatsoever it be,) conceive its own grief, [if it can.]

See B. IV.
n. 1.

XXXIX. That which is an hinderance of the senses, is an evil to the sensitive nature. That which is an hinderance of the appetitive and prosecutive faculty, is an evil to the sensitive nature. As of the sensitive, so of the vegetative constitution, whatsoever is an hinderance unto it, is also in that respect an evil unto the same. And so likewise, whatsoever is an hinderance unto the mind and understanding, must needs be the proper evil of the reasonable nature. Now apply all those things unto thy self. Do either pain or pleasure seize on thee? Let the senses look to that. Hast thou met with some obstacle or other in thy purpose and intention? If thou didst propose without due reservation and exception, now hath thy reasonable part received a blow indeed. But if in general thou didst propose unto thy self whatsoever might be, thou art not thereby either hurt, nor [properly] hindered. For in those things that properly belong
unto

unto the mind, she cannot be hindered by any man. It is not fire, nor Iron, nor the power of a Tyrant, nor the power of a slandering tongue, nor any thing else that can penetrate into her.

XL. *If once round and solid, there is no fear that ever it will change.*

XLI. Why should I grieve myself, who never did willingly grieve any other? One thing rejoiceth one, and another thing another. As for me, this is my joy; If my understanding be right and sound, as neither averse from any man, nor refusing any of those things which as a man I am subject unto; If I can look upon all things in the world meekly and kindly, accept all things, and carry my self towards every thing according to the true worth of the thing it self.

XLII. This time that is now present, bestow thou upon thy self. They that rather hunt for fame after death, do not consider, that those men that shall be hereafter, will be even such as these whom now they can so hardly bear with. And besides, they also will be mortal men. But [*to consider the thing in it self*] if so many with so many voices shall make such and such a sound, or shall have such and such an opinion concerning thee, what is it at all to thee?

XLIII. Take me and throw me where thou wilt: [*I am indifferent.*] For there also I shall have that Spirit which is within me propitious; that is, well pleased and fully contented both in that constant disposition, and with those particular actions which to its own proper constitution are suitable and agreeable.

* See Latin notes.

XLIV. Is this then a thing of that worth, that for it my soul should suffer, and become worse than it was? Is either basely dejected; * and cast down; or confounded within it self, or terrified? What can there be that thou shouldst so much esteem?

XLV. Nothing can happen unto thee, which is not incidental unto thee as thou art a man. As nothing can happen either to an ox, a vine, or to a stone, which is not incidental unto them; unto every one in his own kind. If therefore nothing can happen unto any thing which is not both usual and natural; why art thou displeased? Sure the common nature of all would not bring any thing upon any, that were intolerable. If therefore it be a thing external that causeth thy grief, [*know, that*] it is not that properly that doth cause it, but thine own conceit and opinion concerning the thing: which thou mayest rid thy self of when thou wilt. But if it be somewhat that is amiss in thine own disposition that doth grieve thee; mayest thou not rectifie thy *dogmata* [or, *moral Tenets and opinions* ?] But if it grieve thee, that thou dost not perform that which seemeth unto thee right and just, why dost not thou chuse rather to perform it than to grieve? But somewhat that is stronger than thy self doth hinder thee. Let it not grieve thee then, if it be not thy fault that the thing is not performed. Yea, but it is a thing of that nature, as that thy life is not worth the while, except it may be performed. If it be so, upon condition that thou be kindly and lovingly disposed towards

towards all men, thou mayest be gone. For even then, as much as at any time, art thou in a very good estate of performance, when thou dost die in charity with those that are an obstacle unto thy performance.

XLVI. Remember that thy minde [*is of that nature as that it*] becometh altogether unconquerable, when once recollected in her self; she seeks no other content than this, that she cannot be forced: yea, though it so fall out, that it be even against Reason it self that it doth bandie. How much less when by the help of Reason she is able to judge of things with discretion? And therefore let thy chief Fort and place of defence be, a mind free from passions. A stronger place, (whereunto to make his refuge, and so to become impregnable) and better fortified than this, hath no man. He that seeth not this, is unlearned. He that seeth it, and betaketh not himself to this place of refuge, is unhappy.

XLVII. Keep thy self to the first [*bare and naked*] apprehensions of things, as they present themselves unto thee, and adde not unto them. It is reported unto thee, that such a one speaketh ill of thee. Well; that he speaketh ill of thee, so much is reported. But that thou art hurt thereby, is not reported: [*That is the addition of opinion; which thou must exclude.*] I see that my child is sick. That he is sick, I see; but that he is in danger of his life also, I see it not. Thus thou must use to keep thy self to the first notions and apprehensions of things, as they present themselves outwardly; and adde not unto

them from within thy self [*through mere conceit and opinion* :] and thou hast no hurt. Or rather adde unto them ; but as one that understandeth the true nature of all things that happen in the world.

XLVIII. Is the Cucumber bitter ? set it away. Are Brambles in the way ? avoid them. Let this suffice. * *Addē not presently, speaking unto thy self.* What serve these things for in the world ? For, this, one that is acquainted with the mysteries of Nature will laugh at thee for it ; as a Carpenter would or a Shoo-maker, if meeting in either of their shops with some shavings, or small remnants of their work, thou shouldst blame them for it. And yet those men, it is not for want of a place where to throw them [*that they keep them in their shops for a while* :] but the nature of the Universe hath no such out-place : but herein doth consist the wonder of her art and skill, that she having once circumscribed her self within some certain bounds and limits, whatsoever is within her that seems either corrupted, or old, or unprofitable, she can change it into her self, and of these very things can make new things ; so that she needeth not to seek else-where out of her self either for a new supply of matter and substance, or for a place where to throw out whatsoever is irrecoverably putrid and corrupt. Thus she, at for place, so for matter and art, is her self sufficient unto her self.

XLIX. Not to be slack and negligent ; or loose and wanton in thy actions ; nor contentious and troublesome in thy conversation, nor

to rove and wander in thy phancies and imaginations. Not basely to contract thy soul; nor boisterously to sally out with it, [or, *furiously to launch out as it were*] nor ever to want employment.

L. They kill me, they cut my flesh; they persecute my person with curses. What then? May not thy minde for all this continue pure, prudent, temperate, just? As a fountain of sweet and clear water, though she be cursed by some stander by, yet do her springs nevertheless still run as sweet and clear as before; yea though either durt or dung be thrown in, yet is it no sooner thrown than dispersed, and she cleared. She cannot be dyed [or, *infected*] by it. What then must I doe, that I may have [within my self] an ever-flowing Fountain, and not a Well? Beget thy self by continual [pains and endeavours] to [true] liberty with charity, and true simplicity and modesty.

LI. He that knoweth not what the world is, knoweth not where he himself is. And he that knoweth not what the world was made for, cannot possibly know either what are the qualities, or what is the nature of the world. Now he that in either of these is to seek, for what he himself was made is ignorant also. What then dost thou think of that man, who proposeth unto himself, as a matter of great moment, the noise and applause of men, who both where they are, and what they are themselves, are altogether ignorant? Dost thou desire to be commended of that man, who thrice in one hour

perchance doth himself curse himself? Dost thou desire to please him, who pleaseth not himself? or dost thou think that he pleaseth himself, who doth use to repent himself almost of every thing that he doeth?

* Gr. συμ-
πνῆν.

* Gr. συμ-
πνῆν.

LII. Not only now henceforth to * *have a common breath* [or, *to hold correspondency of breath*], with that Aire that compasseth us about; but * *to have a common minde* [or, *to hold correspondency of minde*], also with that rational substance which compasseth all things. For that also is of it self, and of its own nature (if a man can but draw it in as he should,) every where diffused; and passeth through all things, no less than the Aire doth, if a man can but suck it in.

See before
n. 32.

LIII. Wickedness in general doth not hurt the World. Particular wickedness doth not hurt any other: only unto him it is hurtfull [*whosoever he be that offends,*] unto whom [*in great favour and mercy*] it is granted, that whensoever he himself shall but first desire it, he may be presently delivered of it. Unto my Free-will my neighbour's free-will, whoever he be, (as his life, or his body) is altogether indifferent. For although we are all made one for another, yet have our minds and understandings each of them their own proper and limited jurisdiction. For else another mans wickedness might be my evil; which God would not have, that it might not be in another mans power to make me unhappy: [*which nothing now can doe but mine own wickedness.*]

LIV. The Sun seemeth to be shed abroad.

And

And indeed it is *diffused*, but not *effused*. For that *diffusion* of it is a ~~mens~~ or an extension. For therefore are the beams of it called *diffuses* from the word *diffundere*, *to be stretched out and extended*. Now what a Sun-beam is, thou mayest know if thou observest the light of the Sun, when through some narrow hole it pierceth into some room that is dark. For it is always in a direct line. And as by any solid body that it meets with in the way that is not penetrable by aire, it is divided and *abrupted*, and yet neither slides off, or falls down, but stayeth there nevertheless: such must the *diffusion* of the mind be; not an effusion, but an extension. What obstacles and impediments soever she meeteth with in her way, she must not violently and by way of an impetuous onset light upon them; neither must she fall down; but she must stand, and give light unto that which doth admit of it. For as for that which doth not, [*it is its own fault and loss, if*] it bereave it self of her light.

LV. He that feareth Death, either feareth that he shall have no sense at all, or that his senses will not be the same. Whereas [*he should rather comfort himself, that*] either no sense at all, and so no sense of evil; or if any sense, then another life, and so no death [*properly.*]

LVI. All men are made one for another: either then teach them better, or bear with them.

LVII. The motion of the mind is not as the motion of a dart. For the minde when it is wary and cautelous, and by way of diligent circumspection

cumſpection turneth her ſelf many ways, may then as well be ſaid to goe ſtraight on to the object, [*as when it ſeeth no ſuch circumſpection.*]

See B. IX.

n. 16. B. I.

n. XI.

LVIII. To pierce and penetrate into the eſtate of every ones underſtanding [*that thou haſt to doe wiſh :*] as alſo to make the eſtate of thine own open and penetrable to any other.

THE NINTH BOOK.



E that is unjuſt, is alſo impious. For the Nature of the Univerſe having made all reaſonable creatures one for another, to the end that they ſhould doe one another good, more or leſs according to the ſeveral perſons and occaſions; but in no wiſe hurt one another: it is manifeſt that he that doth tranſgreſs againſt this her will, is guilty of impiety towards the moſt ancient and venerable of all the Deities. For the Nature of the Univerſe is the nature [*the common Parent of all, and therefore piously to be obſerved*] of all things that are; and that which now is, to whatſoever firſt was, and gave it its being, hath relation of blood and kindred. She is alſo called *Truth*; and is the firſt cauſe of all truths. He therefore that willingly and wittingly doth lie, is impious in that he doth deceive, and ſo commit juſtice; but he that againſt his will, in that he

he disagreeeth from the nature of the Universe, and in that striving with the nature of the World, he doth in his particular * *violate the* * Gr. 2-
general order of the world. For he doth no bet- *νοσην.*
 ter than strive and warre against it, who contrary to his own Nature applyeth himself to that which is contrary to truth. For Nature had before furnisht him with instincts and opportunities [*sufficient for the attainment of it :*] which he having hitherto neglected, is not now able to discern that which is false from that which is true. He also that pursues *See note 5.*
 after pleasures, as that which is truly good, *upon B.II.*
 and flies from pains, as that which is truly evil, is impious. For such a one must of necessity oftentimes accuse that common Nature, as distributing many things both unto the evil and unto the good, not according to the deserts of either: as unto the bad oftentimes pleasures, and the causes of pleasures; so unto the good, pains, and the occasions of pains. Again, he that feareth pains and crosses in the world, feareth some of those things which sometime or other must needs happen in the world. And that we have already shewed to be impious. And he that pursueth after pleasures, will not spare [*to compass his desires*] to doe that which is unjust, and that is manifestly impious. Now those things which unto Nature are equally indifferent, (for she had not created both pain and pleasure, if both had not been unto her equally indifferent :) they that will live according to Nature, must in those things (as being of the same mind and disposition that she is)
 be

be as equally indifferent. Whosoever therefore in either matter of pleasure and pain, death and life, honour and dishonour, (which things Nature in the administration of the world indifferently doth make use of,) is not as indifferent, it is apparent that he is impious. When I say that common Nature doth indifferently make use of them, my meaning is, that they happen indifferently in the ordinary course of things, which by a necessary consequence, whether as principal and accessorie, come to pass in the world; according to that first and ancient deliberation of Providence, by which she from some certain beginning did resolve upon the creation of such a World,

* Gr. εν λ-
λαβουσα
πινει λδ-
γν.

* *conceiving them in her womb as it were some certain rational generative seeds and faculties of things future, whether subjects, changes, successions; both such and such, and just so many.*

II. It were indeed more happy and comfortable, for a man to depart out of this World, having lived all his life long clear from all falshood, dissimulation, voluptuousnesse, and pride. But if this cannot be, yet is it some comfort for a man [joyfully] to depart [as] weary, and out of love with those; rather than to desire to live, and to continue long in these wicked courses. Hath not yet experience taught thee to flie from the plague? For a farr greater plague is the corruption of the mind, than any certain change and distemper of the common aire can be. This is a plague of creatures, as they are living creatures; but that

that of men as they are men [or reasonable.]

III. Thou must not in matter of death carry thy self scornfully, but as one that is well pleased with it, as being one of those things that Nature hath appointed. For what thou dost conceive of these, of a boy to become a young man, to waxe old, to grow, to ripen, to get teeth, or a beard, or gray haire; to beget, to bear, or to be delivered; or what other action soever it be that is natural unto man according to the several seasons of his life; such a thing is it also to be dissolved.

It is therefore the part of a wise man, in matter of death, not in any wise to carry himself either violently or proudly; but patiently to wait for it, as one of Nature's operations: that with the same mind as now thou dost expect when that which yet is but an *Embryo* in thy Wive's belly shall come forth, thou mayest expect also when thy soul shall fall off from that [outward coat or skin,] wherein [as a child in the belly] it lieth involved and shut up. But if thou desirest

a * more popular, and [though not so direct and philosophical, yet] a very powerfull and penetrative receipt against the fear of death; Nothing can make thee more willing to part with thy life, than if thou shalt consider, both what the subjects themselves are that thou shalt part with, and what manner of dispositions thou shalt no more have to do with. True it is, that offended with them thou must not be by any means, but take care of them, and meekly bear with them. However, this thou mayest remember, that whensoever it happens that thou depart, it shall not be from men that held the same *Dogmata*, [or,

See note
upon B.
XI. n. 3.

* Gr. ἰδι-
ωτὴς κα-
τασκευ-
ασμένης
ἐκ τῆς
ἐκείνης
συστά-
σεως.

[or, opinions in point of life and practice] that thou dost. For that indeed, (if it were so) is the only thing that might make thee averse from death, and willing to continue here, if it were thy hap to live with men that had obtained the same principles [or, belief] that thou hast. But now, what a toil it is for thee to live with men, whose course of life is so different from thine, thou seest : so that thou hast rather occasion to say, *Hasten, I beseech pray, O Death ; lest I also in time forget myself.*

IV. He that sinneth, sinneth unto himself. He that is unjust, hurts himself, in that he makes himself worse than he was before. Not he only that committeth, but he also that omitteth something, is oftentimes unjust.

V. If my present apprehension of the object be right, and my present action charitable, and this, towards whatsoever doth proceed from God, be my present disposition, to be well pleased with it, it sufficeth.

VI. To wipe away phancy, to use deliberation, to quench concupiscence, to keep the mind free to her self.

VII. Of all unreasonable creatures, there is but one unreasonable soul ; and of all that are reasonable, but one reasonable Soul, divided betwixt them all. As of all earthly things there is but one Earth ; and but one light that we see by ; and but one aire that we breath in, as many as either breath or see. Now whatsoever partakes of some common thing, naturally affects and enclines unto that whereof it is part, being of one kind and nature with it. Whatsoever is Earthly, presseth downwards to the common

mon Earth. Whatsoever is liquid, would flow together. And whatsoever is airy, would be together likewise. So that without some obstacle, and some kind of violence, they cannot well be kept asunder. Whatsoever is fiery, doth not only by reason of the Elementary fire tend upwards; but here also is so ready to joyn, and to burn together, that whatsoever doth want sufficient moisture to make resistance, is easily set on fire. Whatsoever therefore is partaker of that reasonable common Nature [*naturally*] doth as much and more long after his own kind. For by how much in its own nature it excells all other things, by so much more is it desirous to be joyned and united unto that which is of its own nature. As for unreasonable creatures then, they had not long been, but presently begun among them swarms, and flocks, and broods of young ones, and a kind of mutual love and affection. For [*though but unreasonable, yet*] a [*kind of*] soul these had; and therefore was that naturall desire of union more strong and intense in them, as in creatures of a more excellent nature, than either in plants, or stones, or trees. But among reasonable creatures began Common-wealths, friendships, families, publick meetings, and even in their warrs conventions and truces. Now among them that were yet of a more excellent nature, as the stars and planets, though by their nature far distant one from another, yet even among them began some mutual correspondency and unity. So proper is it to excellency in a high degree to affect

affect unity, as that even in things so farre distant, it could operate unto a mutual Sympathy. But now behold, what is now come to pass. Those creatures that are reasonable, are now the only creatures that have forgotten their natural affection and inclination of one towards another.

Among them alone [*of all other things that are of one kind*] there is not to be found a *general disposition to flow together*. But though they fly from Nature, yet are they stopt in their course, and apprehended. Do they what they can, Nature doth prevail. And so shalt thou confess, if thou dost observe it. For sooner mayest thou find a thing earthly where no other earthly thing is; than find a man that [*naturally*] can live by himself alone.

VIII. Man, God, the World, every one in their kind, bear some fruits. All things have their proper time *to bear*. Though by custome, the word it self is in a manner become proper unto the vine, and the like, yet is it so nevertheless as we have said. As for reason, that beareth both common fruit for the use of others; and peculiar, which it self doth enjoy. What it self is in it self, it begets in others, and so doth multiply.

IX. Either teach them better, if it be in thy power; or if it be not, remember that for this use [*to bear with them patiently*] was mildnesse and goodnesse granted unto thee. The gods themselves are good unto such; yea and in some things, (as in matter of health, of wealth, of honour,) are content often to further their endeavours: so
good

good and gracious are they. And mightest thou not be so too? or, tell me, what doth hinder thee?

X. Labour not as one [*to whom it is appointed to be*] wretched, nor as one that either would be pitied, or admired; but let this be thine only care and desire, so always and in all things to prosecute or to forbear, as the law of Charity [*or, mutual society*] doth require.

XI. This day *I did come out* of all my trouble. Nay I *have cast out* all my trouble; it should rather be. For that which troubled thee, whatsoever it was, was not *without* any where, [that thou shouldst *come out* of it;] but *within* in thine own opinions, [from whence it must be *cast out*, before thou canst truly and constantly be at ease.

XII. All those things, for matter of experience, are usual and ordinary; for their continuance, but for a day; and for their matter, most base and filthy. As they were in the days of those whom we have buried, so are they now also, and no otherwise.

XIII. The things themselves [*that affect us*] they stand without doors, neither knowing any thing themselves, nor able to utter any thing to others concerning themselves. What then is it that passeth verdict on them? The understanding.

XIV. As vertue and wickedness consist not in passion, but in action; so neither doth the true good or evil of a reasonable charitable man consist in passion, but in operation and action.

XV. To the stone that is cast up, when it comes
N down

down it is no hurt unto it; as neither benefit, when it doth ascend.

XVI. Sift their minds and understandings, and behold what men they be whom thou dost stand in fear of what they shall judge of thee, what they themselves judge of themselves.

XVII. All things that are in the world are always in the estate of alteration. Thou also art in a perpetual change, yea and under corruption too, in some part: and so is the whole world.

XVIII. It is [*not thine, but*] another man's sin. [*Why should it trouble thee?*] Let him look to it whose sin it is.

XIX. Of an operation and of a purpose there is *an ending*, [or, of an action and of a purpose we say commonly, that *it is at an end*:] from opinion also there is an [*absolute*] cessation, which is as it were the death of it. In all this there is no hurt. Apply this now to a man's age; as first a child, then a youth, then a young man, then an old man: every change from one age to another is a kind of death. And all this while here is no matter of grief yet. Pass now unto that life, first, that which thou livedst under thy Grandfather, then under thy Mother, then under thy Father. And thus when through the whole course of thy life hitherto thou hast found and observed many alterations, many changes, many kinds of *endings* and cessations, put this question to thy self, What matter of grief or sorrow dost thou find in any of these? [or, *what dost thou suffer through any of these?*] If in none of these, then neither in the

the ending and consummation of thy whole life, [*which also is but*] a cessation and change.

XX. [*As occasion shall require,*] either to thine own Understanding, or to that of the Universe, or to his [*whom thou hast now to do with,*] let thy reuge be with all speed. To thine own, that it resolve upon nothing against justice. To that of the Universe, that thou mayest remember, part of whom thou art. Of his [*whom thou hast now to do with,*] that thou mayest consider, whether in the estate of ignorance, or of knowledge. And then also must thou call to minde, that he is thy Kinsman.

XXI. As thou thy self [*whoever thou art*] wert made for the perfection and consummation [*being a member of it*] of a common society; so must every action of thine tend to the perfection and consummation of a life that is [*truly*] sociable. What action soever of thine therefore that either immediately or afarre off hath not reference to the common good, that is an exorbitant and disorderly action; yea, it is seditious; as one among the people who from such and such a consent and unity, should factiously divide and separate himself.

XXII. Children's anger, mere baubles, wretched souls bearing up dead bodies, *that they may not have their fall so soon*: Even as it is in that common dirge-song, [*or, bearing up dead bodies, that the number of the dead may not be full so soon.*]

XXIII. Go to the quality of the cause [*from which the effect hath proceed.*] Behold it by it

self bare and naked, separated from all that is material. Then consider the utmost bounds of time which that cause, thus and thus qualified, can subsist and abide.

XXIV. Infinite are the troubles and miseries that thou hast already been put to, by reason of this onely, because that for all happiness it did not suffice thee, [*or, that thou didst not account it sufficient happiness,*] that thy understanding did operate according to its natural constitution. It is time to make an end, [*and to begin a new course.*]

See before
a. IX.

XXV. When any shall either impeach thee with false accusations, or hatefully reproach thee, or shall use any such carriage towards thee, get thee presently to their minds and understandings, and look in them, and behold what manner of men they be. Thou shalt see that there is no such occasion why it should trouble thee, what such as they are think of thee. Yet must thou love them still, for by nature they are thy friends. And the gods themselves, in those things that they seek from them as matters of great moment, are well content, all manner of ways (*as by dreams and oracles*) to help them [*as well as others.*]

XXVI. Up and down, from one age to another, goe the ordinary things of the world; being still the same. And either of every thing in particular [*before it come to pass,*] the mind of the Universe doth consider with it self and deliberate; and if so, then submit [*for shame*] unto the determination of [*such an excellent*] Understanding: or once for all it did

did resolve upon all things in general; and since that, whatsoever happens, happens by a necessary consequence; and all things *indivisibly in a manner, and inseparably*, hold one of another. In summe, either there is a God, and then all is well; or if all things goe by chance and fortune, yet mayest thou use thine own Providence [*in those things that concern thee properly; and then thou art well.*]

XXVII. Within a while the Earth shall cover us all, and then she her self shall have her change. And then the course will be, from one period of eternity unto another, and so a perpetual eternity: Now can any man that shall consider with himself in his mind the several rollings [*or, successions*] of so many changes and alterations, and the swiftness of all these rollings; can he otherwise but contemn in his heart, and despise all worldly things? The Cause of the Universe [*or, the general cause*] is as it were a strong torrent, it carrieth all away.

XXVIII. And these your professed Politicians, the onely true practick Philosophers of the world, (as they think of themselves) * *so* * *Gr. μὴ full of affected gravity, [or, such profess'd lovers of virtue and honesty,* *ἐν ψυχῇ.* what wretches be they in very deed? how vile and contemptible in themselves? O man! what a doe dost thou keep? Doe what thy nature doth now require. Resolve upon it, if thou mayest: and take no thought, whether any body shall know it or no. Yea, but [*sayest thou*] I must not expect a Plato's Common-wealth. If they profit though

never so little, I must be content; and think much even of that little progresse. Doth then any of them forsake their former [false] opinions [that I should think they profit?] For without a change of opinions, alas! what is all that ostentation, but mere wretchedness of slavish minds; that groan privately, and yet would make a shew of obedience [to Reason and Truth?] Goe to now and tell me of Alexander and Philippos, and Demetrius Phalereus. Whether they understood what the common nature requireth; and could rule themselves or no, they know best themselves. But if they kept a life, and swaggered; I (God be thanked) am not bound to imitate them. The effect of true Philosophy is, unaffected simplicity and modesty. Persuade me not to ostentation and vain-glory.

See B. VII.

II. 26.

XXIX. From some high place as it were to look down, and to behold, here flocks, and there sacrifices without number; and all kind of navigation; some in a rough and stormy sea, and some in a calm; the general differences [or, different estates] of things, some that are now first upon being; the several and mutual relations of those things that are together; and some other things that are at their last. Their lives also who were long agoe, and theirs who shall be after thee, and the present estate and life of those many nations of Barbarians that are now in the world, thou must likewise consider in thy minde. And how many there be who never so much as heard of thy Name, how many that will soon forget it; how many who
but

but even now did commend thee, within a very little while, perchance, will speak ill of thee. So that neither fame, nor honour, nor any thing else that this world doth afford, is worth the while. The summe then of all; Whatsoever doth happen unto thee, whereof God is the cause, to accept it contentedly: whatsoever thou doest, whereof thou thy self art the cause, to do it justly: which will be, if both in thy resolution and in thy action thou have no further end, than to do good unto others, as being that which *by thy natural constitution* [or, *as a man,*] thou art bound unto.

XXX. Many of those things that trouble and streighten thee, it is in thy power to cut off, as wholly depending from mere conceit and opinion, and then thou shalt have room enough.

XXXI. To comprehend the whole world together in thy mind, and the whole course of this present age to represent it unto thy self, and to fix thy thoughts upon the suddain change of every particular object. How short the time is from the generation of any thing, unto the dissolution of the same; but how immense and infinite both that which was before the generation, and that which after the generation of it shall be. All things that thou seest will soon be perished, and they that see their corruptions will soon vanish away themselves. He that dieth a hundred years old, [or, extreme old,] and he that dieth young, shall come all to one.

XXXII. What are their minds and under-

standings; and what the things that they apply themselves unto? what do they love, and what do they hate for? Phansie to thy self the estate of their souls openly to be seen. When they *think* they hurt them shrewdly whom they speak ill of, and when they *think* they doe them a very good turn whom they commend and extoll; O how full are they then of conceit and opinion!

XXXIII. Loss and corruption is in very deed nothing else but change and alteration; and that is it which the Nature of the Universe doth most delight in, by which and according to which, whatsoever is done, is well done. For that was the estate of worldly things from the beginning, and so shall it ever be. Or wouldst thou rather say, that all things in the world have gone ill [*from the beginning for so many Ages,*] and shall ever goe ill? And then among so many Deities, could no Divine power be found all this while, that could rectifie the things of the world? Or is the world to incessant woes and miseries for ever condemned?

XXXIV. How base and putrid every common matter is! Water, dust, [*and from the mixture of these*] bones, and all that loathsome stuffe [*that our bodies doe consist of;*] so subject to be infected and corrupted. And again [*those other things that are so much prized and admired, as*] marble-stones [*what are they but, as it were*], the Kernels of the Earth? gold and silver, [*what are they, but as*] the more gross dreggs of the Earth? Thy [*most royal*] apparel,

rel, for matter, it is but as it were the hair [*of a silly sheep*;] and for colour, the very blood [*of a shell-fish*]. Of this nature are all other things. Thy life it self is some such thing too; [*a mere exhalation of blood*:] and it also apt to be changed into some other common thing.

XXXV. Will this querulousness, this murmuring, this complaining, and dissembling [*or apish complying*] never be at an end? What then is it that troubleth thee? Doth any new thing happen unto thee? What dost thou so wonder at? At the cause, or the matter? Behold either by it self, [*is either of that weight and moment indeed?*] And besides these, there is not any thing. But thy duty towards the gods also, it is time that thou shouldst acquit thy self of it with more goodness and simplicity.

XXXVI. It is all one to see these things for a hundred years together, or but for three years.

XXXVII. If he have sinned, his is the harm, not mine. But perchance he hath not.

XXXVII. Either all things by the providence of Reason happen unto every particular, as a part of one general body; and then it is against reason that a part should complain of any thing that happens for the good of the Whole: or if [*according to Epicurus*] Atoms [*be the Cause of all things,*] and [*that life be*] nothing else but an accidentary confusion of things, and [*death nothing else but*] a mere Dispersion, [*and so of all other things*;] what dost thou trouble thy self for?

XXXIX. Sayest thou unto that Rational part, thou art dead; corruption hath taken hold

hold on thee? Doth it then also void excrements? Doth it, like either Oxen or Sheep, graze or feed; [*that it also should be mortal, as well as the body?*]

XL. Either the gods can doe nothing for us at all, or they can still and allay all the distractions and distempers of thy minde. If they can doe nothing, why dost thou pray? If they can, why wouldst thou not rather pray, that they will grant unto thee, that thou mayest neither fear nor lust after any of those [*worldly*] things [*which cause these distractions and distempers of it?*] Why not rather, that thou mayest not at either their absence or presence be grieved and discontented; than either that thou mayest obtain them, or that thou mayest avoid them? For certainly it must needs be, that if the gods can help us in any thing, they may in this kind also. But thou wilt say perchance, In those things the gods have given me my liberty: and it is in mine own power to doe what I will. But if thou mayest use this liberty, rather to set thy minde at true liberty, than wilfully with baseness and servility of minde to affect those things, which [*either to compass or to avoid*] is not in thy power; wert not thou better? And as for the gods, who hath told thee that they cannot help us even in those things that they have put in our own power? Whether it be so or no, thou shalt soon perceive, if thou wilt but try thy self and pray. One prayeth that he may compass his desire, to lie with such or such a one; pray thou that thou mayest not lust to lie with her. Another,
how

how he may be rid of such a one; pray thou that thou *[mayest so patiently bear with him, as that thou]* have no such need to be rid of him. Another, that he may not lose his child; pray thou that thou mayest not fear to lose him. To this end and purpose let all thy prayers be, and see what will be the event?

XXI. *In my sickness* (saith Epicurus of himself,) *my discourses were not concerning the nature of my disease, neither was that the subject of my talk to them that came to visit me; but in the consideration and contemplation of that which was of especial weight and moment, was all my time bestowed and spent, and among others in this very thing, how my mind by a natural and unavoidable sympathie, partaking in some sort with the present indisposition of my body, might nevertheless keep her self free from trouble, and in present possession of her own proper happiness.* Neither did I, saith he, leave the ordering of my body to Physicians altogether to doe with me what they would, as though I expected any great matter from them *[or, as though I thought it a matter of such great consequence, by their means to recover my health:]* for my present estate, methought, liked me very well, and gave me good content. Whether therefore in sickness (if thou chance to sicken,) or in what other kind of extremity soever, endeavour thou also to be in thy mind so affected, as he doth report of himself: not to depart from thy Philosophy for any thing that can befall thee, nor to give eare to the discourses of silly people and mere naturalists.

XLII. It

XLII. It is common to all trades and professions to mind and intend that only which now they are about, and the instrument whereby they work.

XLIII. When at any time thou art offended with any ones impudency, put presently this question to thy self; What? Is it then possible that there should not be any impudent men in the world? Certainly it is not possible. Desire not then that which is impossible. For this one, (thou must think) whosoever he be, is one of those impudent ones that the world cannot be without. So of the subtle and crafty, so of the perfidious, so of every one that offendeth, must thou ever be ready to reason with thy self. For whilest in general thou dost thus reason with thy self, that the kind of them must needs be in the world, thou wilt be the better able to use meekness towards every particular. This also thou shalt find of very good use, upon every such occasion, presently to consider with thy self, what proper vertue nature hath furnished man with against such a vice, [*or, to encounter with a disposition vicious in this kind.*] As for example, against the unthankfull, it hath given goodness and meekness, as an antidote; and so against another [*vicious in another kind*] some other peculiar faculty. And generally, is it not in thy power to instruct him better that is in an error? For whosoever sinneth, doth in that decline from his purposed end, and is certainly deceived. And again, what art thou the worse for his sin? For thou shalt not find that any one of these against whom thou art incensed,
hath

bath in very deed done any thing whereby thy mind (the only true subject of thy hurt and evil) can be made worse than it was. And what a matter of either grief or wonder is this, if he that is *unlearned* doe the deeds of one that is *unlearned*? Shouldest not thou rather blame thy self, who, when upon very good grounds of reason, thou mightest have thought it very probable that such a thing would by such a one be committed, didst not only not foresee it, but moreover dost wonder at it, that such a thing should be? But then especially, when thou dost finde fault with either an unthankfull or a false man, must thou reflect upon thy self. For without all question thou thy self art much in fault, if either of one that were of such a disposition, thou didst expect that he should be true unto thee: or when unto any thou didst a good turn, thou didst not there bound thy thoughts, as one that had obtained his end; nor didst think that from the action it self thou hadst received a full reward of the good that thou hadst done. For what wouldst thou have more? Unto him that is a man thou hast done a good turn: doth not that suffice thee? What thy nature required, that hast thou done. Must thou be rewarded for it? As if either the eye for that it seeth, or the feet for that they goe, should require satisfaction. For as these being by nature appointed for such an use, can challenge no more than that they may work according to their natural constitution: so man being born to doe good unto others, whensoever he doth a reall good unto any [*by helping them*

out

out of error;] or though but in *middle* things, [as in matter of wealth, life, preferment, and the like] doth help to further their desires; he doeth that for which he was made, and therefore can require no more.

THE TENTH BOOK.



My soul, the time, I trust, will be, when thou shalt be good, simple, single, more open and visible, than that body by which thou art inclosed. Thou wilt one day be sensible of their happiness, whose end is love, and their affections dead to all worldly things. Thou shalt one day be full, and in want of no external thing: not seeking pleasure from any thing, either living or unsensible, that this World can afford; neither wanting time for the continuation of thy pleasure, nor place and opportunity, nor the favour either of the weather or of men. When thou shalt have content in thy present estate, and all things present shall add to thy content: when thou shalt persuade thy self, that thou hast all things, at present; all for thy good, and all by the providence of the gods: and of things future also shalt be as confident, that whatsoever they shall think fit to send, it will all do well, as tending to the maintenance and preservation in some sort of his perfect welfare and happiness, who is perfection of life, of goodness, justice,

See B. V.
n. 8. last
lines.

justice, and beauty; who begets all things, and containeth all things in himself, and in himself doth recollect all things from all places that are dissolved, that of them he may beget others again like unto them. Such one day shall be thy disposition, that thou shalt be able, both in regard of the gods, and in regard of men, so to fit and order thy conversation, as neither to complain of them at any time, for any thing that they doe; nor to doe any thing thy self, for which thou mayest [*justly*] be condemned.

II. As one who is altogether governed by nature, let it be thy care to observe what it is that thy nature [*in general*] doth require. That done, if thou find not that thy nature, as thou art a living sensible creature, will be the worse for it, thou mayest proceed. Next then thou must examine, what thy nature, as thou art a living sensible creature, doth require. And that, whatsoever it be, thou mayest admit of and doe it, if thy nature, as thou art a reasonable living creature, will not be the worse for it. Now whatsoever is reasonable, is also *sociable*. Keep thy self to these rules, and trouble not thy self about idle things.

III. Whatsoever doth happen unto thee, thou art naturally by thy natural constitution either able, or not able to bear. If thou beest able, be not offended, but bear it according to thy natural constitution [*or, as nature hath enabled thee.*] If thou beest not able, be not offended. For it will soon make an end of thee, and it self (whatsoever it be) at the same

same time end with thee. But remember, that whatsoever by the strength of opinion, grounded upon a certain apprehension of both [*true*] profit and duty, thou canst conceive tolerable; that thou art able to bear that by thy natural constitution.

see B.
III. n.
14. 30.

IV. Him that offends, to teach with love and meekness, and to shew him his error. But if thou canst not, then to blame thy self; or rather not thy self neither, [*if thy will and endeavours have not been wanting.*]

V. Whatsoever it be that happens unto thee, it is that which from all time was appointed unto thee. For by the same coherence of causes, by which thy substance from all eternity was appointed to be, was also whatsoever should happen unto it destinated and appointed.

VI. Either [*with Epicurus, we must fondly imagine*] the atomes [*to be the cause of all things;*] or [*we must needs grant*] a Nature. Let this then be thy first ground, that thou art part of that Universe which is governed by Nature. Then secondly, that to those parts that are of the same kind and Nature as thou art, thou hast relation of kindred. For of these if I shall always be mindfull, first as I am a part, I shall never be displeased with any thing that falls to my particular share of the common chances of the world. For nothing that is behovefull unto the whole, can be [*truly*] hurtfull to that which is part of it. For this being the common priviledge of all natures, that they contain nothing in themselves that is hurtfull unto them; it cannot be that the nature of the Universe (whose priviledge beyond

yond other particular natures, is, that she cannot against her will by any higher external cause be constrained,) should beget any thing [*and cherish it in her bosome*] that should tend to her own hurt and prejudice. As then I bear in mind that I am a part of such an Universe, I shall not be displeased with any thing that happens. And as I have relation of kindred to those parts that are of the same kind and nature that I am, so I shall be carefull to doe nothing that is prejudicial to the community, but in all my deliberations shall they that are of my Kind ever be; and the common good, that which all my intentions and resolutions shall drive unto; as that which is contrary unto it, I shall by all means endeavour to prevent and avoid. These things once so fixed and concluded, as thou wouldest think him an happy Citizen, whose constant study and practice were for the good and benefit of his fellow-Citizens, and the carriage of the City such towards him, that he were well pleased with it, so must it needs be with thee, that thou shalt live a happy life.

VII. All parts of the world, (all things I mean that are contained within the whole world,) must of necessity at some time or other come to *corruption*. *Alteration* I should say, to speak truly and properly; but that I may be the better understood, I am content at this time to use that more common word. Now say I, if so be that this be both hurtfull unto them, and yet unavoidable, would not, thinkest thou, the whole it self be in a sweet case, all

the parts of it being subject to alteration, yea and by their making it self fitted for corruption, as consisting of things different and contrary? And did nature then either of her self thus project and purpose the affliction and misery of her parts, and therefore of purpose so made them, not only that haply they might, but of necessity that they should fall into evil? or did not she know what she did, when she made them? For either of these two to say, is equally absurd. But to let pass nature in general, and to reason of things particular according to their own particular natures; how absurd and ridiculous is it, first to say, that all parts of the whole are, by their proper natural constitution, subject to alteration; and then when any such thing doth happen [*as when one doth fall sick and dieth*] to take on, and wonder as though some strange thing had happened? Though this besides might move not so grievously to take on when any such thing doth happen, that whatsoever is dissolved, it is dissolved into those things whereof it was compounded. For every dissolution is either a mere dispersion of the Elements into those Elements again whereof every thing did consist; or a change of that which is more solid, into Earth, and of that which is pure and subtil [*or, spiritual*] into aire. So that [*by this means nothing is lost, but*] all resumed again into those rational generative seeds of the Universe; and this Universe, either after a certain period of time to be consumed by fire, or by continual changes to be renewed, and so for ever to endure.

Now

Now that solid and *Spiritual* that we speak of, thou must not conceive it to be that very *same* which at first was, when thou wert born. For, alas! all this that now thou art in either kind [*either for matter of substance, or, of life;*] hath but two or three dayes agoe partly from meats eaten, and partly from aire breathed in, received all its * *influx, [being the same then, * Gr. which it was at first when thou wert born, in no other respect, than a running river, maintained by the perpetual influx and new supply of waters, is the same.]* That therefore which thou hast since received, not that which came from thy Mother, is that which comes to change [*and corruption.*] But suppose that that [*for the general substance, and more solid part of it,*] should still cleave unto thee never so close; yet what is that to the proper qualities and affections of it, [*by which persons are distinguished*] which certainly are quite different?

VIII. Now that thou hast taken these names upon thee of good, modest, true; of εὖμερον, σὺμμερον, ὑπερμερον; take heed lest at any times [*by doing any thing that is contrary,*] thou be but improperly so called, and lose thy right to these appellations. Or if thou do, return unto them again with all possible speed. And remember, that the word εὖμερον notes unto thee an intent and intelligent consideration of every object that presents it self unto thee, without distraction. And the word σὺμμερον, a ready and contented acceptance of whatsoever by the appointment of the common nature happens unto thee. And the word ὑπερμερον, a *super-ex-*

tension [or, a transcendent, and outreaching disposition] of thy minde, whereby it passeth by all bodily pains and pleasures, honour and credit, death, and whatsoever is of the same Nature, [as matters of absolute indifferency, and in no wise to be stood upon by a wise man.] These then if inviolably thou shalt observe, and shalt not be ambitious to be so called by others, both thou thy self shalt become a new man, and thou shalt begin a new life. For to continue such as hitherto thou hast been, to undergoe those distractions and distempers [as thou must needs] for such a life [as hitherto thou hast lived,] is the part of one that is very foolish, and is over-fond of his life. Whom a man might compare to one of those half-eaten wretches, matched in the Amphitheatre with wilde beasts; who as full as they are all the body over with wounds and blood, desire for a great favour, that they may be reserved till the next day, then also, and in the same estate to be exposed to the same nails and teeth as before. Away therefore, ship thy self, and [from the troubles and distractions of thy former life] conveigh thy self as it were unto these few Names; and if thou canst abide in them [or, be constant in the practice and possession of them,] continue there [as glad and joyfull] as one that were translated unto some such place [of blis and happiness,] as [that which by Hesiod and Plato is called] the Islands of the Blessed, [by others called the Elysian fields.] And whensoever thou findest thy self, that thou art in danger of a relapse, and that thou art not able
to

to master and overcome [*those difficulties and temptations that present themselves in thy present station :*] get thee into thy private corner, where thou mayst be better able. Or if that will not serve, forsake even thy life rather. But so that it be not in passion, but in a plain voluntary modest way : this being the only commendable action of thy whole life, that thus thou art departed : [*or, this having been the main work and business of thy whole life, that thou mightest thus depart.*] Now for the better remembrance of those names that we have spoken of, thou shalt find it a very good help, to remember the gods [*as often as may be ;*] and that the thing which they require at our hands, of as many of us as are by nature reasonable creatures ; is not that [*with fair words, and outward shew of piety and devotion*] we should flatter them, but that we should become like unto them : and that as all other natural creatures, the Figg-tree for example, the Dog, the Bee, both doe, all of them, and apply themselves unto that which by their natural constitution is proper unto them ; so Man likewise should doe that which by his Nature, as he is a man, belongs unto him.

IX. Toies and fooleries [*at home ;*] warts [*abroad :*] sometimes terror, sometimes sorpor, [*or, stupid sloth :*] this is thy daily slavery. By little and little [*if thou dost not better look to it*] those sacred *Dogmata* will be blotted out of thy mind. How many things be there, which when, as a mere naturalist, thou hast barely considered of according to their nature, thou dost

let pass without any further use? Whereas thou shouldst in all things so joyn action and contemplation, that thou mightest both at the same time attend all present occasions, to perform every thing duly and carefully; and yet so intend the contemplative part too, that no part of that delight and pleasure which the contemplative knowledge of every thing, according to its true nature, doth of it self afford, might be lost. [Or, that the true and contemplative knowledge of every thing according to its own nature, might of it self, (action being subject to many lets and impediments) afford unto thee sufficient pleasure and happiness.] Not apparent indeed, but not concealed. And when shalt thou attain to the happiness of true Simplicity, and unaffected gravity? When shalt thou rejoyce in the certain knowledge of every particular object according to its true Nature: as what the matter and substance of it is; what use it is for in the world; how long it can subsist; what things it doth consist of; who they be that are capable of it, and who they that can give it and take it away?

X. As the Spider, when it hath caught the Fly that it hunted after, is not a little proud, nor meanly conceited of her self; as he likewise that hath caught an Hare, or hath taken a Fish with his * net; as another for the taking of a Boar, and another of a Bear: so may they be proud, and applaud themselves for their valiant acts against the *Sarmatae* [or, Northern Nations lately defeated.] For these also, [these famous souldiers and warlike men,] if thou dost look
into

* Gr. *κόρη*.
κῆρ.

See notes.

into their minds and opinions, what doe they for the most part but hunt after prey?

XI. To find out, and set to thy self some certain way and method of contemplation, whereby thou mayest clearly discern and represent unto thy self the mutual change of all things, the one into the other. Bear it in thy mind evermore, and see that thou be thoroughly well exercised in this particular. For there is not any thing more effectual to beget true magnanimity.

XII. He hath got loose from, [*or, he hath shaken off the bonds of*] his body, and perceiving that within a very little while he must of necessity bid the World farewell, and leave all these things behinde him, he wholly applied himself, as to righteousness in all his actions, so to the common Nature in all things that should happen unto him. And contenting himself with these two things, to doe all things justly, and whatsoever God doth send to like well of it; what others shall either say or think of him, or shall doe against him, he doth not so much as trouble his thoughts with it. To goe on straight, whether right reason directed him, and in so doing to follow God, was the onely thing that he did mind, that, his onely business and occupation.

XIII. What use is there of suspicion at all? [*or, why should thoughts, of mistrust and suspicion concerning that which is future, trouble thy mind at all?*] What now is to be done, if thou mayest search and enquire into that, what needest thou care for more? And if thou art well

able to perceiue it alone, let no man diuert thee from it. But if alone thou dost not so well perceiue it, suspend thine action, and take advice from the best. And if there be any thing else that doth hinder thee, goe on with prudence and discretion, according to the present occasion and opportunity, still proposing that unto thy self which thou dost conceive most right and just. For to hit that aright, and to speed in the prosecution of it, must needs be happinesse, since it is that onely which we can [*truly and properly be said to*] mis of, [*or, miscarry in.*]

XIV. What is that that is slow, and yet quick? merry, and yet grave? He that in all things doth follow Reason for his guide.

XV. In the morning as soon as thou art awaked, [*when thy judgement, before either thy affections or external objects have wrought upon it, is yet most free and impartial:*] put this question to thy self, whether if that which is right and just be done, the doing of it by thy self, or by others [*when thou art not able thy self,*] be a thing material or no. For sure it is not. And as for these that keep such a life, and stand so much upon the praises or dispraises of other men; hast thou forgotten what manner of men they be? that such and such upon their beds, and such at their board: what their ordinary actions are; what they pursue after, and what they fly from: what thefts and rapines they commit, if not with their hands and feet, yet with that more precious part of theirs, their minds; which (would it but admit of them) might

might enjoy faith, modesty, truth, justice, a good spirit.

XVI. *Give what thou wilt, and take away what thou wilt*, saith he that is well taught and truly modest, to him that gives, and takes away. And it is not out of a stout and peremptory resolution, that he saith it, but in mere love, and humble submission.

XVII. Thy life is almost at an end : To live henceforth, [*as indifferent to the world, and all worldly objects*] as one who liveth by himself alone upon some desert hill. For whether here or there, if the whole world be but as one Town, it matters not much for the place. Let them behold, and see a Man, that is a Man indeed, living according to the true nature of man. If they cannot bear with me, let them kill me. For better were it to die, than so to live [*as they would have me.*]

XVIII. Make it not any longer a matter of dispute, or discourse, what are the signs and proprieties of a good man ; but really and actually be such a one.

XIX. Ever to represent unto thy self, and to set before thee, both the general Age and time of the World, and the whole Substance of it. And how all things particular in respect of these are for their substance, as one of the least seeds that is, [*or, as the seed that is in a Figge :*] and for their duration, as the turning of the pestle in the Mortar once about. Then to fix thy mind upon every particular object of the World, and to conceive it, (*as it is indeed,*) as already being in the state of dissolution, and of change ;

change; tending to some kind of either putrefaction or dispersion, or whatsoever else it is, that is the death as it were of every thing in his own kind.

XX. Consider them through all actions and occupations of their lives: as when they eat, and when they sleep; when they are in the act of necessary exoneration, and when in the act of lust. Again, when they either are in their greatest exultation, and in the middle of all their pomp and glory; or being angry and displeased, in great state and majesty, as from an higher place, they chide and rebuke. How base and slavish, but a little while agoe, they were fain to be, that they might come to this; and within a very little while what will be their estate, [*when death hath once seized upon them.*]

XXI. That is best for every one, that the common Nature of all doth send unto every one; and then is it best, when she doth send it.

XXII. *The Earth [saith the Poet] doth often long after the rain. So is the glorious skie often as desirous to fall upon the Earth: which argues a mutual kind of love between them. And so [say I] doth the world bear a certain affection of love to whatsoever shall come to passe. With thine affections shall mine concurre, O World. The same (and no other,) shall the object of my longing be, which is of thine. Now that the world doth love, as it is true indeed, so is it as commonly said and acknowledged, when [according to the Greek phrase, imitated by the Latines, of things that use*

nse to be,] we say commonly, that they *love to be.*

XXIII. Either thou dost continue in this kind of life, and that is it which so long thou hast been used unto [*and therefore tolerable :*] or thou dost retire [*or, leave the World,*] and that of thine own accord, [*and then thou hast thy mind :*] or thy life is cut off, and then [*mayest thou rejoyce that*] thou hast ended thy chaige. One of these must needs be. Be therefore of good comfort.

XXIV. Let it always appear, and be mani-
 fested unto thee, that solitariness and desert pla-
 ces, [*by many Philosophers so much esteemed of*
and affected,] are of themselves but thus and
 thus; and that all things are here [*to them that*
live in Towns, and converse with others,] as
 they are [*the same nature every where to be seen*
and observed,] to them that have retired
 themselves to the top of mountains, and to de-
 sert Havens, or what other [*desert and inha-*
bited] places soever. For any where [*if thou*
wilt] mayest thou quickly find and apply that to
 thy self, which Plato saith [*of his Philosopher,*]
 in a place; [*as private and retired*] saith he,
 [*as if he were*] shut up and enclosed about
 in some Shepherd's lodge, on the top of a hill.
 There by thy self to put these questions to
 thy self [*or, to enter into these considerations :*]
 What is my chief and principal part, which hath
 power over the rest? What is now the pre-
 sent estate of it, as I use it; and what is it
 that I employ it about? Is it now void of
 reason or no? Is it free, and separated; or
 so affixed, so congealed and grown toge-
 ther,

See B. IV.
N. III.

ther, as it were, with the flesh, that it is swayed by the motions and inclinations of it?

XXV. He that runs away from his Master, is a fugitive. But the law is every man's Master. He therefore that forsakes the Law, is a fugitive. So is he, whosoever he be, that is either sorry, angry, or afraid of, or for any thing that either hath been, is, or shall be by his appointment, who is the Lord and Governour of the Universe. For he truly and properly is Νόμος [or, the Law] as the onely διανομης [or, distributor and dispenser] of all things that happen unto any one in his lifetime. Who.ever then is either sorry, angry, or afraid, is a fugitive.

XXVI. From man is the seed. That once cast into the womb, man hath no more to doe with it. Another Cause succeedeth, and undertakes the Work, and in time brings a Child (that wonderfull effect from such a beginning,) to perfection. Again, Man lets food down through his throat; and that once down, he hath no more to do with it. Another Cause succeedeth, and distributeth this food into the Senses, and the affections; into life, and into strength; and doth with it those other many and marvellous things that belong unto man. These things therefore that are so secretly and invisibly wrought and brought to passe, thou must use to behold and contemplate; and not the things themselves onely, but the power also by which they are effected; that thou mayest behold it, though not with the eyes of the body, yet as plainly and visibly as thou canst see and discern the [outward] effect-
ent

ent cause of the depression and elevation of any thing.

XVII. Ever to mind and consider with thy self, how all things that now are, have been heretofore much after the same sort, and after the same fashion that now they are: and so to think of those things which shall be hereafter also. Moreover, whole *dramata*, and uniform scenes, [or, *scenes that comprehend the lives and actions of men of one calling and profession,*] as many as either in thine own experience thou hast known, or by reading of ancient histories; (as the whole Court of Adrianus, the whole Court of Antoninus Pius, the whole Court of Philippus, that of Alexander, that of Cræsus :) to set them all before thine eyes. For thou shalt find that they are all but after one sort and fashion: [or, *all of the same kind and nature:*] only that the actors were others.

XXVIII. As a Pig that flings and cries when his throat is cut, phansie to thy self every one to be, that grieves [*for any worldly thing*] and takes on. Such a one is he also, who upon his bed alone doth bewail the miseries of this our mortal life. And remember this, that unto reasonable creatures only it is granted that they may willingly and freely submit unto Providence: but absolutely to submit, is a necessity imposed upon all creatures equally.

XXIX. Whatsoever it is that thou goest about, consider of it by thy self, and ask thy self, What? because I shall doe this no more when I am dead, should therefore death seem grievous unto me?

XXX.

See B.
VII.n.19.

XXX. When thou art offended with any mans transgression, presently reflect upon thy self, and consider what thou thy self art guilty of in the same kind. As that thou also perchance dost think it a happiness either to be rich, or to live in pleasure, or to be praised and commended, and so of the rest in particular. For this if thou shalt call to minde, thou shalt soon forget thine anger: especially when at the same time this also shall concur in thy thoughts, that he was constrained [*by his error and ignorance*] so to doe: For how can he chuse [*as long as he is of that opinion?*] Do thou therefore, if thou canst, take away that from him that forceth him to doe as he doth.

XXXI. When thou seest Satyro, think of Socraticus and Eutyches, or Hymen; and when Euphrates, think of Eutychio and Sylvanus; when Alciphron, of Tropæophorus; when Xenophon, of Crito, or Severus. And when thou dost look upon thy self, phantasie unto thy self some one or other of the Cæsars; and so for every one, some one or other that hath been for estate and profession answerable unto him. Then let this come to thy minde at the same time; And where now are they all? No where, or any where? For so shalt thou at all times be able to perceive how all worldly things are but as the smoke, [*that vanisheth away:*] or, indeed, mere nothing. Especially when thou shalt call to minde this also, that whatsoever is once changed, shall never be again as long as the world endureth. And thou then, how long shalt thou endure? And why doth

doth it not suffice thee, if vertuously, and as becometh thee, thou mayest pass that portion of time, how little soever it be, that is allotted unto thee?

XXXII. What a subject, and what a course of life is it, that thou dost so much desire to be rid of? For all these things what are they, but fit objects for an understanding, that beholdeth every thing accurately and according to its true nature, to exercise it self upon? Be patient therefore, untill that (as a strong stomach that turns all things into its own nature; and as a great fire that turneth into flame and light whatsoever thou dost cast into it;) thou have made these things also familiar, and as it were natural unto thee.

XXXIII. Let it not be in any mans power to say truly of thee, that thou art not truly simple, [or, *sincere and open,*] or not good. Let him be deceived whosoever he be that shall have any such opinion of thee. For all this doth depend of thee. For who is it that should hinder thee from being either truly simple or good? Do thou only resolve rather not to live, than not to be such. For indeed neither doth it stand with reason that he should live that is not such.

XXXIV. [*Wouldst thou now be happy?*] Doe that and speak that, whatsoever it be, that may now upon this present occasion according to best reason and discretion either be said or done: (for whatsoever it be, it is in thy power either to doe it or to say it, and therefore seek not any pretences as though thou wert hindered:) *and thou hast thy wish.* For untill such time

time that thou be so minded and affected, as that, what pleasure is unto the voluptuous, be unto thee, to doe in every thing that presents it self whatsoever may be done conformably and agreeably to the proper constitution of man, [or, to man as he is a man:] thou wilt never cease groaning and complaining. For thou must account that pleasure, whatsoever it be, that thou mayest doe according to thine own Nature. And to doe this, every place will fit thee. Unto the *Cylindrus* [or, roller] it is not granted to move every where according to its own proper motion; as neither unto the water, nor unto the fire, nor unto any other thing, that either is merely natural, or natural and sensitive, but not rational. For many things there be that can hinder their operations. But of the mind and understanding this is the proper priviledge, that according to its own nature, and as it will it self, it can pass through every obstacle that it finds, and keep straight on forwards. Setting therefore before thine eyes this happiness and felicity of thy mind, whereby it is able to pass through all things, [and is capable of all motions, whether] as the fire, upwards, or as the stone, downwards, or as the *Cylindrus*, through that which is sloping; [content thy self with it, and] seek not alter any other thing. For all other kind of hinderances [that are not hinderances of thy mind] either they are proper to the body, or merely proceed from the opinion, Reason not making that resistance that it should, but basely and cowardly suffering it self to be foiled;
and

and of themselves can neither wound, nor doe any hurt at all. Else must he of necessity, who-soever he be that meets with any of them, become worse than he was before. For so is it in all other subjects, that that is thought hurtfull unto them whereby they are made worse. But here contrariwise, man (if he make that good use of them that he should) is rather the better and the more praise-worthy for any of those kind of hinderances, than otherwise. But generally remember that nothing can hurt a natural Citizen, that is not hurtfull unto the City it self; nor any thing hurt the City, that is not hurtfull unto the Law it self. But none of these casualties or external hinderances do hurt the Law it self; [that is, the providence of Almighty God, who doth over-rule all things in the world, and of his infinite wisdom dispense all particular events to the general good and preservation of the Universe:] neither therefore do they hurt either City or Citizen.

XXXV. [As he that is bitten by a mad dog, is See B. VI.
afraid of every thing almost that he seeth: so] n. 52.
unto him whom the *Dogmata* have once bitten
[or, in whom true knowledge hath made an im-
pression] every thing almost [that he sees or
reads,] be it never so short or ordinary, doth
afford a good *memento*, to put him out of all
grief and fear; as that of the Poet, *The winds
blow upon the trees, and their leaves fall upon the
ground. Then do the trees begin to bud again,
and by the spring-time they put forth new branches.
So is the generation of men; some come into the
world, and others goe out of it.* Of these leaves

P

then

then thy Children are. And they also that applaud thee so gravely, [or, *that applaud thy speeches with that their usual acclamation, ἀξιωμαστος, O truly spoken!*] and speak well of thee; as on the other side, they that stick not to curse thee, they that privately and secretly dispraise and deride thee, they also are but leaves. And they also that shall follow, in whose memories the names of men famous after death is preserved, they are but leaves neither. For even so is it of all these [*worldly*] things. Their Spring comes, and they are put forth. Then blows the wind, and they goe down. And then in lieu of them grow others out of the wood [or, *common matter of all things,*] like unto them. But, to endure but for a while, is common unto all. Why then shouldest thou so [*earnestly*] either seek after these things, or flie from them, as though they should endure for ever? Yet a little while, * *and thine eyes will be closed up,* and for him that carries thee to thy grave shall another mourn within a while after.

* Gr. *χ*
καταμύ-
σῃς.

XXXVI. A good eye must be good to see whatsoever is to be seen, and not green things only. For that is proper to sore eyes. So must a good ear and a good smell be ready for whatsoever is either to be heard or smelt: and a good stomach as indifferent to all kinds of food, as a millstone is to whatsoever it was made for to grinde. As ready therefore must a sound understanding be for whatsoever shall happen. But he that saith, *O that my Children might live!* and, *O that all men might commend me for whatsoever I doe!* is as an eye that seeks
after

after green things; or as teeth, after that which is tender.

XXXVII. There is not any man that is so happy in his death, but that some of those that are by him when he dies, will be ready to rejoyce at his [supposed] calamity. Is it one that was vertuous and wise indeed? Will there not some one or other be found, who thus will say to himself, *Well, now at last shall I be at rest from this Pedagogue. He did not indeed otherwise trouble us much: but I know well enough that in his heart he did much condemn us.* Thus will they speak of the vertuous. But as for us, alas! how many things be there, for which there be many that would be glad to be rid of us? This therefore if thou shalt think of whensoever thou diest, thou shalt die the more willingly, when thou shalt think with thy self, I am now to depart from that World, wherein those that have been my nearest friends and acquaintance, they whom I have so much suffered for, so often prayed for, and for whom I have taken such care, even they would have me die, hoping that after my death they may perhaps live happier than they did before. What then should any man desire to continue here any longer? * Nevertheless, whensoever thou diest, thou * See notes. must not be less kind and loving unto them for it; but as before, so then, continue to be their friend, to wish them well, and meekly and gently to carry thy self towards them; but yet so, that on the other side, it make thee not the more unwilling to die. But as it fareth with them that die an easie quick death, whose soul

is soon separated from their bodies, so must thy separation from them be. To these had nature joyned and annexed me : now she parts us ; I am ready to depart, as from friends and kinsmen, but yet without either reluctancy or compulsion. For this also is according to Nature.

XXXVIII. Use thy self, as often as thou seest any man doe any thing, presently (if it be possible) to say unto thy self, What is this mans end in this his action ? But begin this course with thy self first of all, and diligently examine thy self [*concerning whatsoever thou doest.*]

XXXIX. Remember, that that which sets a man at work, and hath power over the affections to draw them either one way, or the other way, is [*not any external thing properly, but*] that which is hidden within, [*every mans dogmata and opinions :*] That, that is Rhetorick, that is life ; that (to speak true) is man himself. As for [*thy body,*] which as a vessel [*or, a case,*] compasseth thee about, and the many and curious instruments that it hath annexed unto it, let them not trouble thy thoughts. For of themselves they are but as a carpenter's ax, but that they are born with us, and naturally sticking unto us. But otherwise, without the inward cause that hath power to move them, and to restrain them, those parts are of themselves of no more use unto us, than the shuttle is of it self to the weav'ster, or the pen to the writer, or the whip to the Coach-man.

THE ELEVENTH BOOK.



THE natural properties and privileges of a reasonable soul are; That she seeth her self; that she can order and compose her self; that she makes her self as she will her self; that she reaps her own fruits whatsoever; whereas plants, trees, unreasonable creatures, what fruit soever they bear, (be it either fruit properly, or analogically onely) they bear it unto others, and not to themselves. Again, Whensoever and wheresoever [*sooner, or later*] her life doth end, she hath her own end nevertheless. For it is not with her, as with dancers and players, who if they be interrupted in any part of their action, the whole action must needs be imperfect: but she, in what part of time or action soever she be surprised, can make that which she hath in her hand, whatsoever it be, compleat and full, so that she may depart with that comfort, *I have lived; neither want I any thing of that which properly did belong unto me..* Again, she compasseth the whole world, and penetrateth into the Vanity and mere outside (wanting substance and solidity) of it, and stretcheth her self unto the infiniteness of eternity; and the revolution [*or, restauration*] of all things after a certain period of time, to the same state and place as before, she fetcheth about, and doth comprehend in her self; and considers withall, and sees clearly this, that

neither they that shall follow us shall see any new thing that we have not seen, nor they that went before any thing more than we: but that he that is once come to forty (if he have any wit at all) can in a manner (for that they are all of one kinde) see all things, both passed and future. As proper is it and natural to the soul of man to love her neighbours, to be true and modest, and to regard nothing so much as her self; which is also the property of the Law: whereby [by the way] it appears, that sound reason and justice comes all to one, [and therefore that justice is the chief thing that reasonable creatures ought to propose unto themselves as their end.]

See B.
XII. n.
VI.

I. A pleasant song or dance, the *Pancrastastes exercise*, [sports that thou art wont to be much taken with,] thou shalt easily contemn, if thou shalt divide the harmonious voice into so many particular sounds whereof it doth consist, and of every one in particular shalt ask thy self, whether this or that sound is it that doth so take [or, conquer] thee. For thou wilt be ashamed of it. And so for dance, if accordingly thou shalt consider it every particular motion and posture by it self: and so for the wraстlers exercise too. Generally then, whatsoever it be, besides vertue, and those things that proceed from vertue, [that thou art subject to be much affected with] remember presently thus to divide it, and by this kind of division in each particular, to attain unto the contempt of the whole. This thou must transferr and apply to thy whole life also.

III. That

III. That soul which is ever ready, even now presently (if need be) to be separated from the body, whether by way of Extinction, or Dispersion, or Continuation [*in another place and estate,*] how blessed and happy is it? But this readiness of it, it must proceed, not from an *ob-* Gr. κατὰ
ψυχὴν κα-
τάξιον.
See the
Notes.
stinate and peremptory resolution of the mind, violently and passionately set upon opposition, (as Christians are wont;) but from a peculiar judgement, with discretion and gravity, so that others may be persuaded also and drawn to the like example, but without any noise and passionate exclamations.

IV. Have I done any thing charitably? then am I benefited by it. See that this upon all occasions may present it self unto thy mind, and never cease to think of it. What is thy profession? to be good. And how should this be well brought to pass, but by certain Theorems and doctrines; some concerning the Nature of the Universe, and some concerning the proper and particular constitution of man [*or, by the true and Theorematical knowledge both of the nature of the Universe, &c?*]

V. Tragedies were at first brought in and instituted, to put men in mind of worldly chances and casualties: That these things in the ordinary course of nature did so happen; That men that were much pleased and delighted by such accidents upon this stage, might not by the same things upon a greater stage be grieved and afflicted: For here you see what is the end of all such things; and that even they that cry out so mournfully *to Citharon*, must bear them

[for all their cries and exclamations,] as well as others. And in very truth many good things are spoken by these Poets, as that (for example) is an excellent passage : *But if so be that I and my two children be neglected by the Gods, they have some reason even for that, &c.* And again, *It will me little avail thee to storm and rage against the things themselves, &c.* Again, *To reap ones life, as a ripe ear of corn ;* and whatsoever else is to be found in them that is of the same kind.

After the Tragedy, the *Comœdia vetus*, or ancient Comedie was brought in, which had the * liberty to inveigh against personal vices ; being therefore through this her freedom and liberty of speech of very good use and effect, to restrain men from pride and arrogance. To which end it was, that Diogenes took also the same liberty. After these, what were either the *Media*, or *Nova Comœdia* admitted for, but merely (or for the most part at least) for the delight and pleasure of curious and excellent imitation ? * *It will steal away ; look to it, &c.* Why, no man denies but that these also have some good things, [*whereof that may be one. :*] But the whole drift and foundation of that kind of *Dramaticall Poetry*, what is it else but as we have said ?

VI. How clearly doth it appear unto thee, that no other course of life could fit a true Philosopher's practice better than this very course that thou art now already in ?

VII. A branch cut off from the continuity of another branch, must needs be cut off from the whole tree : so a man that is divided from another man,

* παιδα-
γωγικήν
παρρησίαν
ἐχούσα.

Gr. ὑπερ-
βύπ' ἐπι-
στροφῆς.

man, is divided from the whole Society. A branch is cut off by another; but he that hates and is averse, cuts himself off from his neighbour, and knows not that at the same time he divides himself from the whole body, [or, *corporation*.] But herein is the gift and mercy of God, the Author of this society, in that, [once cut off] we may grow together and become part of the Whole again. But if this happen often, [the misery is that] the further a man is run in this division, the harder he is to be re-united and restored again: and however, the branch which, once cut off, afterwards was grafted in, gardeners can tell you is not like that which sprouted together at first, and still continued in the unity of the body.

VIII. * *To grow together like fellow-branches* * Gr. ὁμο-
[in matter of good correspondence and affection;] συμνήν
but not in matter of opinions. They that shall μίτ, μὴ ὁ-
oppose thee in thy right courses, as it is not in μὴ ὁμοθυμα-
their power to divert thee from thy good τῇν δό-
action, so neither let it be to divert thee from
thy good affection towards them. But be it
thy care to keep thy self constant in both; both
in a right judgement and action, and in true
meekness towards them, that either shall doe
their endeavour to hinder thee, or at least will
be displeased with thee [for what thou hast
done.] For to fail in either (either in the one to
give over for fear, or in the other to forsake thy
natural affection towards him who by nature is
both thy friend and thy kinsman,) is equally
base, and much favouring of the disposition of a
cowardly fugitive souldier.

IX. It is not possible that any nature should be inferiour unto art, since that all arts imitate nature. If this be so ; that the most perfect and general nature of all natures should [*in her operation*] come short of the skill of arts, is most improbable. Now common it is to all arts, to make that which is worse for the betters sake. Much more then doth the common Nature do the same. Hence is the first ground of Justice. From Justice all other vertues have their existence. For Justice cannot be preserved, if either we settle our minds and affections upon worldly things ; or be apt to be deceived, or rash and inconstant.

X. The things themselves (which either to get or to avoid thou art put to so much trouble,) come not unto thee themselves ; but thou in a manner goest unto them. Let then thine own judgement and opinion concerning those things be at rest ; and as for the things themselves, they stand still and quiet, without any noise or stirre at all : and so shall all pursuing and flying cease.

XI. Then is the Soul [*as Empedocles doth liken it,*] like unto a *Sphere*, or *Globe*, when she is all of one form and figure : When she neither [*greedily*] stretcheth out her self unto any thing, nor [*basely*] contracts her self, or lies flat and dejected ; but shineth all with light, whereby she does see and behold the true nature, both that of the Universe, and her own in particular.

XII. Will any contemn me? let him look to that, [*upon what grounds he does it :*] my care shall

shall be, that I may never be found either doing or speaking any thing that doth truly deserve contempt. Will any hate me? let him look to that. I for my part will be kind and loving unto all, and even unto him that hates me [whosoever he be] will I be ready to shew his error, not by way of exprobration, or ostentation of my patience, but ingenuously and meekly: such as was that famous *Phocion*, if so be that he did not dissemble. For it is inwardly that these things must be: that the gods [who look inwardly, and not upon the outward appearance,] may behold a man truly free from all indignation and grief. For what hurt can it be unto thee [whatsoever any man else doeth,] as long as thou mayest do that which is proper and futable to thine own nature? Wilt not thou (a man wholly appointed to be both *what*, and *as* the common good shall require,) accept of that which is now seasonable to the nature of the Universe?

XIII. They condemn one another, and yet they seek to please one another: and whilest they seek to surpass one another [in worldly pomp and greatness,] they most debase and prostitute themselves [in their better part] one to another.

XIV. How rotten and unsincere is he that saith, I am resolved to carry my self hereafter towards you with all ingenuity and simplicity! O man, what dost thou mean? what needs this profession of thine? the thing it self will shew it. It ought to be written upon thy forehead. No sooner is thy voice heard, than thy countenance must

must be able to shew what is in thy mind : even as he that is loved knows presently by the looks of his sweet-heart what is in her mind. Such must he be for all the world that is truly simple and good, as he whose arm-holes are offensive, that whosoever stands by, as soon as ever he comes near him, may as it were smell him whether he will or no. But the affectation of simplicity is in no wise laudable. There is nothing more shamefull than perfidious friendship. Above all things, that must be avoided. [*However*] true goodness, simplicity and kindness cannot so be hidden, but that [*as we have already said*] in the very eyes and countenance they will shew themselves.

XV. To live happily is an inward power of the soul, when she is affected with indifferencie [*or, indifferently affected*] towards those things that are by their nature indifferent. To be thus affected she must consider all worldly objects both divided and whole : remembring withall that no object can of it self beget any opinion in us, neither can come to us, but stands without still and quiet ; but that we our selves beget, and as it were print in our selves opinions concerning them. Now it is in our power, not to print them ; and [*if they creep in*] and lurk in some corner, it is in our power to wipe them off. Remembring moreover that this care and circumspection of thine is to continue but for a while, and then thy life will be at an end. And what should hinder, but that thou mayest doe well with all these things ? For if they be according to nature, rejoyce in them, and let them be pleasing and acceptable unto thee.

bee. But if they be against Nature, seek thou that which is according to thine own Nature, and whether it be for thy credit or no, use all possible speed [*for the attainment of it :*] for no man ought to be blamed, for seeking his own good and happiness.

XVI. Of every thing [*thou must consider*] from whence it came, of what things it doth consist, and into what it will be changed : what will be the nature of it [*or, what it will be like unto*] when it is changed, and that it can suffer no hurt by this change. [*And as for other mens either foolishness, or wickedness, that it may not trouble and grieve thee :*] First generally thus ;
What reference have I unto these ? and that we are all born for one anothers good. Then [*more particularly*] after another consideration ; as a Ram is first in a flock of Sheep, and a Bull in a Herd of cattel, so am I born to rule over them. Begin yer higher, even from this : If *Atoms* be not the beginning of all things, [*than which to believe nothing can be more absurd,*] then must we needs grant that there is a Nature that doth govern the Universe. If such a Nature, then are all worse things made for the betters sake ; and all better for one anothers sake. Secondly,
what manner of men they be, at board and upon their beds, and so forth. But above all things, how they are forced by their opinions that they hold, to doe, what they doe ; and even those things that they doe, with what pride and self-conceit they doe them. Thirdly, that if they doe these things rightly, thou hast no reason to be grieved. But if not rightly, it must needs
be

1.

2.

3.

be that they doe them against their wills, and through mere ignorance. For as [*according to Plato's opinion*] no soul doth willingly erre, so by consequent neither doth it any thing otherwise than it ought, but against her will. Therefore are they grieved, whensoever they hear themselves charged either of injustice, or unconscionableness, [or, unthankfulness,] or coverousness, or, in general, of any injurious kind of dealing towards their neighbours.

4. *Fourthly*, that thou thy self dost transgress in many things, and art even such another as they are. And though perchance thou dost forbear the very act of some sins, yet hast thou in thy self an habitual disposition to them, but that either through fear, or vain-glory, or some such other sinister respect, thou art restrained.

5. *Fifthly*, that whether they have sinned or no, thou dost not understand perfectly. For many things are done * *by way of discreet policy*; and generally a man must know many things first, before he be able truly and judiciously to judge of another mans action.

* Gr. καὶ
οἰκονομίαν.

6. *Sixthly*, that whensoever thou dost take on grievously, or makest great woe, [*little dost thou remember then*] that a man's life is but for a moment of time, and that within a while we shall all be in our graves.

7. *Seventhly*, That it is not the sins and transgressions themselves that trouble us properly; for they have their existence in their minds and understandings onely, [*that commit them*:] but our own opinions concerning those sins. Remove them, and be content to part with that conceit of thine, that it is a grievous thing, and thou

thou hast removed thine anger. But how should I remove it? [*How?*] reasoning with thy self that it is not shamefull. For if that which is shamefull be not the onely true evil that is, thou also wilt be driven [*whilest thou dost follow the common instinct of Nature, to avoid that which is evil,*] to commit many unjust things, and to become a thief, and any thing, [*that will make to the attainment of thy intended worldly ends.*] *Eighthly*, How many things may and do oftentimes follow upon such fits of anger and grief; far more grievous in themselves than those very things which we are so grieved or angry for. *Ninthly*, That meekness is a thing unconquerable, if it be true and natural, and not affected, or hypocritical. For how shall even the most fierce and malicious that thou shalt conceive, be able to hold on against thee, if thou shalt still continue meek and loving unto him; and that even at that time when he is about to do thee wrong, thou shalt be well disposed, and in good temper, with all meekness to teach him, and to instruct him better? [*As for example;*] *My son; we were not born for this, to hurt and annoy one another: It will be thy hurt, not mine, my son:* and so to shew him forcibly and fully, that it is so in very deed; and that neither Bees doe it one to another, nor any other creatures that are naturally sociable. But this thou must doe not scoffingly, nor by way of exprobration, but tenderly without any harshness of words. Neither must thou doe it by way of exercise or ostentation, that they that are by and hear thee, may admire thee:

See B. VI.
n. XV.

8.

9.

thee : but so always that no body be privy to it, but himself alone ; yea, though there be more present at the same time. These nine particular heads, as so many gifts from the Muses, see that thou remember well : and begin one day, whilst thou art yet alive, to be a man indeed. But on the other side thou must take heed as much to flatter them as to be angry with them : for both are equally uncharitable, and equally hurtfull. And in thy passions, take it presently to thy consideration, that to be angry, is not the part of a man, but that to be meek and gentle, as it savours of more humanity, so of more manhood. That in this there is strength and nerves [or, *vigour*] and fortitude ; whereof anger and indignation is altogether void. For the nearer every thing is unto *unpassionateness*, the nearer it is unto power. And as grief doth proceed from weakness, so doth anger. For both [*both he that is angry and that grieveth*] have received a wound, and cowardly have as it were yielded themselves [*unto their affections.*] If thou wilt have a *Tenth* also, receive this Tenth gift from [*Hercules*] the Guide and Leader of the Muses : That it is a mad man's part, to look that there should be no wicked men in the World, because it is impossible. Now for a man to brook well enough, that there should be wicked men in the world, but not to endure that any should transgress against himself, is against all equity, and indeed tyrannical.

XVII. Four several dispositions, [or, *inclinations*] there be of the mind and understanding,
which

which to be aware of thou must carefully observe : and whensoever thou dost discover them, thou must rectifie them, saying to thy self concerning every one of them, *This* imagination is not necessary ; *This* is uncharitable : *This* thou shalt speak as another man's slave, or instrument ; than which nothing can be more senseless and absurd : For the *Fourth*, thou shalt sharply check and upbraid thy self, for that thou dost suffer that more divine part in thee to become subject and obnoxious to that more ignoble part of thy body, and the gross lusts and concupiscences thereof.

1.
2.
3.
4.

XVIII. What portion soever, either of aire or fire, there be in thee, although by nature it tend upwards, submitting nevertheless to the ordinance of the Universe, it abides here below in this mixt body. So whatsoever is in thee, either earthy or humid, although by nature it tend downwards, yet is it against its nature both raised upwards, and standing [or, *consistent.*] So obedient are even the elements themselves to the Universe, abiding patiently wheresoever (though against their Nature) they are placed, untill the sound as it were of their retreat and separation. Is it not a grievous thing then, that thy reasonable part only should be disobedient, and should not endure to keep its place : yea though nothing be enjoined it contrary unto it, but that onely which is according to its Nature ? For [*we cannot say of it when it is disobedient, as we say of the fire, or aire,*] that it tends upwards towards its proper Element, for then goes it the quite contrary way,

Q

way, [or, For we cannot say of it, as of the Elements, that it suffers against its own nature to be obedient : but rather when disobedient, then goes it a quite contrary course to that which is natural unto it.] For the motion of the mind to any injustice, or incontinency, or to sorrow, or to fear, is nothing else but a separation from nature. Also when the mind is grieved for any thing that is happened [by the divine Providence] then doth it likewise forsake its own place. For it was ordained unto holiness and godliness, [which specially consist in an humble submission to God and his Providence in all things ;] as well as unto Justice : these also being part of those duties, which as naturally sociable we are bound unto ; and without which we cannot happily converse one with another [or, without which, common societies cannot prosper :] yea and the very ground and fountain indeed of all just actions.

See B.XII.
n. 1.

XIX. He that hath not one and the self-same general end always as long as he liveth, cannot possibly be one and the self-same man always. But this will not suffice, except thou adde also what ought to be this general end. For as the general conceit and apprehension of all those things which upon no certain ground are by the greater part of men deemed good, cannot be uniform and agreeable, but that onely which is limited and restrained by some certain proprieties and conditions, as of community : [that nothing be conceived good, which is not commonly and publickly good :] so must the end also that we propose unto our selves be common and sociable.

ciable. For he that doth direct all his own private motions and purposes to that end, all his actions will be agreeable and uniform; and by that means he will be still the same man.

XX. Remember the fable of the countrey mouse and the city mouse, and the great fright and terror that this was put into.

XXI. Socrates was wont to call the common conceits and opinions of men, the common *Lamia* or bugbears of the world: the proper terrour of silly children.

XXII. The Lacedemonians, at their publick *spectacula*, were wont to appoint seats and forms for their strangers in the shadow; they themselves were content to sit any where.

XXIII. What Socrates answered unto Perdiccas, why he did not come unto him, *List of all deaths I should die the worst kind of death*, said he: *that is, not able to requite the good that hath been done unto me.*

XXIV. In the ancient mysticall letters of the Ephesians, [commonly called *Ephesia litera*] there was an *item*, that a man should always have in his mind some one or other of the Ancient Worthies.

XXV. The Pythagoreans were wont betimes in the morning, the first thing they did, to look up unto the heavens, to put themselves in mind of them who constantly and unvariably did perform their task: as also to put themselves in mind of orderliness [or, *good order*] and of purity, and of naked simplicity. For no starre or planet hath any cover before it.

XXVI. How Socrates looked, when he was
Q 2 fain

fain to gird himself with a skin, Xantippe his wife having taken away his clothes, and carried them abroad with her; and what he said to his fellows and friends, who were ashamed, and out of respect to him, did retire themselves when they saw him thus decked.

XXVII. In matter of writing or reading thou must needs be taught before thou canst doe either: much more in matter of life. For thou art born a mere slave, [*to thy senses and brutish affections;*] destitute [*without teaching*] of all true knowledge and sound reason.

XXVIII. *My heart smiled within me. They will accuse even vertue her self, with most hainous and opprobrious words.*

XXIX. As they that long after [*green*] figgs in winter, [*when they cannot be had;*] so are they that long after children, before they be granted them.

XXX. *As often as a Father kisseth his Child, he should say secretly with himself (said Epictetus,) To morrow perchance shall he die. But these words be ominous. No words ominous (said he) that signifie any thing that is natural: In very truth and deed not more ominous than this, To cut down grapes when they are ripe. Green grapes, ripe grapes, dried grapes [or, raisins:] so many changes and mutations of one thing, not into that which was not absolutely [or, into so many severall substances,] but rather so many successions of time in one and the selfsame subject and substance, [or, so many severall changes and mutations, not into that which*
hath

hath no being at all, but into that which is not yet in being.]

XXXI. *Of the free will there is no thief or robber: out of Epictetus; Whose is this also: That we should finde a certain art and method of assenting; and that we should alwayes observe with great care and heed the inclinations of our minds, that they may always be with their due restraint and reservation, always charitable, and according to the true worth of every present object. And as for earnest longing, that we should altogether avoid it: and to use averfeness in those things onely that wholly depend of our own wills. It is not about ordinary petty matters, believe it, that all our strife and contention is, but whether [with the vulgar] we should be mad, or [by the help of Philosophy] wise and sober, said he.*

XXXII. Socrates said, *What will you have? the souls of reasonable, or unreasonable creatures? Of reasonable. But what? Of those whose reason is sound and perfect? or of those whose reason is vitiated and corrupted? Of those whose reason is sound and perfect. Why then labour ye not for such? Because we have them already. What then do ye so strive and contend between you?*

THE TWELFTH BOOK.



Whatsoever thou dost hereafter aspire unto, thou mayest even now enjoy and possess, if thou dost not envy thy self thine own happiness. And that will be, if thou shalt forget all that is past, and for the future refer thy self wholly to the divine providence, and shalt bend and apply all thy present thoughts and intentions to holiness and righteousness. To holiness, in accepting willingly whatsoever is sent by the divine providence, as being that which the nature of the Universe hath appointed unto thee, which also hath appointed thee for that, whatsoever it be. To righteousness, in speaking the Truth freely, and without ambiguity; and in doing all things justly and discreetly. Now in this good course, let not other mens either wickedness, or opinion, or voice hinder thee: no, nor the sense of this mass of flesh that compasseth thee: for let that which suffers, look to it self. If therefore whensoever the time of thy departing shall come, thou shalt readily leave all things, and shalt respect thy mind onely, and that divine part of thine, and this shall be thine onely fear, not that some time or other thou shalt cease to live, but that thou shalt never begin to live according to Nature: then shalt thou be a man indeed, worthy of that world from which thou hadst thy beginning; then shalt thou cease to be a stranger

See notes
upon B.
VII. n.
XXXIX.

ger in thy Country, and to wonder at those things that happen daily, as things strange and unexpected, and anxiously to depend of divers things [*that are not in thy power.*]

II. God beholds our minds and understandings bare and naked from these material vessels, and outsides, and all earthly dross. For with his simple and pure understanding he pierceth into our inmost and purest parts, which from His, as it were by a water-pipe and channel, first flowed and issued. This if thou also shalt use to doe, [*to look upon thy self as consisting of a bare soul and understanding, all other parts being no parts of thee but improperly,*] thou shalt rid thy self of that manifold luggage wherewith thou art round about encumbered. For he that does not regard either his body, or his cloathing, or his dwelling, or any such external furniture, [*as either part of himself, or properly belonging unto him,*] must needs gain unto himself great rest and ease. Three things there be in all which thou dost consist of; thy body, thy life, and thy mind. Of these the two former are so far forth thine, as that thou art bound to take care for them. But the third alone is that which is properly thine. If then thou shalt separate from thy self (that is, from thy mind) whatsoever other men either doe or say, or whatsoever thou thy self hast heretofore either done or said; and all troublesome thoughts concerning the future, and whatsoever (as either belonging to thy body or life,) is without the jurisdiction of thine own will, and whatsoever in the ordinary course of humane chances

and accidents doth happen unto thee; so that thy mind (keeping her self loose and free from all outward coincidental intanglements, always in a readiness to depart,) shall live by her self, and to her self, doing that which is just, accepting whatsoever doth happen, and speaking the truth always: If, I say, thou shalt separate from thy mind whatsoever by sympathy might adhere unto it, and all time both past and future, and shalt make thy self in all points and respects like unto Empedocles his [*allegorical*] Sphere, *all round and circular, &c.* and shalt think of no longer life than that which is now present: Then shalt thou be truly able to pass the remainder of thy days without troubles and distractions, nobly and generously disposed, and in good favour and correspondency with that Spirit which is within thee.

III. I have often wondered, how it should come to pass, that every man loving himself best, should more regard other mens opinions concerning himself than his own. For if any God or grave Master standing by, should command any of us to think nothing by himself, but what he should presently speak out; no man were able to endure it, though but for one day. Thus do we fear more what our neighbours will think of us, than what we our selves.

IV. How comes it to pass, that the gods having ordered all other things so well and so lovingly, should be overseen in this one onely thing, that whereas there have been some very good men, that have made many covenants as it were with God, and by many holy actions and out-ward

ward services contracted a kind of familiarity with Him; and these men when once they are dead, should never be * *restored to life*, but be extinct for ever? But this thou mayest be sure of, that this (if it be so indeed) would never have been so ordered by the gods, had it been fit otherwise. For certainly it was possible, had it been more just so; and had it been according to Nature, the Nature of the Universe would easily have born it. But now because it is not so, (if so be, that it be not so indeed,) be therefore confident that it was not fit it should be so. For thou seest thy self, that now seeking after this matter, how freely thou dost argue and contest with God. But were not the gods both just and good in the highest degree, thou durst not thus reason with them. Now if just and good, it could not be that in the creation of the world, they should either unjustly or unreasonably oversee any thing.

V. Use thy self even unto those things that thou dost at first despair of. For the left hand, we see, which for the most part lieth idle, because not used, yet doth it hold the bridle with more strength than the right, because it hath been used unto it.

VI. Let these be the objects of thy ordinary meditation: to consider, what manner of men both for soul and body we ought to be, whensoever death shall surprise us: the shortness of this our mortal life: the immense vastness of the time that hath been before, and will be after us; the frailty of every worldly materi-

* Gr. *ζωή*
ζωή.
 See Suidas in
αἰατῶν
ζωή.
 See note
 4. upon
 B. II.

material object: All these things to consider, and behold clearly in themselves, all disguise-ment of external outside being removed and taken away. Again, to consider the efficient causes of all things: the proper ends and references of all actions: what pain is in it self, what pleasure, what death, what fame or honour: how every man is the true and proper ground of his own rest and tranquillity, and that no man can truly be hindered by any other: that all is but conceit and opinion. As for the use of thy *Dogmata*, thou must carry thy self in the practice of them, rather like unto a *Pancratiastes*, [or, one that at the same time fights and wrestles, using both hands and feet, &c.] than a *Gladiator*. For this, if he lose his sword that he fights with, he is gone: whereas the other hath still his hand free, which he may easily turn and manage at his will.

VII. All worldly things thou must behold and consider, dividing them into matter, form and reference, [or, *their proper end*.]

VIII. How happy is man in this his power [that hath been granted unto him,] that he needs not doe any thing but what God shall approve, and that he may embrace contentedly whatsoever God doth send unto him?

* See
Notes.

IX. * Whatsoever doth happen in the ordinary course and consequence of natural events, neither must the gods, (for it is not possible that they either wittingly or unwittingly should doe any thing amiss;) nor men be accused; for it is through ignorance, and therefore against their wills, that they doe any

any thing amiss. None then must be accused.

X. How ridiculous and strange is he, that wonders at any thing that happens in this life in the ordinary course of nature !

XI. Either Fate, and that an absolute necessity, and unavoidable decree ; or a placable and flexible Providence ; or All is a mere casual Confusion, void of all order and government. If an absolute and unavoidable Necessity, why dost thou resist ? If a placable and exorable Providence, make thy self worthy of the divine help and assistance. If all be a mere Confusion without any Moderator or Governor, then hast thou reason to congratulate thy self, that in such a general flood of Confusion, thou thy self hast obtained a reasonable Faculty, whereby thou mayest govern thine own life and actions. But if thou beest carried away with the flood, it must be thy body perchance, or thy life, or some other thing that belongs unto them that is carried away : thy mind and understanding cannot. Or should it be so, that the light of a candle indeed is still bright and lightsome untill it be put out : and should Truth, and Righteousness, and Temperance cease to shine in thee whilst thou thy self hast any being ?

XII. At the conceit and apprehension that such and such a one hath sinned, [*thus reason with thy self.*] What do I know whether this be a sin indeed, as it seems to be ? But if it be, what do I know but that he himself hath already condemned himself for it ? And that is all one as if a man should scratch
and

and tears his own face, [*an object of compassion rather than of anger.*] Again, that he that would not have a vicious man to sin, is like unto him that would not have moisture in the figg, nor children to weep, nor a horse to neigh, nor any thing else that in the course of nature is necessary. For what shall he doe that hath such an habit? If thou therefore beest * *powerfull and eloquent*, remedy it if thou canst.

* Gr. εἰ
 2092 δὲ εἰ.

XIII. If it be not fitting, doe it not. If it be not true, speak it not. Ever maintain thine own purpose and resolution free from all compulsion and necessity; and alwayes set the Universe before thine eyes.

XIV. Of every thing that presents it self unto thee, to consider what the true nature of it is, and to unfold it, as it were, by dividing it into that which is formal, that which is material, the true use or end of it, and the just time that it is appointed to last.

XV. It is high time for thee, to understand that there is somewhat in thee better and more divine than either thy passions, or thy sensual appetites and affections. What is now the object of my mind? is it fear, or suspicion, or lust, or any such thing? To doe nothing rashly without some certain end; let that be thy first care. The next, to have no other end than the common good. For, alas! yet a little while, and thou art no more: no more will any, either of those things that now thou seest, or of those men that now are living, be any more. For all things are by nature appointed [*soon*] to be changed, turned and corrupted, ~~that~~

that other things might succeed in their room.

XVI. [*Remember*] that all is but opinion, and all opinion depends of the mind. Take thine opinion away, and then as a Ship that hath stricken in within the arms and mouth of the harbour, *a present calm; all things safe and steady; a Bay not capable of any storms and tempests: [as the Poet hath it.]*

XVII. No operation whatsoever it be, ceasing for a while, can be truly said to suffer any evil, because it is at an end. Neither can he that is the Author of that operation, for this very respect, because his operation is at an end, be said to suffer any evil. Likewise then, neither can the whole body of all our actions, (which is our life,) if in time it cease, be said to suffer any evil for this very reason, because it is at an end: nor He truly be said to have been ill affected, that did put a period to this *series* of actions. Now this time or certain period depends of the determination of Nature: sometimes of particular nature, as when a man dieth old; but of nature in general, however; the parts whereof thus changing one after another, the whole world still continues fresh and new. Now that is ever best and most seasonable, which is for the good of the Whole. Thus it appears that death of it self can neither be hurtfull to any in particular, because it is not a shamefull thing; (for neither is it a thing that depends of our own will, nor of it self contrary to the common good:) and generally, as it is both expedient and seasonable to the Whole, that in that respect it must

must needs be good. It is that also which is brought unto us by the order and appointment of the divine providence; so that he whose will and mind in these things runs along with the divine ordinance, and by this concurrence of his will and mind with the Divine providence, is led and driven along as it were by God himself, may truly be termed and esteemed the *Θεοῦ ἡγούμενος*, or *Divinely led and inspired*.

XVIII. These three things thou must always have in a readiness: First concerning thine own actions, whether thou doest nothing either idly, or otherwise than justice and equity do require: and concerning those things that happen unto thee externally, that either they happen unto thee by chance, or by providence; either of which to accuse, is equally against reason. Secondly, what our bodies are like unto [*or, what are the beginnings of our bodies*] whilst yet rude and imperfect, untill they be *animated*; and from their *animation* untill their expiration: of what things they are compounded, and into what things they shall be dissolved. Thirdly, [*how vain all things will appear unto thee*] when, from on high as it were, looking down, thou shalt contemplate all things upon Earth, and the wonderfull mutability that they are subject unto: considering withall both the immenseness of that Aire and of that Heaven [*or, the infinite both greatness and variety of things aerial and things celestial,*] that are round about it: and that as often as thou shalt behold them,

thou

See B. VII.
n. 26.

thou shalt still see the same; as the same things, so the same shortness of continuance of all those things. And, behold, These be the things that we are so proud and puffed up for.

XIX. Cast away from thee opinion, and thou art safe. And what is it that hinders thee from casting of it away? When thou art grieved at any thing, hast thou forgotten that all things happen according to the Nature of the Universe; and that him only it concerns who is in fault; and moreover, that what is now done, is that which from ever hath been done in the world, and will ever be done, and is now done every where: how nearly all men are allied one to another by a kindred not of blood, nor of seed, but of the same mind? Thou hast also forgotten that every mans mind partakes of the Deity, and issueth from thence; and that no man can properly call any thing his own, no not his child, nor his body, nor his life, for that they all proceed from that One [*who is the giver of all things:*] That all things are but opinion; that no man lives properly, but that very instant of time which is now present; [*or, that all life properly doth consist in this present instant of time, separated from that which is either past or future:*] And therefore that no man [*whensoever he dieth*] can properly be said to lose any more than an instant of time.

See B. II.
n. XII.

XX. Let thy thoughts ever run upon them, who once for some one thing or other were moved with extraordinary indignation; who were once in the highest pitch of either honour

or

calamity, or mutual hatred and enmity; or of any other fortune or condition whatsoever. Then consider what's now become of all those things. All is turned to smoak; all to ashes, and a mere fable; and perchance not so much as a fable. As also whatsoever is of this Nature, as Fabius Catulinus in the field, Lucius Lupus, and Stertinius at *Baia*, Tiberius at *Caprea*, Velius Rufus, and all such examples of vehement prosecution in worldly matters; let these also run in thy mind at the same time; and how vile every object of such earnest and vehement prosecution is; and how much more agreeable to true Philosophy it is, for a man to carry himself in every matter that offers it self, justly and moderately, as one that followeth the gods with all simplicity. For, for a man to be proud and high-conceited that he is not proud and high-conceited, is of all kind of pride and presumption the most intolerable.

Gr. πῶς
τὸ κατὰ
τὴν φύσιν.

XXI. To them that ask thee, Where hast thou seen the gods, or how knowest thou certainly that there be gods, that thou art so devout in their worship? I answer first of all, that even to the very eye they are in some manner visible and apparent. Secondly, neither have I ever seen mine own soul, and yet I respect and honour it. So then for the gods, by the daily experience that I have of their power [and providence towards my self and others,] I know certainly that they are, and therefore worship them.

XXII. Herein doth consist happiness of life, for a man to know throughly the true nature
of

of every thing; What is the matter, and what is the form of it: with all his heart and soul, ever to doe that which is just, and to speak the truth. What then remaineth, but to enjoy thy life in a course and coherence of good actions, one upon another immediately succeeding, and never interrupted, though for never so little a while?

XXIII. There is but one light of the Sun, though it be intercepted by walls and mountains, and other thousand objects. There is but one common substance of the whole World, though it be concluded and restrained into several different bodies; in number infinite. There is but one common soul, though divided into innumerable particular essences and natures. So is there but one common intellectual soul, though it seem to be divided. And as for all other parts of those Generalls which we have mentioned, as either sensitive souls or subjects, these of themselves (as naturally irrational) have no common mutual reference one unto another, though many of them contain a Mind [or, *Reasonable Faculty*] in them, whereby they are ruled and governed [or, *that hath power and authority over them.*] But of every reasonable mind this is the particular nature, that it hath reference to whatsoever is of her own kind, and desireth to be united: neither can this common affection, or mutual unity and correspondency, be here intercepted or divided, or confined to particulars [as those other common things are.]

XXIV. What dost thou desire? To live long. What? To enjoy the operations of a sensitive

R

soul,

soul, or of the appetitive Faculty? or wouldst thou grow, and then decrease again? Wouldst thou long be able to talk, to think and reason with thy self? Which of all these seems unto thee a worthy object of thy desire? Now if of all these thou dost find that they be but little worth in themselves, proceed on unto the last, which is, In all things to follow God and Reason. But for a man to grieve that by death he shall be deprived of any of these things, is both against God and Reason.

XXV. What a small portion of vast and infinite eternity it is, that is allowed unto every one of us, and how soon it vanisheth into the general age of the world: of the common substance, and of the common soul also what a small portion is allotted unto us; and in what a little clod of the whole Earth (as it were) it is that thou dost crawl. After thou shalt rightly have considered these things with thy self, phantasie not any thing else in the world any more to be of any weight and moment but this, to doe that only which thine own nature doth require; and to conform thy self to that which the common Nature doth afford.

XXVI. What is the present estate of my understanding? For herein lieth all indeed. As for all other things, they are without the compass of mine own will: and if without the compass of my will, then are they as dead things unto me, and as if they were mere smoke.

XXVII. To stirre up a man to the contempt of death, this among other things is of good power and efficacy, that even they who esteemed pleasure

pleasure to be happiness, and pain misery, did nevertheless [*many of them*] condemn death [*as much as any.*] And can death be terrible to him, to whom that only seems good which [*in the ordinary course of nature*] is seasonable? to him, to whom, whether his actions be many or few, so they be all good, is all one; and who whether he behold the things of the world [*being always the same*] either for many years, or for few years only, is altogether indifferent? O man! as a Citizen thou hast lived and conversed in this great City [*the world.*] Whether just for so many years, or no, what is it unto thee? Thou hast lived (thou mayest be sure) as long as the Laws and Orders of the City required; which may be the common comfort of all. Why then should it be grievous unto thee, if, not a Tyrant, nor an unjust Judge, but the same nature that brought thee in, doth now send thee out of the world? As if the *Prator* should fairly dismiss him from the *scene* [*or, stage*] whom he had taken in to act a while. Oh, but the play is not yet at an end; [*or, I have not yet pronounced all the five parts:*] there are but three Acts yet acted. Thou hast well said: for in matter of life, three acts [*or, parts*] is the whole Play. Now to set a certain time to every mans acting, belongs unto him only, who as first he was the cause of thy *composition*, so is he now of thy dissolution. As for thy self, thou hast to doe with neither. Goe thy ways then well pleased and contented: for so is He that dismisseth thee.

F I N I S.

R 2

7



NOTES UPON
ANTONINUS.
UPON

The first Book.



THE inscription of these Books is,
M. Antoninus ἡς εἰς αὐτόν which
I verily believe to be Antoninus
his own; because both for propriety and obscurity so suitable to
these his Books. For as no other
title could fit the subject of these books better,
if rightly understood; so is the obscurity of it
such, that few I think have penetrated into the true
meaning of it. Not they, I believe, (as that
ancient Greek Author, whom Suidas doth allege)
who expound it, ὅς ἐστι βίη διαγωγὴν much less they
(as Xylander and many others) who translate
it, *De vita sua*. Canterus comes nearer: *De officio
suo*. But, *De seipso* (as Xylander himself in his
first Edition had well rendered it, but ill expounded
it, *seu vita sua*;) or *De se*; as my Father (of
blessed memory) doth render it in divers places,

Notes upon the first Book.

is both more literal, and more true by far. Now by *ἑαυτὸν*, you must know, the Stoicks understood *ἑνὸς καὶ τὰ δόγματα*, a mans reason or intellectual part, and his opinions, by which he did frame and order the course of his life. Of all other things whatsoever, they held, that they were little or nothing at all unto man; (and therefore termed them *ἀδιάφορα*, or, *things indifferent* :) his mind and his opinions (in their judgement,) being the only thing that every man in himself could properly call *Himself*. *Μὴ δὲ ποτε ἀπὸ ὧν κοινῶν, μὴ ἐπαινεῖτε μὴτε ψέγετε, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ δόγματων. Ταῦτα γὰρ ὅτι τὰ ἴδια ἐχέτε, τὰ καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς αἰχρᾶς ἢ καλὰς ποιεῖτε.* Never either commend or discommend any man for ordinary common things, (which men usually are either commended or discommended for :) but only for his dogmata, or, certain Tenets in points of life and practice. For they only are that which every man may truly account his own, and that only which can make actions either shamefull or praiseworthy. See Antoninus himself Book VIII. Number (as for the ease and convenience of the Reader we have divided him) XXXVIII. And again B. X. n. XXXVIII. XII. 2. 26. See Plato himself at large in his Alcibiades, &c. and out of him Iamblichus in his Protrepticks, and Julian the Apostate in his 2^d Oration. Apuleius de Deo Socr. *Si cotidiana eorum æra dispungas, inuenies in rationibus multa prodigè profusa, & in Semet nihil. In sui dico Demonis cultum.* If thou shalt run over their ordinary expenses (saith he) thou shalt find that upon many other occasions they have been very prodigal and excessive; but upon Themselves at little or no cost at all. Upon
their

their own *Dæmon* [or, *Spirit* : See note 8. upon Book II.] I mean, &c. So much upon the title of this Book was by me written at the first, when I first set out this translation of Antoninus, *a. d.* 1634. and 1635. Eight years after, to wit, *a. d.* 1645. I did set him out in Greek and Latin, with larger and more elaborate Notes and animadversions, as it became me, having now to doe with all the learned of Europe, to whom I was accountable for what I had done, being the first man (since the *παρρησια* of good learning and literature : *absit invidia verbo* :) that had taken upon me publickly, to make this divine work of the best and most learned of all the Emperours that ever were, intelligible and usefull : as in the Prefaces, both Latin and English, hath been more largely discoursed. In those Latin notes before mentioned, I have largely disputed and proved, that the true and exact interpretation of this title, *Εἰς ἑαυτόν*, is, *Of himself, and to himself* : neither do I see, or much fear, what can be opposed against it by any man. But it is very strange to me, and such kind of dealing as I have not known before, that some that have set out this author since, in Greek and Latin with Commentaries ; though they take very good notice of my English translation (the first edition of it) and of the Notes there ; yet they take no notice at all (nor once mention it, that I know of,) of the Latin ; nor of those more elaborate Notes and animadversions we spake of. I am sure, they could not say they had never seen it, (a thing very improbable, however :) who have said and acknowledged, they had it in their studie ever since it came out. I beseech the Reader

Notes upon the first Book.

der (if so far impartial) to read and ponder what is written by me, in those Latin Notes, upon this Title ; and what is set out by them, so many years after, upon the same. For my part, though I never thought my self worthy of half the thanks (and praises, I might adde) which I have received from all parts, for what I have done upon this author : not to speak of great preferment offered me beyond the Seas, for it : nor, yet, can modestly entertain so great an opinion of my self : Yet I must say, and acknowledge, that since I have heard of the endeavours of many to cry down what, I believe, they never read, or understood : (but this is it, not to be of the faction :) I am now forced to think much better of it, and to applaud my self more than ever I did before. It was never my intention to write Commentaries (though I do not except against them that have done it ; but rather think them worthy of many thanks, since there be that need and like such,) upon the book ; and I have given my reason in my Latin Notes, p. 10. and 11. upon those words there, *μὴτε μεμπανει*, &c. I wish I may live and have an opportunitie to set out my Latin Notes, with some additions, which may be of some consequence to the book, and the right understanding of it, in divers places.

I. *Both to frequent publick Schools.*] τὸ μὴ εἰς δημοτὰς διατριβὰς ποιεῖσθαι, rendred by Xylander, *ut ne in publicos ludos commearum, sed, &c.* which by the plain and evident testimony of ancient Writers will appear most false. Witness the

ancient Author cited by Suidas, who speaking of Antoninus, ἀκροατὴς μὲν καὶ ἄλλων γινόμενος, ὕστερον δὴ ἴκνεται καὶ Σέξτου ἐν Βοιωτίας φιλοσοφῶν ἐπ' αὐτῆς Ρώμης (saith he with great admiration :) θαυμάζων αὐτὴν καὶ φοιτῶν ἐπὶ δούροις. And that he did so to his dying day appeareth by that which followeth in the same writer. *Tantum in eo studium Philosophia fuit* (they are the words of Julius Capitolinus in his life :) *ut adscitus jam in Imperatoriam dignitatem, tamen ad domum Apollonii discendi causa veniret. Audivit & Sextum Charonensem, &c.* And again, *Studuit & Juri, audiens L. Volusium, &c.* *Frequentavit & declamatorum Scholas publicas, &c.* So much I think will suffice, to make any man confess that it must be written, as I have interpreted it, not τὸ μὴ, but τὸ με εἰς δημοσίαν, &c. or without any pronoun (if any man had rather have it so, because it is omitted in most places, though expressed in some towards the end,) τὸ εἰς δημ. &c.

2. *Not easily to believe those things which are commonly, &c.*] The words are, καὶ τὸ ἀπιστηκὸν (ἀπιστηκὸν in the second edition :) τοῖς ὑποφθῶν τετρατάμειον, &c. Xylander in his translation corrects it, ἀπιστηκὸν which is very probable. Suidas cites it, ὁπιστηκὸν, which I cannot altogether reject, because ὁπισθισ and ἐπιστάνειν are words that Antoninus doth often use, and to this purpose : as where he sayeth, πλεῖστον καὶ μάλιστα ἂν τις ἐπιστάνειν, ἑαυτὸ ἀληθὲς ᾖν. But in this sense I must confess, it should rather have been, ἐπιστηκὸν πλεῖστον λεγομένων. However, that Antoninus by these words doth understand the

Baſ. p. 242.

Ch. 11. 11.

Christians, I think probable for these reasons. First, because (as appeareth by the ancients) Christians were ordinarily accounted by the Heathens, and Christ himself held by them to have been a great Magician. Secondly, that the Heathens themselves, not only upon other occasions, but especially for Dæmoniacks, and such as were possessed, made often use of Christians, appeareth by more than one passage of Tertullian : and in particular, how Lucilla, daughter to this Antoninus, infested with the Devil, was cured by one Abercius, Bishop of Hieropolis, may be seen by the acts and particulars of it yet extant. Whether also those laws of Antoninus, made against them, *qui sub obtentu & monitu deorum quedam vel renunciant vel jactant, vel scientes effingunt, quo lues hominum animi superstitione Numinis terreatur*, mentioned by Ulpianus and Modestinus, were made against Christians, as some are of opinion, I will not determine. Now if so be that Antoninus doth here intend the Christians, I do not see, how he could altogether discredit the truth of their strange and miraculous operations : especially if we give credit to those acts extant, not as yet, that I know of, questioned by any : and if he did not intend them particularly, (which I confess is not necessary that we should believe ;) then that in general he should discredit all such operations as were accounted miraculous and supernatural, is much less credible ; whenas (besides many good reasons that might be given to the contrary,) the Christians themselves (as Athenagoras who then lived) did not deny, but that strange things in that kind were done and brought to pass among

among the very Heathens. Τὸ μὲν δὲ καὶ πᾶσι καὶ πό-
λεις καὶ θνητοὶ γίνεσθαι πρὸς ἑσὶ νόμον ἐσθλῶν ἐργῶν,
ἢ ἡμῶς ἀνθρώπων. That in some certain places
and towns of several nations some operations (or,
wonderfull effects) are brought to pass in the name
of Idols, is not by us denied: saith he in his Apo-
logie. I say therefore, except we much restrain
Antoninus his words, of such and such impostours,
and of such and such wonders; I do not see how
he could profess that he did ἀπιστεῖν but ὁρῶντας
well he might; that is, first with best discretion
and diligence examine things before he hid believe
them: and then, in case the truth did appear, yet
not as one of the silly multitude, to stand amazed
with a superstitious kind of astonishment, but as
a wise man to consider of the causes and possibi-
lity of all such whether only seeming, because
secret; or truly and really supernatural events
and operations. For these reasons I conceive it
should have been either τὸ ὁρῶντας καὶ ὅτι λεγ-
ομένων, he did consider of them with discretion: or,
τὸ μὴ ὁρῶντας τοῖς λεγομ. at least; that he gave no
great heed unto such things; rather than so abso-
lutely τὸ ἀπιστεῖν, that he did not believe. But I de-
termine it not. All this while, though my mat-
ter did in a manner lead me unto it, have I for-
born to mention that great wonder, which in the
days, and in the very presence of this Antoninus,
happened in his warres of Germany, when God at
the same time by a miraculous rain from Heaven,
both revived the Romans, which were now at the
last cast, having lost already many of their number,
which perished for want of water; and overthrew
their enemies in the height of their greatest hopes

and security : acknowledged by all generally, as well Heathens as Christians, miraculous ; but by the Heathens ascribed, by some of them, to God immediately, by others, to art Magick ; and by the Christians, both Fathers and Historians, to the Name of Christ, at the Intercession of some Christian Souldiers of the Army. Before I would ground any thing upon this story, I must first profess my mind concerning some circumstances of it, wherein I may perchance be found to differ from others ; and that I would be loth to doe but upon very good grounds, which would require a large discourse ; and therefore it is that I have declined it. I will only tell you (because it may concern Antoninus, that you know it,) what learned men have judged of those letters, which in these days goe under Antoninus his name written by him to the Senate about this matter (produced by Baron. and others ;) which is, that they are either *supposititia*, *aut saltem interpolata*. Capp. Hist. Eccles. p. 42. See Scaliger upon Eusebius ; and Salmasius in *Aug. Hist. scriptores*.

3. Not to keep coturnices] *μὴ ὀρνιθοτροφῆιν*. How marvellously and even madly some men were wont to affect such things, may appear by the composition of the word *ὀρνιθομαρία*, which among other examples of the like composition, as *γυμνακομαρία*, &c. is set down by Athenæus lib. II.

4. I did write Dialogues in my youth] in imitation of Plato and others : to good purpose, as Antoninus did it ; but not as many others, who took a pride

pride in it, and thought themselves fine fellows for it. ἰδὲ πῶς διαλόγους συνίδουσιν. Behold how bravely I can write Dialogues: saith a vainglorious Stoick, Arr. lib. 2. cap. 1. The next words may be conferred with those of Capitolinus in this Emperour's life: *Duodecimum annum ingressus habitum philosophi sumsit, & deinceps tolerantiam, cum studeret in pallio, & humi cubaret: vix autem matre agente instrato pellibus lectulo accubaret.* Thus may many other places be compared with the like either of Capitolinus, or others that have written his life, or, of him, which will be no great labour for any to doe, that desires to understand this book, and would be too tedious for me to undertake: which I desire the reader to take notice of.

5. *That I did never affect by way of ostentation*] ἢ πανταποσλήκτως τὸν ἀσκητικόν, &c. Of this kind of vanity see Epictetus in Arrianus at large lib. 6. cap. 12. μετ' ἀσκήσεως Sen. ep. XV. *Stulta est, mi Lucili, & minimè conveniens literato viro occupatio exercendi lacertos; &c.*

6. *Epictetus his Hypomnemata*] collected and set out by Arrianus his Scholar, and so called and intitled by Arrianus himself, in his preface before the said books: as learned Master Patrick Young, the worthy keeper of the King's Library, and my kind friend, had noted in the Margine of that Antoninus which he did lend me.

7. *A man not subject to be vexed*] Antoninus his words are, καὶ τὸ ἐν ταῖς ἐξηγήσεσιν μὴ διχρασιπικόν.

πρόν. καὶ τὸ ἰδεῖν ἀνδρῶν οὐρανὸν ἑλαχίστον ὅτι αὐτοὺς χα-
 λῶν ἡγάγμεν πλὴν ἐμπειρίας καὶ πλὴν ἐντρέχειαν πλὴν αὐτῶν
 τὸ παραδοῦναι τὰ δωρήματα καὶ τὸ λαβεῖν πῶς δεῖ λαμ-
 βάνειν τὰς δοκούς χάριτας ὧς εἶκον, μοιτε ἔξηπώμεθα
 διὰ ταῦτα, μήτε ἀναιδίτως ὧς ἀπαιτῶντα. Xylan-
 der translates them, *Tum etiam ut in percipienda
 doctrina me non morosum praberem, sed circumspicerem
 de homine qui palam experientiam, & in tra-
 dendis scientiis facultatem minimum suorum bono-
 rum putaret, praeterea modum beneficia (ut his vi-
 dentur) ab amicis accipiendi, ne vel accepta ea nos
 viliores redderent, vel &c.* The reason of that limi-
 tation, τὰς δοκούς (as commonly they are accounted,) added by Antoninus to the word χάριτας, is, be-
 cause that favours and courtesies may be thought a
 thing arbitrary, which either to perform or to o-
 mit wholly depends of our own good will and
 discretion; whereas all possible good turns and
 good offices of what kind or extent soever; that
 one man can perform unto another, are, by Anto-
 ninus his philosophy, mere duties of nature and
 right reason: which all men, as men, are equally
 obliged unto. So afterwards using the word τιμὰς
 of things external and worldly against the precise
 decrees of the Stoicks, he restrains it likewise
 with a δοκούς, τὰς δοκούς τιμὰς honours and dig-
 nities, as commonly they are accounted.

8. Not to be offended with Idiot, nor unseasona-
 bly to set] τὸ ἀνὰ πικρὸν τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, καὶ τὸ ἀδυσχερῶς
 τῶν οἰομένων. There was not any thing more ordi-
 nary with their vainglorious affected Stoicks,
 than in all places and upon all occasions, *semper
 creare Theorematas*, To be ever talking and dis-
 puting

puting about their Theorems and proper Tenets: so that this very word *Theoremata* became almost infamous, through their abuse and vanity. To repress this abuse the learned Stoicks, who are yet extant, have many caveats and serious admonitions. But most pertinent here are Epictetus his words cap. 68. *μη λάλειν τὸ πολὺ ἐν ἰδιώταις* *ὅτι οἱ θεωρημάτων*, which he repeats in the very next chapter also. *οἰσις* and *οἰεσθαι* are words so frequent and ordinary, in the writings of the Stoicks, appropriated by them to them, that they called *Idiots*, or *worldly men*, as creatures that in very deed see nothing as it is, nor know the true nature of any thing, but are altogether led by phantasies and opinions; that I shall not need to produce any examples. Now for the word *ἀδιωρήτων*, that I offer it no violence to translate it as I do, may appear by this passage of *Diog. Laertius*, who writes that the Stoicks called virtues some *θεωρηματικὰς*, τὰς ἐχούσας πλὴν οὐρανὸν ἐν θεωρημάτων, and some *ἀδιωρήτους*, ὅτι μὴ ἔχουσιν συγκατάδοις, &c. If this would not serve, with little alteration it might have been read to the same purpose τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, τῶν ἀδιωρήτων, τῶν οἰομένων. For in the Stoicks language *οἱ ἰδιῶται*, *οἱ ἀδιωρήτοι* (taken in another sence) and *οἱ οἰόμοροι* are all one thing; as I could easily have shewed.

9. *Who are commonly called εὐκατείδαι*] His meaning by these words I take to be no other, than, That many Great men (partly because they think it becomes not their gravity so well to take any thing much to heart, and partly for other reasons, easie to be guessed at by them that are acquainted

quainted with ancient histories :) are not commonly so tender-hearted. Some such thing it was that Antoninus Pius alluded unto, when in excuse of this our Antoninus his (as it was thought by others) unseemly lamentation for the death of his Foster-father, he used these words: *Permittite illi ut homo sit, neque enim vel Philosophia, vel Imperium tollit affectus.* And whereas I render the words before, (*οἷα ἡ τυραννικὴ βασιλεία, &c.*) the state of a tyrannous King: it may be the words import no more than what I find recorded by the Historians, that when Antoninus first came to the Empire, he disputed among his friends, *qua mala in se contineret Imperium.* The word *ἰλδοθρία*, some lines after, I might have translated, I know, more literally: especially those words of Capitolinus being considered, *cum populo, non aliter egit, quam est adum sub civitate libera.* But then would it have been taken by many of the Vulgar quite contrary to Antoninus his meaning: whose meaning we may best know by his form of Government, which he never went about to alter, that I know of. *Finis justi imperii* (to use Amm. Marcellinus his words) *ut sapientes docent, utilitas obedientium aestimatur & salus.* He might also allude perchance to that *ἰλδοθρία* that he speaketh of lib. IX. n. 40. and n. 5. of this first book. And the rather, because I find there was a report among the people concerning this Emperour, *quod populum sublatis voluptatibus vellet cogere ad philosophiam.* Jul. Capitol. in his life.

10. From *Claudius Maximus*] It is printed,

παρὰ κλη-

παρὰ κλησὶς Μαξίμου, &c. whereas in all the other examples from the beginning to the end, it is constantly παρὰ. as παρὰ τῷ πάτρι, παρὰ Διογνήτι, παρὰ Ροσίῳ, &c. But that here also it must of necessity be so, may be collected by these words following some few lines after, καὶ πάντας αὐτῷ περὶν, &c. which words if you refer to παρὰ κλησὶς, you cannot possibly make any sense of. But if unto παρὰ, it will be here, as in other places, where this παρὰ must be paraphrased, not only, *I have learned from*, but also, *I have observed in*; as in the example immediately before, παρὰ τῷ ἀδελφῷ μου Σεουήρῳ, καὶ τὸ μὴ δεῖδωσθαι τοῦ φίλου αὐτοῦ, &c. It was written it seems παρὰ κλ. Μαξίμου, &c. which was turned into παρὰ κλησὶς. That this Maximus's forename was *Claudius*, we learn by the Historians. *Capitolinus*; *Andivit & Sextum Charonensem, Plutarchi nepotem, Junium Rusticum, Claudium Maximum & Cinnam Catulum, Stoicos.*

Hence therefore may their error be clearly refuted (in which I wonder so many great men have been) who confound this *Claudius Maximus* with that other *Maximus Tyrius*, mentioned by *Eusebius*, whose works (or part of them at least) are yet extant; whenas besides the difference of the Names, this also should have moved them to be of another mind, that the one was a profest Stoick, and the other a Platonick. As for *Eusebius* therefore, who may seem to have been in the same error, and indeed to have led others into it, his Greek words are miscited and mistaken, (though the mistake be ancient it seems;) and must of necessity be corrected by the Latin, as they are yet remaining in

best Editions, being of S. Jerom's interpretation.

11. *And patient bearing of others*] in the Greek τὸ ζυγικὸν ἀκριβῶς ἐν ταῖς συμβουλίαις, καὶ ὀπίμονον, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ περατῆν τῆς ἐξουίας ἀρχαῖς ταῖς περὶ χάριτος φαντασίαις, which words do not well hang together, as any man may see. My Father in his Notes upon Jul. Capitol. cites this place, and writes it thus: ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ, Περαιτῆν τῆς ἐξουίας, &c. which may very well be, if you conceive those words, Περαιτῆν τῆς ἐξουίας, ἀρχαί, &c. (as it seems my Father would have it,) not as Antoninus own words, but as taken by him from some other, and here applyed; as indeed he doth often; and so here perchance. Otherwise, I should like better, that the words were thus read, καὶ ὀπίμονον ἄλλαν, οὐ περατῆν τῆς ἐξουίας, &c. which I have followed in my translation.

12. *And kept an account of the common expences*] καὶ τριμνητικὸν τῆς κοινῆς, καὶ ὑπομνητικὸν τῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς ταύταις τέχναις καὶ τιμῆς. Capitolinus in his life, *Rationes omnium provinciarum apprime scivit, & vectigalium, &c.* This book of accounts was called *Rationarium Imperii*: and it was kept very strictly by many Emperours, but not so strictly by any as by this Antoninus; who therefore was called by some in scorn *κυμανοπένης*, as Xiphilinus recordeth, and is here intimated by our Antoninus; who toucheth upon it again, B. 6. n. XXVIII. See also Julian in his *Cæsares*. But as patient as he was, I doubt much where he would have born with any man, that should have reported that of him which Xylander (not Antoninus,) doth here, who

who translates this passage, *Sumpens procurabat, neque detrectabat de iis rebus causam dicere*: which is little better than of a meek and patient prince, to make him an obnoxious subject. Now if the word *τις* be not found in other Greek authors in this very sense, yet is it a most proper word for Antoninus his purpose. For what is *τις* properly, but *rigor*? and *rigor* was the word that was then used among the Latins upon this occasion. So Valerianus in his Epistle written in the behalf of Aurelianus, *Vellemus q. (saith he) singulis devotissimis Reipub. viris multo maiora deferre compendia—sed facit rigor publicus ut accipere de provinciarum oblationibus ultra ordinis sui gradum nemo plus possit, &c.* Flav. Vopiscus, in the life of Aurelianus the Emperour.

13. That he never was commended by any man] *οὐ μήτε ἄν πνα εἰπὶν μήτε ὅτι σπουδῆς, μήτε ὅτι δικολογῆς ἀντιπαρῶν, μήτε ὅτι σχολαστικῆς, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἀνδρῶν πῶτις*, &c. The Greek words may be interpreted, either that he never so commended others, or, (as we have rendred it,) that he never was by others so commended himself. For both interpretations, probable reasons may be given. As for the first, That such a man as Antoninus was, should not be commended by any, for any officious obsequious man, should be no wonder, a man would think, but rather a wonder if he should. Neither do these other titles of *σπουδῆς* or *σχολαστικῆς* suite so well with the person of a Prince, that the omission of them should be noted and recorded as a matter observable. But that so ingenuous a man as Antoninus was, should never commend in any other

those said parts and faculties mentioned, is not in any mans judgement, I think, without some wonder; and in the judgement of a Stoick, must needs be very commendable: out of the School of which Sect proceeded this decree, *Μὴ τιτὴν καὶ τῶν κοινῶν μὴ ἐπαυεῖτε μὴ τι ψέγειν*, &c. Never either commend or discommend any man for any thing that is common and popular, but only for his *Dogmata* or certain Tenets in point of life and practice; for they only are that which every man may truly account his own, and that only, which can make our actions either shamefull or praise-worthy: as by Epictetus in Arrianus you shall find more than once expressed. But now on the other side, that which Antoninus not many lines after doth adde of his Father's care, that all in any possession (as Oratours by name) excellent, might according to their desert be reputed and respected in the world; and that which in the sixth book he doth more clearly set down of the same among other things, that he was not *Sophistes*; doth as pregnantly cross and overthrow that former interpretation. Neither is it necessary, that what is here said of *Pius*, must be understood of him when Emperour; which he was not till the year of his life 53. or thereabouts. And as for those other commendations of *Sophista* and *Scholasticus* (words, then, of the same or little different signification) they were generally then, and many years after, titles of that high credit and esteem, that the greatest that were, as they disdained not the practice, so they were for the most part very ambitious of the Name. Sen. ep. 88. *Magno impendio temporum, magnâ alienarum aurium molestiâ, laudatio*

reference to some former reason. Now that τοῖς ἀνθρώποις is a very good reason, these other passages of Antoninus may declare. Lib. 8. n. XXII. *πράσσω π; πράσσω, ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων εὐποιῖαν ἀναμένων.* Shall I do it? yes; I will: and the end of my action shall be, to do good unto men: that is, and my comfort shall be, that I do it for the good and benefit of men. And in the ninth Book n. XLIII. *τί γὰρ πλεον εἴλεες εὖ ποιῆσαι ἀνθρώπου; ἢ ἀρκαῖ σοι, &c.* Thou hast done a good turn to a man: what wouldest thou more? is not this sufficient? must thou also for a thing done according to thy nature be rewarded? Many other like passages there be. And here I think it will not be unseasonable to note, that he that reads the writings of the Stoicks, must not always too precisely stand upon the ordinary use and construction of words. For besides that they were *miri verborum opifices*, (as Cicero somewhere speaketh of them) and coyners of new words (in this little book you may observe many words not any where else to be read that I know:) their Master Chrysippus had taught them (as is recorded by Plutarc.) not to think much if at any time they committed either *ποιᾶς ἀταρξίας ἢ ἐλλείψεως*, ἢ τὴν Δία σολοικισμῶς, ἐπ' οἷς ἄλλοι ἀναισχυνδεῖσιν ἢ ὀλίγοι even such solocisms which most others would be ashamed of. For one thing I cannot but highly commend them, that they would express their thoughts, though commonly with words very proper and significant, yet in a style so free from all affectation or curiositie (such as is this of our Antoninus, that of Epictetus and some others) as cometh next to the simplicity of the holy Scriptures.

15. *His homely countrey apparel*] The Greek words, as they are printed, are, ἡ ἀπὸ λυρίε σολῆ, ἀνάγεσσι ἀπὸ τῆς κούτης ἐπαύλας, καὶ τῶν ἐν Λαυρελίῳ τὰ πολλὰ. τῇ πελώνῃ ἐν Τέσκαλοις ὀδυνημένῳ ὡς ἐχρήσατο, καὶ πᾶς ἐπὶ αὐτῷ τέρπειτο. Two learned men have had already to doe with this place, and several ways have gone about to correct it; as may be seen in their Notes and Comments upon the *Augustæ Historiæ scriptores*. I may not interpose my self as a Judge between them, for many reasons: neither indeed do I see reason enough yet in their interpretations, that I can warrant either to be true. And therefore though I have translated them, yet I warrant nothing here, but rather desire the reader to read them, and use his own judgement: and to remember withall that Antoninus wrote not these things unto others, but to himself: So that it can be no wonder if in such passages concerning things so private he cannot be understood by us so long after, though he might very well understand himself, and perchance be understood by them that lived in those daies, and knew both him and those that are mentioned by him familiarly.

16. *To live in the Court without either guards or followers*] μήτε δορυφορήσεων χρῆξεν, μήτε ἐκείτων σημειωδῶν, μήτε λαμπάδων καὶ ἀνδελιάντων ταινῶνδ' ἵππων, καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων κόμπων. Lipsius in his Comments upon Tacitus takes it for granted, that this place must needs be understood of those things which were properly called τὰ σύμβολα, or, *Insignia Imperii*. Indeed ἡ δορυφορήσις, I confess, or οἱ δορυφόροι, is commonly the first that is reckoned among these

particulars; and yet the words are not so proper to express the Royal guard, but they are sometimes used of any troop or company, that either in duty, good will, or respect, attend any one, though he be neither King nor Prince. As for the words ἱδντες σιμειώδεις, or rather σιμειωται, (translated by Lipsius, *insignes vestes, purpuræque*) they contain no more than extraordinary apparel in general; or that which the Latines called *vestes clavatae*; of which there were many kinds. All the question is, by λαμπίδες and ἀνδριάντες what is to be understood. By λαμπίδες that πῦρ or fire (saith Lipsius) which Herodian testifieth was wont in his time to be carried before the Emperour, as *Insigne Majestatis*. A strange thing to me it is, if this πῦρ were a λαμπάς indeed, that Herodian making mention of it so often as he doth (four several times at the least) should never call it λαμπάς, but always τὸ πῦρ. But if this were granted of λαμπάς, what are these ἀνδριάντες that Antoninus speaks of here? doth any other Author mention any such thing among the *Insignia Imperii*? That indeed the ancient Romans had their *cubicularæ imagines* (as is observed by my Father upon Suetonius,) and that the latter Emperours of Rome did keep a *Fortunam Auream* in their bed-chambers as *Insigne Imperii*, I know. Of these I am sure these ἀνδριάντες here mentioned cannot be understood, and Lipsius tells us nothing of them at all, nor any other that I know. For my part, I much incline to think, that Anton. doth not here speak of those *Insignia* particularly, but that he doth instance in these particulars, as particulars of worldly pomp and

and magnificence in general: which he himself by those words (*ὅτε ὁμοίᾳ κόμῳ*) doth seem to intimate. Now amongst those many descriptions of great worldly pomp and magnificence that have been made by ancient authors, there is not any that hath been more taken notice of (imitated since by others, and among others by Virgil himself in his *Cuïex*,) than that of Lucretius, in his second Book, the very beginning whereof is,

*Si non aurea sunt Juvenum Simulachra per ades,
Lampadas igniferas manibus retinentia dextris,
Lumina nocturnis epulis ut suppeditentur, &c.*

And yet long before Lucretius, had a greater Poet, even Homer the Poet of Poets, used the same expression, whom Lucretius herein doth seem rather to translate than imitate: for as their sense, so their words are the same without any difference, but of the language. Homer's words in the description of Alcinous his Palace are these:

*Χρυσῆσι δ' ἄρα κῦροι ἐν δμῶν ὄπῃ βασιλῶν
ἔστασαν αἰδομένους δαΐδας μετὰ χερσὶν ἔχοντες,
Φαεινὸν γύκλας κατὰ δίδματα δατυμένους.*

Where though there could be no great doubt of it, yet since the Scholiast thought good to make a note of it, I think it not impertinent to transcribe it hither from him, that by *χρυσῆσι κῦροι* are to be understood *αἰδομένους πύξ* which is the word by Anton. here used, And though *Lucretius* doth not here mention sumptuous apparel at all, yet elsewhere I find that he doth (in his V. B.) upon that same occasion, and the very self-same
that

that is here expressed by Antoninus. His words are (speaking of the simplicitie of the old time,) *Frigus enim nudos sine pellibus excruciabat Terrigenas : at nos nil/ædit veste carere Purpureâ, atque auro signisque ingentibus apta :* which is ἐνδὺς σιμαίνῃ, as directly as may be. I need not to say more. Let the reader judge. I must only adde, that whereas Antoninus may be thought to commit a kind of *Tautologie* in these words, τοῖωνδ' ἔπιναν καὶ τῶ ὁμοίῳ κόσμῳ, his meaning by those τοῖωνδ' ἔπιναν is, to distinguish those λαμπράς and ἀνδραγαθίας from ordinarie common ones, such as were in every Roman's house almost, which could be no fit instance of great excess and sumptuousness; but *Such* and *Such* as were ordinarie among the great ones and in great places.

17. So that as for the Gods] ὥς ὅσον ὅτι τοῖς θεοῖς — μηδὲν καλύειν ἤδη κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν με, ἢ ἀπολαύειν ἐν τέτῳ θεῷ τὴν ἐμὴν αἰτίαν καὶ θεῷ τί, &c. Xyl. *Quod ad Deos attineret — nihil jam obstare, quin aut secundum naturam viverem, aut non. Atque hoc quidem fore meâ culpâ, qui Deum monitus, &c.* Between the particles ἤδη and ἐν there is a manifest opposition, which Xylander did not observe. The words otherwise I confess are somewhat intricate and confused. Not long after, καὶ τέτῳ ἐς καὶ τῇ ὥσπερ χρῆσι, is by Xylander rendered, *Hocque Caieta sicut Chrasæ*, as if it had been, καὶ τοῦτο ἐν Κ. ὥσπερ χρῆσι* which although Xylander do not so well like of in his Notes, and therefore I may be the better excused, if I did not follow him; yet I durst undertake to maintain it to be most right. For Caieta, we know, was an Haven-

Haven-Town of *Campania* in *Italie*; where *Antoninus*, as it should seem, having been an earnest suitor by the sea-shore, whether to *Apollo*, or any other Heathen God, for something or other, wherein he conceived himself afterwards to have been heard; it could not but put him in mind of *Chryses*, *Apollo's* priest, who is described in *Homer Iliad. i.* earnestly praying *πρὸς θινὰ πο-
λυλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης*, that is, *by the sea-shore*; and there immediately obtaining his request. That the sea-shore was a place in great request with *Antoninus*, he himself professeth B IV. n. 3.

18. *An unsociable uncharitable Man*] ἀκοινώνη-
τοφ. ἀκοινώνη[το, (a frequent word with him) must
in *Antoninus* be taken as the opposite of κοινωνικός
a sociable Man, one who out of a due respect un-
to, and affectionate care of humane societie, and of
the publick community of men, is in all things that
tend to their good, willing to fit and accommo-
date himself unto others, accounting their wel-
fare his own happiness. He then that is not so,
is ἀκοινώνη[το that is in general, an unsociable
man. Now the vertue of a sociable man consist-
ing especially partly in meekness and affability,
and partly in goodness and bountifulness; ἀκοινώ-
νη[το may be more particularly interpreted either
a harsh rigid and arrogant man; or one that is
hard-hearted and uncharitable. Of these two,
because *Antoninus* doth alwaies use the word
κοινωνικός whether adjectively or substantively, with
special relation to ὑποστάς, ἐνμέστας, and the like;
by which words he doth also sometimes express
him-

self: the proper signification of ἀγαπᾶν must in his acception be that which is properly contrary to *goodness and bountifulness*. But as *Charity*, being otherwise of it self but one particular virtue, is nevertheless in another sense and respect said to comprehend all other virtues, (as Rom. 13. I Cor. 13. and elsewhere we are taught at large,) so that a man any ways vicious may be called an *uncharitable man*: even so is the word *unsociable* used by Anton. which therefore I know not how better to express, than by the word *uncharitable*. And here I cannot but say somewhat of the marvellous consent of this Heathen mans philosophy with the holy Scriptures. That it doth in many things agree, with the sacred Word of God, any man that reads him will easily observe. But however, that in many it doth agree, I do not so much regard, as that it doth in the chiefest. In those

Hof. 8. 12. things, I mean, which in the Scriptures are termed, τὰ μεγάλα τῶ νόμου in the old Testament; and in the new, τὰ βαρύτερα τῶ νόμου of which kind especially are those two great *Commandments*, to love God with all our hearts, and our neighbours as our selves. Which be the very things which in these books are most pressed and stood upon; as might appear by a number of passages, obvious enough to any man that reads him, or almost any part of him. And as our Saviour saith of those, that on them the Law and the Prophets do hang: so doth Anton. in some places seem to reduce all his Philosophy to these two very

B.V.n. 27. points: πᾶσαι; (saith he in a place) τί δ' ἄλλο ἢ θεὸς μετ' εἶναι καὶ εὐφραίνειν, ἀνθρώπος δ' εὐποιεῖν; *what will suffice thee, as long as thou livest? what else, but*

to worship and praise the Gods, and to do good unto men? and again in another book: ἐν τῇ τε καὶ ἀγαπᾷ, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον κοινωνικὴς μεταβιβάζειν ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ κοινωνικῶν οὐκ ἔστιν θεῷ. Let the only object of thy joy and content in this world be this, from one charitable action presently to pass unto another, God always remembered in all. And in the same book again; αἰδῶ θεόν, σὺ δὲ ἀνθρώπους· βεβχὺς ὁ βίβη, εἰς καρπὸς τῆς ἐμπύου ζωῆς, διαβάτης τοῖα, καὶ πλεονεξίᾳ. Fear the Gods, succour them that are in misery [or, intend the good and preservation of men:] this life is but short, and the only fruit and comfort of this earthly life is, a holy disposition, and actions that are charitable. In the same book; ἐν ᾧ πολλὰ ἄξιον, τὸ μετ' ἀληθείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης εὐμενῆ τῶν θεῶν καὶ ἀδίκους διαβίβη. There is but one thing in this present life that is of great consequence, and by us much to be respected; for a man whilest he liveth, living according to justice and truth, kindly and lovingly to converse with false unrighteous men. And again, as the Apostle doth particularly reduce all commandments to Charity, which therefore he calls the fullfilling of the Law, as elsewhere it is called the end of the Law and the bond of perfectness: so doth Antoninus not only often mention εὐποσίαν εὐμενίαν, &c. (which I cannot better English than by the word Charity) as that which is all in all; but also for the same reason, by words (as already hath been intimated) which of themselves are proper and peculiar to either this one virtue, as πολιτικὸς, κοινωνικὸς &c. or to the contrary vice, as ἀκοινωνικὸς, &c. (words which of themselves imply no more than sociableness or unsociableness; a charitable or uncharitable disposition,) he

B. VI. n. 6.

he doth include and comprehend all vertues and vices in general. And whereas I have mentioned the word πολῖτης as proper to signifie a *sociable*, or *charitable* disposition; of it self indeed, and as Anton. doth use it, it is so: howbeit it is not so used by all. For Plato (whom Anton. otherwise both in words and sentences doth studiously follow,) first taking the word more popularly, for one that beareth offices in the common wealth, and for an ambitious aspiring man; as Anton. doth extend that more proper signification of the word, to imply an *honest vertuous man* in general; so he (upon further consequences, and deductions from the present estate of that commonwealth whereof he was a member,) that other more popular word, in general to express a *vicious ungodly man*. In a matter of such weight and consequence as this, which by writers both divine and humane is made the very matter indeed and purpose of our lives and of all religion, I thought I ought to be the larger, to make the words fully understood; for sure I am they are oftentimes much mistaken.

19. *Bloud, bones, and a skin*] λυθρὸν καὶ ὀστέα καὶ κροκύφαντον ἐν νεύρῳ, φλεσίῳ, ἀρτηρίῳ πλεγματιον, &c. It is certain that κροκύφαντον (whereof the Latine word *crocusantia* in the 34. D. t. 2. de anro & arg. leg 25. was made,) or κερφοαλον, was properly some *Pepins*, or coysse used by women to cover their head and haues; answerable (if not the very same) to that which by the Latins was called *reticulus* or *reticulum*. As for the words therefore, we might have thought that Antoninus here had alluded to that part of the body which

which the Latins usually call *omentum*, and by the Greeks is sometimes called *γαλσάμων* and *σαγήνη*, (a fishers net properly ;) as is observed by the Anatomists : and that these following words, *ἐν νεύρων, φλεβίων, ἀρτηριῶν πλεγμάτων*, had been a further explication of this *reticulum* or *γαλσάμων* the reason of this greek application being rendered by Pollux, because that (the *omentum* scil. or *ἐπίπλυν*) *νεύρων ἔχει πλέγμα, καὶ δάερ, &c.* and that the Anatomists do further describe it, as consisting of a world of little nerves, veines, and arteries. And by this, I further grant, Antoninus might allude (and so include) to the bowells also, covered in some sort by this *omentum*, as the hairees divided into tresses, and winded up together (not much unlike the folding and twisting of the bowells in the belly,) were covered and kept in by this *reticulus*. Yet nevertheless why after general and principal parts, as *blood* and *bones*, he should make such expresse mention either of the *omentum*, or (to extend it as far as may be) of the *belly* it self, more than of other parts, I know not. And therefore untill I be berter satisfied, I rather understand this *προκύφαν* & here of a more general *covering*, to wit, the skin of the body ; which though by parts of less moment, yet wholly taken, is not only the most apparent, but also may be reckoned as a principal similiary part of the body ; and so of one extraordinarily fallen in his flesh, we usually say in English, that he is nothing but *skin* and *bones*. Now of it Anatomists say, that it is the opinion of the *vulgus*, that *ex venarum, arteriarum & nervorum extremitatibus dilatatis, & eorum inexplicabili textura generatur.* Whe-

Whether it be so or no, I leave it to them to dispute.

Notes upon the second Book.

EVery mans happiness depends from himself] *ἐν ᾧ ὁ βίος ἐστίν. ὅτι δὲ οὐ γὰρ διότι καὶ αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ σκεπάζει, &c.* The purpose and meaning of all this passage, I think is apparent enough. If I thought it were not, I would refer the Reader to n. XIV. of this very Book, and sundry other places, where he handles the same matter more at large. As for those words *ἐν βίῳ ἐστίν*, certainly somewhat must be supplied, to make the sense full: either *ἐστίν περ' αὐτοῦ*, as we have translated it; or *ἐστίν ἀποφύγιον αὐτοῦ* which I think more probable, because Antoninus doth much affect (if I may use that word of him, and doe him no wrong) the simplicitie of these repetitions, and that it is ordinary for Scribes (as is well known to all them that ever had to doe with MSS.) to slip over something, when they come to such repetitions. All this passage is thus translated (whether I speak properly or no, when I say translated, let the Reader judge :) by Xylander, *Ignominiâ teipsum affice, anime, contemne teipsum, inquam: ut enim honore teipsum afficias, non tibi pretereâ tempus suppetet. Vita enim unicuique id prabet, quæ tibi propemidum jam exacta est. Non igitur teipsum venerare, sed felicitatem tuam aliorum in animis repositam habe, &c.*

Bas. ed. p.
179..

2. That intend not, and guide not ly reason
and discretion] *τὰς τῆς τῆς ἰσῆς λογικῆς κινήσεις μὴ
ἔχοντα*

Ἀκολουθεῖν, &c. Xyl. qui verò sui ipsius animi motibus non obsequitur, &c. motus non assequitur, at least, had been far more tolerable. παρακολουθεῖν is in Antoninus a word of great weight, and doth always import a due, right and rational apprehension of things: but it cannot always be translated alike, thought never but very fitly and properly used by him. κίνησις also and κινήδω, as τρεῖς and τέτταρ, are proper Platonick words, by the right and full explication whereof much light might be given to many obicure passages both of Anton. and of others.

2. As after a vulgar sense such things] ὡς εἰναι κοινότερον τὰ τοιαῦτα συγχεῖναι, &c. Xyl. ubi ostendit communioem ea inter se confereendi rationem, &c. But they are Antoninus words of himself, who though he were not a professd Stoick, yet was so respective of them, that he would not transgress against their common Tenets and opinions without some short apologie for himself. Now all the world knowes, that the Stoicks held, that omnia peccata were equalia, and to compare things known and granted equal must needs be very absurd. Therefore doth Antoninus by this short parenthesis here, from the rigor of their Decrees, appeal to more vulgar and popular judgments.

4. As unable either to prevent, or better to order and dispose] μὴ δυνάμειν εἶ, &c. a word (or blasphemy rather) which most other Stoicks upon this or the like occasion did not stick at. Whose error therefore Anton. doth here modestly and obscurely point at and correct. Epictetus (a man other-

T

wise

wise so divine in his writings, that some Christians I see, but upon weak grounds I think, have undertaken to prove him a Christian:) in Ari-
 rian. lib. 1. cap. 1. ὥστε ἢ ἡ ἀξίον, τὸ κράτιστον ἀ-
 πάντων καὶ κυριεύον οἱ θεοὶ μόνον ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐποίησαν τὴν
 χρεῖαν τὴν ὁρῶν ταῖς φαντασίαις· τὰ δ' ἄλλα ἐκ ἐφ'
 ἡμῶν. ἀραγε ὅτι ἐκ ἡθελον; ἐγὼ μὲν δοκῶ ὅτι εἰ ἐδύνατο,
 καὶ πάντα αὐτὸν ἡμῶν ἐποίησαν. ἀλλὰ πάντως ἐκ ἐδύνατο.
 You may read more in him to the same purpose. So
 Seneca; *Mittamus animum ad ea quæ æterna sunt,*
visemur in sublime volitantes rerum omnium for-
mas, Deumque inter illa versantem & providentem,
quemadmodum quæ immortalia facere non potuit,
quia materia prohibebat, defendat à morte, ac rati-
one vitium corporis vincat. Epist. 58. and de
Benef. lib. 2. cap. 29. Quicquid nobis negatum est,
dari non potuit.

5. As for life therefore and death, honour and dishonour] These words I would have the Reader, that is not otherwise much versed in the Stoicks, to take especial notice of, as the true ground of all their strange and unnatural Tenets and Paradoxes. That all temporal wordly blessings are common both to good and bad, they saw. That this, if there were no more in it than so, could not stand with God's justice and goodness, (which to deny is to deny that there is a God:) they saw likewise. Upon this ground (a ground that he stands much upon, and presseth as far as ever any Christian did,) Plato's illation was, That after this life there must needs be a Judgement, when both good and bad should according to their deeds be rewarded. The Stoicks, as fully perswaded

as Plato was, that a God there is, and he a just and good God ; and yet concerning the future estate of the dead, not so fully satisfied as he was ; to maintain their belief against that common exception, could find no better way than to maintain, that all those things that men usually did either seek after or flee from, as either good or bad, were in themselves and in very truth neither good nor bad, but altogether indifferent. So that whether a man was rich or poor, in health or in pain, long-lived or soon cut off, in honour or dishonour ; that all this was nothing at all to either his happiness or unhappiness, no not whilest he lived ; and by consequent, that it was no argument against the goodness and justice of God, that these things were known and granted to happen unto all promiscuously, whether good or bad. Antoninus doth elsewhere touch upon it again, as towards the end of the fourth, and about the beginning of the ninth book. To him, though I intend brevity, yet for further illustration of a point of that weight and moment, as hath been the occasion of so many large volumes, I can do no less than adde Epictetus his words at the least, out of his *Enchirid.* chapter, as I find him by some divided, 38. as by others, 29. *Τὸς δὲ τῶν θεῶν εὐσεβείας ἵσθι ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ἡμετέρων ὅτιν, ὅρθως ὑπολαμβάνεις καὶ αὐτῶν ἔχειν, αἷς ὄντων καὶ διοικούντων τὰ βλά καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, &c.* Know that in this especially true piety towards the Gods doth consist, that thou have right opinions concerning them : as, That they are, That with justice and equity they govern the whole world : That thou to this end wert appointed and ordained, to obey them, to submit unto them, and willingly to follow them in all things,

things, as proceeding all from him, and by him brought to pass, who is Reason and Understanding it self in the highest degree of excellency. So shalt thou never complain of the Gods, or accuse them as neglected and little cared for by them. But this cannot possibly be, except thou first give over all pursuit after those things which are not in our own power : and that on them only which are in our power and wholly depend on our own wills, thou be fully persuaded, that all that is truly good or evil doth depend. For as for any other things, if thou shalt deem any of them good or evil, it must needs follow, that as thou dost either miss of those thou dost desire, or fall into those thou wouldest not, thou shalt not only complain of them that are the cause, but hate them also. For this is natural unto every creature, as to shun and abhorre all things hurtfull, both the things themselves, and their causes ; so those that are profitable, both the things themselves, and their causes, to prosecute and highly to respect, &c.

See Ant.
B. VI. n.
XV. B. IX.
n. I.

6. From whose bare conceits and voices honour and credit $\text{ἡ δὲ τιμὴ καὶ δόξα οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τῶν λόγων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων.}$ *Ἔτι δὲ τῶν λόγων, &c. quorum opiniones & voces gloriam. Quidnam est mors, &c.* So Xylander translates it, and marks it for an imperfect place. That a verb, to make the sense full, must be supplied, I grant : but because without it the sense of the words may be apparent enough, it may very well be, that whatsoever it is that is to be supplied, was by Anton. himself omitted as not necessary. Now for the sense I must appeal to other like places : as lib. III. n. IV. towards the end ; $\text{ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τῶν λόγων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων.}$
av,

ov, &c. Moreover that honour and praise ought not generally, &c. and again in the same book n. X. Μικρὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ μνηστὴν ὑπεροφημία, &c. And the greatest fame that can remain, &c. In the fourth book n. III. towards the end, ἡ γὰρ στήλη, &c. For the whole Earth is but as one point, &c. But I will not heap all the passages he hath against the vanity of praise and applause. This in the sixth, n. XV. comes very near: Τί ἐν τιμῶν; τὸ κροτέϊδες; ὡς. ὡς καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ γλαυκῶν κροτέϊδες. αἱ γὰρ παρὰ τοῦ πολλῶν εὐφημία, καὶ τὸ γλαυκῶν. What is it then that should be dear unto us, &c. See also the last words of the same book.

7. And how that part of man is affected when it is said to be diffused] καὶ ὅταν πῶς ἔχῃ διακίπται τὸ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ τοῦ μέρους. Xyland. Præterea quomodo afficitur eo tactum pars illa. I translated it as written διακίπται from the 8. book towards the end, where he treats concerning the χῆς and ἀχῆς of the mind and understanding. But it may be, it would fit the place better if it were καὶ ὅταν πῶς ἔχει ἢ διακίπται τὰ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ τοῦ μέρους. Where Antoninus himself did so by an (ἢ διακίπται) further expound himself; or whether it be but a mere glossema proceeding from any other, I leave to others to judge.

8. To the tendance of that spirit which is within him.] πρὸς μὲν τῷ ἐνδον αὐτοῦ δαίμονι ἴδ), &c. I could not easily find a word either Latin or English, whereby to express this δαίμων, here and elsewhere so often mentioned by Antoninus. That by

that word Antoninus doth intend a Deity, he himself doth sufficiently clear, not only where he calls it *θεοποίησιν*, and *θεοποίησιν τοῦ θεοῦ*, but by other passages, where he plainly says of him that he is a God. But even for these passages sake (besides other reasons) could not I well translate it *God*: for so must I have made him say, not only that *God* was a divine effluence, and a particle of *God*; but also that *God* was *God*; which would have been too gross and manifest a *tautologie*. The word *Genius* used by Xylander, however it might fit in some respects; and as it is used and interpreted by some ancients, comes nearest of any Latin word to Antoninus his meaning: yet certain it is, as out of Apuleius may appear, that it is against its proper signification that it is so used, and in regard of its more popular and ordinary use, there could not be any other more improper and contrary. For whereas there is nothing more ordinary among the Latins than these phrases, *Genio indulgere*, *genium curare*, *genium defraudare*, and the like, in which manner of speeches the word *Genium* is used as the best and greatest Motive to Epicurean mirth and jovialty; Antoninus doth always press his *δαίμων* as the best and greatest motive and obligation to all manner of temperance, sobriety, chastity, modesty, holiness and the like. Some will think perchance that I might have retained the word *Demon*. But seeing even in Antoninus his time, and before, that word, by means of the blessed Gospel of Christ, was already become so publickly odious to Latin ears, that Apuleius himself, an arrant Heathen, being to write *μετὰ τοῦ Σωκράτους δαιμονίου*, (which was Plutarch's title)

title) though he maintained the thing, that it was not a *God*, but a direct *Demon*, of a nature far different and inferiour to the *Gods*, yet avoided the word as odious, and of purpose (as is well and at large observed by S. Augustin *De Civitate Dei lib. 8. cap. 14.*) intitled his book, not, *de Demone*, but, *de Deo Socratis*: I should have done Anton. great wrong, if I could not have fitted his excellent matter and purpose with a more plausible word. Now for the word *Spirit*, which of all others I have made choice of, some will think, perchance, that I have made too bold with it, to put it, so sacred a word, in a Heathens mouth so often, and to make it so common a word with him, as it will be found by my Translation. Although I could give a more direct and general answer both for Antoninus and my self, if I would take occasion here to fall upon that subject: yet for brevities sake, I will content my self to require that of the Reader, which I think no reasonable man can deny, that to express an Heathens meaning, I may be allowed words that have been used by Heathens. I think that of Seneca no man makes any question, (notwithstanding that ancient report and opinion of many concerning some Epistles that should pass between him and S. Paul, which S. Hierome and others speak of;) but that he was a Heathen. His words are these *Epist. 41. Propè est à te Deus: tecum est: in me est. Ita dico, Lucili. Sacer intrinseus Spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator & custos: hic prout à nobis tractatus est, ita nos ipse tractat. Bonus vir sine Deo nemo est, &c.* Thus much of the word. Now concerning the thing it self, how Antoninus came by this phi-

Iosophy (so much by him in these his books inculcated) of this inward spirit, and so to examine Plato's and other ancients opinion concerning the same, or how near either he or any of them came to the truth, and so to heap together many passages, and to compare them with some like passages in the Scripture ; is a thing which I my self have taken much pleasure in, and some others would perchance : but that would require far more scope than this place can afford me, and therefore I let it alone.

9. *With a kind of pity and compassion also*] ἐν δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν τρυφήν καὶ ἐλεεινὰ, &c. The Stoicks would not allow ἐλεῶ or *misericordia* in a wise man. For they maintained that such a one was in continual joy. Now ἐλεῶ they defined to be *Aegritudinem animi ob alienarum miseriarum speciem*, or, a grief of the mind for other mens supposed miseries. As therefore the word implied grief and sorrow, they rejected it. But as for the effects of it, as clemency, goodness, and whatsoever it is that true compassion in the highest degree, for the relief and comfort of any distressed, would prompt a man unto, that they thought themselves bound unto as much as any, and proposed it (so they professed) as the main scope of their lives and actions. Seneca is very large upon this subject. The truth is, they would not have men to be men, but mere Gods. And whiles they thus went about to elevate this virtue, the crown of all vertues, to a higher pitch of divine purity and simplicity than humane nature was capable of ; and to abstract from it, as it were, all that was humane and fleshly ; I fear they made many, who were not

not so capable of their distinctions and subtilties (such as you shall find in Seneca upon this subject) the less to regard that which nature otherwise, and to good purpose, had made them more capable of. Certain it is and by them confessed, that for this very thing, they commonly and their profession had a very hard report. This maybe the occasion that Antoninus takes occasion to mention so often, and to commend τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, which if it be not the same, yet comes next to it. Yet such respect did he bear unto the Stoicks, that he would not, we see here, use that word by them condemned without some qualification; not εὐσυνῶν barely, but, τέρπον πρὸς εὐσυνῶν.

10. That man can part with no life properly, s. ve that little | ἐπὶ ὅδε ἄλλον ἀποβάλλει βίον, ἢ τὸτον ἐν ζῇ, οὐδὲ ἄλλον ζῇ, ἢ ἐν ἀποβάλλει. Xyl. Tamen recedendum tibi est, neminem aliam ab ea quam vivit vitam deponere, neque aliam deponere quam eam quam vivit: so shall you find it in both the Editions.

11. For those things are plain and apparent which] διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὰ πρὸς τὸν Κυνικὸν Μονιμὸν λεγόμενα, διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὸ χρησιμὸν, &c. Spoken unto Monimus, you must understand, by way of Dialogue, and philosophical conference; by persons introduced, and made to speak by Monimus himself. For that Monimus himself and no other must be conceived to be the Author of those writings both sweet and profitable, upon which Anton. doth here pass his judgement, may be gathered by what Laertius doth relate of him, whose words are, εἶπε μὲν ἑμβριδίστα-
 70 ἰχθυετο, ὅσα δὲ ξηρὸς μὲν κατατρονεῖν, σπέρδος δὲ ἀλίθην
 παρορμαίν. γράφει δὲ παύσια πονοῦν ἢ λεληθῆα μεμνημένα,
 &c.

3cc. He ~~was~~ (saith he) marvellous grave and serious; main matter of honour and credit altogether carelesse, so after Truth very hot and vehement. He did write some merry Pleasant Books, mixed with hidden and profitable seriousness. That therefore of Monimus his own writings Antoninus is to be understood; I think is apparent: but because what was the form of these writings, whether they were Dialogues or otherwise, is not certain, and that Laertius saith nothing of it; I could be well content that ~~πρὸς Κορινθίους~~ *Μονίμου διαλέξεις* were more generally translated, ~~those things that are spoken of~~ in the writings of Monimus the Cynick; if the Greek would allow it; which I much doubt of, though ~~words~~ for *apud* I know is ordinary.

And thus have I now, for reasons mentioned in the Preface, gone over the two first books, not omitting wittingly any place that required either light or cure. And because I presume the Reader by this to be fully satisfied both concerning my course that I have held in the translating of this Book, and that it needed a new translation: I will spare my self the labour to proceed further in the same kind; some few places, here and there, (which would by no means be omitted) excepted. And to this end I will take all that remains together.

Curſor

Cursorie Notes and Illustrations

U P O N

The X. Books that remain.

B. IV. n. XXXIX. *Helice, Pompeii, Herculanum*] Concerning *Helice*, that may suffice that Xyl. hath in his Notes. Of the suddain ruine of the famous town *Pompeii* by an earthquake, you may read in Tacitus *Ann.* XV. Seneca *Nat. Quest. lib. 6. cap. 1.* Tertullian in his *Apologetic.* and elsewhere. *Herculanum* was very near *Pompeii*, as by Plinie, Strabo, Pomp. Mela, and others doth appear; by which neighbourhood it may be conceived that when the one did perish, the other could not but suffer. And though otherwise of the ruine of it I find not much in any other ancient besides Antoninus, yet as much as I said Seneca saith in the same place where he speaks of *Pompeii*; *Nam & Herculanensis oppidi pars ruit, ubicque stant etiam qua relictæ sunt.* Xylander in his Notes upon this place refers us to another place of Anton. B. VIII. n. 29. where he by his Translation makes Antoninus to mention the same *Pompeii* again. But there the words bearing either *Pompeiorum gens*, as Xyl. in his first Edition had rendred it; or *urbs Pompeii*, as it is in his second: though I condemn not this latter, yet I have rather followed that former interpretation, for reasons which upon a better opportunity I shall give more at large.

Ibid.

Ibid. *That which but the other day was vile ſni-
vel,* } The whole paſſage in the Greek (as it is
printed) runs thus, Τὸ γὰρ ἄλα χαπιδὴν αἰὲν τὰ ἀν-
θρώπινα ὡς ἐρήμεια καὶ ἐντελῆ. καὶ ἐχθὲς μὲν μυζάριον
αὐρίον δὲ πῆριχθ' ἢ πῆρεα, &c. The latter words
(for the former he ſlips quite over) are thus
translated by Xylander. Baſ. ed. 214. *Quod
heri fuit piſcis, cras erit ſalsamentum, aut cinis.*
The Greek words, as they are printed, are
not without fault; but the fault is neither
great, nor hard to be diſcovered. In ſtead of τὸ γὰρ
ἄλα, it muſt be corrected, τὸ γὰρ ἄλον a phraſe to this
purpoſe often uſed by Antoninus; as τὸ σῦμπαν, τὸ
σύνολον, and the like; which all ſignifie one thing.
Now for μυζάριον, which by Xylander is transla-
ted *Piſcis*; whether the Greek Dictionaries de-
ceived him, or he them, I know not: but ſure
I am, that both he and they are much deceived,
and that μυζάριον here is a mere *diminutive* of
μύζα, as it ſignifieth *mucum* or *mucor*; uſed again
in the ſame ſenſe (and there well translated by
Xylander) by Antoninus himſelf in another paſ-
ſage of theſe his books. They that are any thing ver-
ſed in the writings of Greek Stoicks, cannot but
know, that it is their ordinary ſtyle to ſpeak of
all worldly things (the more emphatically to ex-
preſs their vileness and contemptible baſeneſs)
by *Diminutives*: to that end taking uſually that li-
berty to themſelves, as to coyn new ones, where
they find none ready coyned to their hands.
For examples whereof I need to ſend you no fur-
ther than to this our Antoninus in very many
places of theſe his books. The ground, as it ſeems
by him, of Xyl. miſtake, was by the word πῆριχθ'
here;

here; which becauſe in its more ordinary ſignification it ſignifies *ſaſamentum*, and *ſaſamentum* is moſt proper of fiſhes; he concluded that *μυζάριον* muſt needs be a *fiſh*, and thus, by a tranſlation rather of ſubſtances than of words, (which we might more properly call a Metamorphoſis) of a *man* he hath made a *fiſh*; and ſo hath it continued hitherto in all Greek Dictionaries that I have ſeen. As for the word *τάρχιον*, that Antoninus may not be thought either the firſt, or only, that ever uſed it in this ſenſe; I will produce but one paſſage of Lucian, wick I think will abundantly do the deed. He therefore in his diſcourſe *de Luſtu*, towards the end treating of the ſeveral ſorts of burial uſed by ſundry nations, hath theſe words; *ὁ μὲν Ἕλλην* (ſaith he) *καυσὼν ὁ δὲ Πέρσης ὑθαλείν· ὁ δὲ Ἰνδὸς ὑάλην περὶ χεῖρας· ὁ δὲ Σκύθης κατὰ δέσιν· τὰριχαῖεν δὲ ὁ Ἀρμένιος*. The Grecian did burn; the Perſian bury; the Indian doth anoint with ſwines greaſe; (the word in Lucian is *ὑάλην*, which muſt needs ſignifie either *ſwines dung*, or, as Eraſmus doth render it, *adipem ſuillum*: but ſome learned men there be, who correct it, *μύελον medullâ*:) the Scythian eat; and the Egyptian powder, or imbalme. When Anton. then ſaith, (either an imbalmed carcaſe or aſhes;) he doth allude to the cuſtome of his dayes among the Romans, which was either to burie (the bodies of the richer ſort being firſt imbalmed,) or to burn: though indeed the latter, through the increaſe of Chriſtians, began ſoon after Anton. his time to grow much out of uſe every where. Now they that burned, uſed to gather the reliques of the dead corps, conſiſting of bones and aſhes, and to lay them up in *urnis, ollis, offuariis*;
in

in pots, urns, crocks, and the like earthen veſſels made of purpoſe; and ſo to burie them. I would not note it (I muſt confeſs,) as a thing that I thought worth noting, (for I think there can be nothing more common :) but that I am glad to take this occaſion to impart unto the Reader a memorable curioſity in matter of antiquity, which by the learned Antiquaries beyond the Seas, I am ſure, would be much eſteemed. Some two or three miles beyond Sittingborn in Kent, Weſt, as you goe to London, there is a little Village in the way called *Newington*. It hath not been my luck hitherto, in any either later Book or ancient Record, to find any thing concerning this Village worth the noting. All that I can ſay of it, is, that the inhabitants ſhew a place, to which they ſay that in former times the water came, as indeed by many circumſtances it is very probable : and that *Milton* (a town before the Conqueſt of great fame, and of very great antiquity) is not above two miles from it. About a quarter of a mile before you come to *Newington*, not much above a ſtone caſt from the high way, on the right hand as you come from Sittingborn, there is a field, out of which, in a very little compaſs of ground, have been taken out by digging within theſe few years Roman Pots and Urns, almoſt of all ſizes and faſhions, and in number very many : ſome thouſands, I have been told upon the place ; but many hundreds, I am ſure I may ſay, and ſpeak within compaſs. And though ſo many have already been found and carried away, yet doth the field afford them ſtill (as I am told) plentifully enough now and then, according as you prove either ſkillfull

or

or lucky in the digging. The figures of some of them I have here caused to be represented to the Reader.

The first and greatest, with an Inscription graven and cut in about the neck of it, SEVERIANUS, &c. was above a year agoe by the pious and ingenuous Vicar of that Parish, Mr. Henry Dearing, bestowed upon me, which I keep as a great Treasure: as also was the last not long after, with the cover of it over it, so severally represented of purpose, that the form of either might the better appear. The words of the Inscription of that first (as near as they could be imitated) are these:

SEVERIANVS·PATER·D·
OL·I·OL·V·EE·K·X

In the writing of which words although something may be observed not ordinary, as *Ola*, for *Olla*; and those kind of A. and L. &c. yet is there nothing so singular, but a learned Antiquarie well versed in Gruter's *Thesaurus* of Inscriptions, will soon find examples of it. As for the sense and meaning of the words, though not so obvious perchance as might be wished, yet must I (because few words will not serve) suspend my opinion till some fitter opportunity. That in the middle, with the Inscription COCCILLIN, was by the means

means of a worthy friend, M. Dr. Winſton, (that great ornament of his profeſſion) procured unto me from the Right Honourable (for his worth and love to learning as well as by his place) Richard, Earl of Portland, Lord High Treafurer of England, &c. whom, with ſome other rare Antiquities, it was ſent unto ſome years ago. I was deſirous to compare theſe that I had (for the Inſcriptions ſake eſpecially) with ſome others of the ſame kind. But I find this difference, that whereas mine were much periſhed and worn by age, ſuch was the brightneſs and ſmoothneſs of this middle, (of the cover of it I mean, which is of a red-coloured earth) as that it rather reſembled pure Coral than ordinarie red earth: and as for the letters of the Inſcription, that they were not, as mine, rudely graven in with the hand, but in the ſame mould, and at the ſame time when the cover it ſelf was formed, very artificially printed, or imboſſed rather: as by theſe figures that are represented you may in part perceive. Since that, when I paſſed laſt by *Newington* coming from London, among many other fragments of Antiquity in M. Dearing's garden I found the pieces of juſt ſuch another Cover (but that the colour of it is nothing ſo freſh) with this Inſcription in the middle likewiſe, PRISCIAN. Now as the multitude of theſe *Newington Urnes* (for I do not remember that ever ſo many in ſo narrow a compaſs of ground were found:) is obſervable; ſo is the manner of their laying in the ground. They that have been preſent often at their digging up, have obſerved, that where one great *Urne* is found, divers leſs veſſels are; ſome within

within the great, ſome about it: all covered either with a proper cover of the ſame earth and making as the pot it ſelf is; or more coarſely, but very cloſely ſtopped up with other earth. Of all thoſe ſmall veſſels of what faſhion ſoever that are found either in or about theſe *Urnes*, I know no other uſe (to ſatiate in ſome part their curioſitie that wonder at them when they ſee them) that was ordinarie among the Romans, but either to contain ſome fragrant odoriferous liquor and durable conſectiion; or that *libatio* of wine and milk that they uſed about their dead; or laſtly (not to ſpeak here of thoſe burning lamps that have been found in ſome ancient urnes and monuments, which ſo many have largely written and diſputed of) to receive and preſerve the tears that were ſhed by the friends of the deceased for grief of their dead. As for the difference of the greater and the leſſer urnes, Fabricius in his *Roma*, and Marſianus in his topographical deſcription of the ſame, are of opinion, that when urnes of different bigneſs are found in the ſame place, the greater were for the greater and richer, as the Maſters and *Patroni*; and the leſſer, for the poorer and inferiour, as the ſervants, and *clientes*. In things of this nature, which were, I mean, altogether arbitrarie, there is no queſtion but different faſhions were uſed in different places; yea, and likely in the ſame place, as every mans particular conceit or humor ſerved him. And therefore it were hard to determine any thing as certainly and generally true. But as for theſe *N. urnes*, this ſeems to have been the cuſtome there uſed. One great urne was appointed to contain the bones and aſhes of all one, either houſhold or kindred. As often there-

fore as any of them died, ſo often had they re-
 courſe unto the common urne, which ſo often was
 uncovered. To prevent this, I find that the fa-
 ſhion hath been in ſome places, to let in the aſhes
 through ſome holes made and fitted for that pur-
 poſe. See Gruter fol. 814. Now beſides the
 great and common urne, it is likely that every
 particular perſon that died had ſome leſſer urne or
 veſſel, particularly dedicated to his own memo-
 rie; whereby both the number of the deceased,
 and the parties themſelves might the better be
 remembred. There might be alſo another uſe of
 theſe leſſer pots, in my judgement very neceſſary,
 and that is, that by them the common great Urnes
 might the better be known and diſcerned one
 from another; which being ſo near, in ſo ſmall a
 compaſs of ground, and not much unlike one a-
 nother, might otherwiſe eaſily be miſtaken. And
 this is the more likely, becauſe of thoſe many hun-
 dreds that have been taken up of the leſſer ſort,
 ſcarce have there been found any of one and the
 ſame making. I hear not of any thing that hath
 hitherto been found in theſe Newington urnes be-
 ſides bones and aſhes; and ſometimes clear wa-
 ter. And ſodo I read of *urnes* or Earthen veſſels
plenis limpidiſſimâ aquâ, that have been found
 elſewere, as that which is mentioned in Gruterus,
 fol. 917. I doubt not but many would be glad
 (as well as I) to know certainly what this place
 hath formerly been. But alas! how ſhould we (*who*
are of yeſterday, and know nothing) without the help
 of ancient Records, recall the memorie of things
 forgotten ſo many hundred of years agoe? Thus
 much we may certainly enough conclude: Firſt,
 from

from the multitude of theſe *urnes*, that it was once a common burying-place for the Romans. Secondly, from the Hiſtory of the Romans in this land, that no *urne* is there found, but is 1200. or 1300 years old, at the leaſt: ſo many ages of men have theſe poor earthen veſſels (of ſo much better clay for durance than humane bodies are,) outlaſted both the makers of them, and the perſons to whoſe memory they were conſecrated. Laſtly, from the place which is upon an aſcent (and for a good way beyond, hilly,) not far from the Sea, and near the high way; we may affirm in all probability, that it was once the ſeat of a Roman ſtation. If any man can teach me more of it, I ſhall heartily thank him. Since this was written, I made another journey to the place, and ſpent ſome time there in digging, but with no ſucceſs. However, that I might not return home empty, the ſame Mr. Deering gave me a piece of urne, which hath this inſcription, FVL. LINVS.

B. V. n. 12. But as for thoſe which by the vulgar are eſteemed good] Euripides in one of his Tragedies, had made one of the Actors to commend money upon the Stage in a tranſcendent manner, ſtyling it, among other things, *ῥαῖμας ἀνθρώπων*, *ingens generis humani bonum*, (as the words are tranſlated by Seneca) *the beſt gift* Sen. 115. *of the Gods unto men; the principal good or happi-* Epist. *neſs of mankind.* At which and other like words the people took great offence, (I pray God there be no worſe people among Chriſtians) inſomuch that they roſe up together with great indignation, ready to thruſt both the Actor and the Author of

such wicked lines off the stage : which they had done accordinly, had not Euripides himself presently stept in, and gently desired them, that they would have patience but a while, to see what would be the end of this great admirer of gold and silver. To some such history or passage of ancient Poet, it must needs be that Antoninus doth here allude. In the next words also, it is as certain that he doth allude to some passage or other of ancient Comedie, where the Poet did scurrilously scoffe at that paradox of the Stoicks, (so frequent in all their writings) That a wise man, though otherwise he was such an one as was ready to starve for want of food and cloathing, yet was even then the only rich man of the world ; and that all others if unwise, though never so great in the world, were mere beggers. It doth much favour of Aristophanes his succrillous wit. And indeed I remember that my Father in the Murgent of his Anton. (which is now in our King's most Royal Library) had written right over this place *Locus Aristoph.* though I must confess, where to find it in Aristophanes I know not, nor have indeed at this time the leisure to seek it. But this is the way, and the only way, to understand obscure places in this book: they that impute the obscurity of many such places to the translation, will be much deceived I fear, when they come to read the Greek. I remember a place of Aristophanes his *Plutus*, somewhat near this in sense, and may perchance give some light to it. There industrious *Poverty* pleading for her self very philosophically, and commending her condition, for that as she had no over-plus, so neither did she want, (*οτι ουδεν υπερεισιν, ουδεν*)

Aristoph.
Plut. A&
2. Scen. 5.

μὴ εὐχαιρῶν) Great happineſs indeed, replies Chremylus, for a man to ſpare and labour all his life long, and when he dies, not to leave ſo much after him as will bury him! playing merrily upon the ambiguity of the word εὐχαιρῶν, which the Latine will not fitly expreſs.

Ibid. n. 21. To live with the Gods] Ζεῶν θεοῖς. Thus it is in many places in the *infinitive*, not *imperative*. In many of theſe places I have rendred it (according to the Greek idiotiſme) by the *imperative*; as B. VI. n. 18. B. VII. n. 31. &c. In ſome I have of purpoſe retained the *infinitive*, becauſe I conceived them rather hints and heads of meditations, collected out of ſeveral Authors by Antoninus, and compendiouſly thus by him entred into this his book of *Memorandums*, (in which caſe I think the *infinitive*, as well in the Engliſh as in the Greek, is more proper) than precepts, or ſayings of his own. That it is ſo in many I could eaſily ſhew, if I were to write a comment upon the book.

Ibid. num. 23. Where there ſhall neither roarer be nor barlot] οὐτὶς ῥεγυρῶν, ὅτι πόρνη. I take theſe words to have been uſed proverbially by Philoſophers, for a place free from all worldly trouble, moleſtation and diſtraction: in the ſame ſenſe as that other proverb, often uſed by Tully, *Ubi nec Pelopidarum nomen nec facta*; as where he ſaith, *Quin hinc ipſe avolare cupio, & aliquo pervenire, ubi nec Pelopidarum nomen nec facta audiam*,

Epist. ad Fam. 1. VII. epist. 30. The word *τρυφήν*, I am ſure, is by Antoninus in divers places, and by other Philoſophers often uſed, as a proper word to expreſs the troubles, vexations and confuſions of a worldly mans life : and as for *πένη*, that it is not improper for this purpoſe, may appear (not to alledge n. IX. of this very book, where it is upon another occaſion) from Crates his deſcription of a Philoſophical city; from which excluding all cares and tumultuouſneſs, all violence, vice and wickedneſs, he hath among other things theſe words,

Εἰς ἣν ὅτι περὶ ἀπλῆ ἀνὴρ μάστιγος παράσιτο,
Οὐτε λίχνος πένης ἐπαλασσόμενος πυγῆσαν, &c.

To which verſes haply this paſſage of Ant. might have ſome reference. Againſt this proverb, or common ſaying uſed in the commendation of a retired and ſequeſtered life, Anton. doth here reaſon and argue, as he doth elſewhere in many places : maintaining that there is no ſuch neceſſity of avoiding mens company, to enjoy reſt and tranquillity. See in the Table, *Solitarineſs*.

Ibid. n. 29. For, alas ! what is all this ſolemn decl.] It is printed *ἔπος τοῦ ζῆντος καλῶν ὅτι τῶν ἐμὲ βόλων* which I did at firſt underſtand more generally (and therefore had made a ſection of it apart) *de forenſibus negotiis*. Of which (thoſe excepted which are for the maintenance of peace and juſtice among men) that of Saint Auguſtine in his Confessions is for the moſt part moſt true : *Majorum nuga, negotia vocantur & puerorum autem iuſta cum ſint, puniuntur à majoribus, &c.* But
now

now that I have better considered of the place, I find a very paufible coherence of the words with the former ; if we understand them more particularly of those funerall speeches and orations in commendation of the dead, usually performed among the Romans (in a place called the *Rostra*) with such solemnity, that Polybius, a very wise and grave Historian , attributes those many rare examples of valour and vertue among them, to this custom as much as to any thing. From whence by the way, I would have those words of Antoninus B. IV. n. 16. receive some light, viz.

—— but even to thee living what is thy praise ? but only for a secret and politick consideration, which we call *οικονομια*, &c. For that indeed is it which the Greek Philosophers properly call *οικονομια*, as here-

after perchance we may have occasion to shew more at large. That being ended, saith Polybius, Polyb. hist. l. 6. p. 495. the dead, *μετὰ λοιπῶ κόσμῳ* with the rest of the funeral pomp and preparations, is carried *πρὸς τὰς ἑμῶν ἐμῶν* to the place by them called *ἑμῶν* or *Rostra*, &c. and some lines after : Then doth his son, if he have left any, or some one or other of his kin, *ἀναβὰς δὲ τὴν ἐμῶν*, commemorate his vertues, and relate at large what brave things he did in his life, (if he did any,) and that so pathetically, that what properly is but the private loss of one, becomes by this means the publick grief and sorrow of all that are present. This then is that whereof among all Historians so frequent mention is made *pro rostris laudavit*, or *laudati*, which Anton. himself very formally according to the customes of his time performed, not only unto his good Father Antoninus surnamed the *Religious*,

(as Pausanias doth interpret the word,) an Emperour indeed for his goodneſs, clemency, prudence and other good parts, inferiour unto none but this his incomparable Son ; but alſo to Fauſtina his wife, though none of the beſt.

B. VI. n. XXXVII. *As that vile and ridiculous verſe*] Chryſippus his own words and Plutarch's cenſure upon them you may read in Plutarch πεισὶς κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν whereby it appears that Chryſippus his word, was not σίχθ' ἁλοῖθ', as we have it here, but δειγνύμενα ἁλοῖτον.

B. VII. n. XXXIX. *Of this maſs of fleſh that comp.*] It was in former Greek editions, περιθεσμίου which would import, *pampered*, but that περιτρίβειν is not found in this ſenſe. Περιτρίβειν therefore (*circumdari*, as Xyl. had expreſſed it in his tranſlation) is the more warrantable reading of the two, (as may further appear by collation of places, where we find περιτρίβειν uſed in the ſame ſenſe :) and which we have exhibited in our Greek edition.

B. VIII. n. I. *Contrary to that perfection of life*] ἡ περὶ ἀνψις καὶ ἐπαγγελία τοῦ φιλοσόφου (ſaith Epiſtetus in Arrianus lib. 4.) ἢ ἀναμάρτητον The profeſſion of a Philoſopher is, not to ſin : and in the ſame chapter ſhall you find, φιλόσοφος ἀμαρτάνων, exploded, as implying a flat contradiction. And now here will I perform what in my Preface I did promiſe, for the more full and perfect explication of this word φιλόσοφος. That the immortality of the ſoul, and the reward of the

the good and bad after this Life, was never more ſtoutly maintained by any of all the Heathens, than by Plato, is full well known and acknowledged by all. But it is objected, that this ſound and true Tenet he by many odde fictions of his own, and ridiculous descriptions of the torments of the wicked after this Life, hath much corrupted and adulterated. One thing eſpecially, though by more objected againſt him, yet by one Greek Father ſpecially is much exaggerated; that in a place where he treateth of the reward of the juſt and unjuſt after this life, he ſhould there propoſe unto his *Philophers* as their beſt reward for their juſtice and piety, the *metempsychosis* and tranſmutation of their ſouls into *Bees* and *Ants*, and ſuch like: a thing ſo ſtrange and ridiculous even to conceive, that I cannot but wonder how they that could believe any ſuch thing of Plato, could in other places find in their hearts ſo highly to extoll, and ſo abſolutely to prefer him before all other Philoſophers that ever were. But as for his many relations, and ſtrange descriptions both of the manner and place of torments after this life, I will not take upon me to excuſe him. Only this I will ſay, that he profeſſing in ſo many places, that what he related in this kind, he neither believed himſelf, nor required of any that they ſhould believe; and that he was well content, that ſuch and ſuch relations as theſe ſhould go for old womens tales, for that in very deed they were no better; and that all that he ſtood upon, was, That men might certainly be perſwaded that the ſoul was immortal, and that there was a reward for the juſt after this life; but as for the reſt, whether theſe very things or ſomewhat equi-

Theodor.
Serm. XI.
Plat. in
Phæd.

Supplem. 3.
part. 9. 97.
Art. 6.

equivalent were believed, untill they had more certain information was to him indifferent: I do not ſee, what ſould well be expected more from an Heathen. And he that ſhall compare thoſe many deſcriptions of Hell and Purgatorie, which are to be found in books written many hundred years agoe, with his, will certainly judge, that either Plato was not much amiſs, or that many Chriſtians have deſerved far more blame than he. And I further think that Plato might in this caſe with as much reaſon, to maintain among the vulgar an opinion of the immortality of the ſoul and of a judgment after this life, make uſe of old womens tales; as the Angelical Doctor againſt ſome Fathers, who affirm the contrary, doth take upon him to maintain, that *ignis inferni ejuſdem eſt ſpeciei cum igne noſtro*, becauſe Aristotle hath written, that *omnis aqua omni aqua eſt idem ſpecie*. And as for that which Plato writes concerning the transformation of worldly carnal mens ſouls, according to Pythagoras doctrine; it is true, that Pythagoras and his opinions being in great eſteem among the people, Plato not knowing himſelf what certainly to affirm of the manner of their puniſhment after their death, was very indifferent whether this or that were believed, ſo ſome-what were believed; and therefore propoſes ſometimes one opinion, ſometimes another. But as for the reward of the juſt and godly, it is an intolerable miſtake. For in that very place which is alledged, he plainly ſaies that the true Philoſophers after their death *εις των θεων μεταβαλονται*, are received into the communion and ſociety of the Gods, and are transformed into their very na-

tures.

tures. And though it cannot be doubted who they are that Plato calls Philoſophers, they being ſo often and ſo amply deſcribed by him; yet to make the caſe clearer, I will produce his deſcription of them in that very place: οἱ ὁρθῶς φιλοſοφοῦντες ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀπασῶν καὶ καρτερῶσιν, καὶ ἐκ τῆς φιλοſοφίας αὐταῖς αὐτοῖς. ἔτι οἱ κορυφαῖαν τε καὶ πνίαν φοβούμενοι, ὥστε οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι ἐδὲ ἀν' ἀπείαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν μαχόμενοι δεδόπις, ὥστε οἱ φίλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλόπμοι, ἐπιτη ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς, &c. *All true Philoſophers abſtain from all carnal luſts and concupiſcences, &c. They fear not the ruine of their goods and houſes, nor poverty, as other ordinary men, and ſuch as are addicted to wealth and riches: they fear not the reproach and diſhonour of a private idle life, as they that hunt after honour and glory; for they purpoſely avoid all ſuch things, &c. The ground (and yet no ground at all, had he been but looked upon,) of the miſtake, (as appears by them who have objected this unto him) is, that Plato ſetting down the ſeveral transformations of worldly men, according to their ſeveral diſpoſitions and employments during their life, ſaith that οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν τε καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτηδεδιχότες, ἢν δὲ καλεῖται οὐροστυλίω τε καὶ διχαροστυλίω. — εἰς ταῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνῶνται πολιτικὴν καὶ ἡμερον γίνεσθαι, ἢ περὶ μελιτῆρος, ἢ σφηκῶν, ἢ μυρμηκῶν. &c. by which words of οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν τε καὶ πολιτ. &c. he was miſtaken, as though he had meant them whom he uſually calls *Philoſophers*, which in many reſpects was a very groſs miſtake. For firſt, as was ſaid in the Preface, it was not the love or exerciſe of vertue alone that made a *Philoſopher*, as they meant it; but the love
of*

of vertue μετ' ἀναπορίας and ſo diſtinguiſhed them from politick worldly men, who (not to ſpeak of the vain-glorious,) often exerciſe juſtice and many other vertues, not out of any love to them, but becauſe, as the times are, it may be moſt advantageous for them to ſhew themſelves in their actions juſt and righteous. And from the Epicureans, who though they acknowledged not a divine providence, nor the immortality of the ſoul, and propoſed unto themſelves Pleaſure as the only end of their lives; yet maintained (moſt of them) that they that were φιλήδονοι, or, lovers of pleaſure, muſt of neceſſity be φιλοδίκαιοι, or, lovers of juſtice; and that ἀνὴρ ἀρετῆς, or, without vertue, it was not poſſible for a man to live in true pleaſure. And certain it is that the Epicureans have written as many excellent books to exhort men to vertue, and, for the moſt part, in the ſight of the world lived as well as any of any other Sect: ſo that as it was ſaid of the Stoicks (for they were moſt of them notable hypocrites) that they did λίσσιν τὴν ἡσυχίαν, καὶ ποιεῖν τὰ αἰσχροτάτα, of the Epicureans it was ſaid, that they did δογματίζεν τὴν αἰσχυρίαν, καὶ ποιεῖν τὰ καλὰ. Then it was further to be obſerved, that Plato doth not ſay δικαιοσύνην absolutely, but, ἢν καλῶς δικαιοσύνην nor ἀρετῶν absolutely, but, πολιτικῶν ἀρετῶν by which words he cannot be underſtood to mean others, than thoſe whom in other places he calls πολιτικούς, men that intereſſed themſelves in publick affaires and in the government of the commonwealth; of which kind of men he in many places (as things then ſtood) maintained that they could not poſſibly be *Philosophers*: though otherwiſe (as all know) thoſe Commonwealths he

pro-

pronounced most happy, which were governed by them that were. But that which plainly puts all out of doubt, and makes the mistake in a manner inexcusable, is, that Plato after these words, presently addes *ἀνδρες φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νῦν* and in the words immediately following, sets down those that he calls *Philosophers*, as men of a quite different sect and profession; which they that object this place unto him confound with the former: and not they only, but (which is very strange, and in some sort doth acquit those ancient Christians) Heathens also, even the most learned; as Alcinous in his excellent Introduction to Plato's Philosophie, cap. 27. I think the Book it self will justifie me, that I do the Author of it no wrong, for making him a Heathen when he wrote it, whatsoever he became afterwards. For otherwise I am not ignorant, that some have made of this Alcinous, not a Christian only, but a Bishop.

I am glad I have had occasion here in this subject to do Plato some right; a man, if ever Heathen was, (as Plutarch somewhere of Socrates) *ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας* and I shall (when occasion serves) as gladly do it in many others, wherein he is as wrongfully mistaken. However, that which hath now made me the more willing to say so much in his defence, is partly that our Ant. might the better be understood, as often as he useth these words *Philosophy* and *Philosophers*; and partly that some passages of his, otherwise obscure, compared with this of Plato, with that which hath been said upon it, might be made plain and easie. See B. III. n. 17. B. VII. n. 37. B. IX. n. 28, &c. Neither will this interpretation of these words *Philosopher* and *Philosophie*, only be useful in the reading of
of

of this Antoninus and other Heathens; but of ancient Fathers also, by whom they have been used in the same sense; but especially by Saint Chrysostom: as where he saith, that *τα τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐν τῇδε μέγα πλεονεκτήματα παρὰ τοὺς νόμους*, that a man is bound to a great deal more Philosophy since Christ, than they were under the Law; that the Philosophie of the Gospel is most perfect: and many such other speeches, which he useth almost in every page.

Ibid. n. 35. *What? are either Pantheas* *ἡ δὲ περὶ τῆς τοῦ κυρίου σοφίας ἱστορίας*, &c. The story of Pantheas you have at large in Xenophon, where, if you read it, it will easily appear, that either Antoninus his memory did here somewhat fail him, or that there is somewhat amiss in the Greek Copie. For *κυρίως* a learned man had corrected *κύριον* but that is as far or further from the truth of the storie. You may for varietie sake, if you please, read the same storie in Philostratus also the Sophist.

B. X. n. X. *And applaud themselves for their valiant acts against the Sarmatz* *ἡ δὲ περὶ τῆς τοῦ κυρίου σοφίας ἱστορίας* Great was the glory of these warres, equalled by good Historians to the greatest conquests of the Romans. *Bellum quantum nulla unquam memoria fuit*, say some of them. And by the same Historians is all the honour and glorie of these warres, next unto God, (whose providence in some particular passages of this expedition is acknowledged both by Heathens and Christians, to have been very extraordinary, and indeed, miraculous. (See Note 2. upon

upon B. 1.) adscribed to Antoninus his great valour and wisdom; who himself was present in person all the while for many years together. Yet so little did Antoninus take upon himself of all that he had deserved, that as by the Heathens he is often styled *verecundus Imperator*, so by Orosius the Spanish Priest, and Historiographer, who lived in Saint Augustines daies, for this very reason he is called *gravissimus & modestissimus Imperator*.

B. X. n. XXXVII. *What then should any man desire, &c. Nevertheless,*] Did ever a more meek soul concur with so valiant and courageous a disposition? But these, perchance, were but his intentions; perchance, not so much as intentions, but bare speculative Meditations. If that be true which Historians of best account relate concerning his son Commodus, that he hastened his Father's death, &c. it will appear, that as he proved a true prophet in regard of others, so in regard of himself he approved himself in his death as true and profitable a Teacher; yea that his practice in this very particular rather went beyond his vows and meditations, than came short of them.

B. XI. n. III. *Violently and passionately set upon opposition, as Christians are wont,*] G. *μὴ κατὰ ψιλὴν πρᾶταξιν, ὡς οἱ Χριστιανοί, ἀλλὰ λαλοῦσιναι, καὶ συμῶς, &c.* It was an error of the Stoicks (forsaking herein the more sound doctrine of ancient Philosophers, as Plato, Aristotle, and others,) that in some cases it was not only lawfull, but also laudable, for a man to make himself away.

I do

I do not find that our Antoninus doth any where absolutely and directly oppoſe this error ; but this I find, and any man may obſerve that ſhall read him, that in many places he doth reſtrain the caſe with ſuch limitations and reſtrictions, as might ſeem in ſome manner equivalent to a plain and direct oppoſition. However, I ſpeak not this to excuſe him, but that it ſhall be free for me or any man to judge him or his opinions, as they ſhall ſee occaſion. The reaſon that moves me to take here more particular notice of his opinion in this point, than I do in many others of no leſs moment, is, partly becauſe Antoninus, though he often toucheth upon it, yet every where he doth it ſo briefly and obſcurely, that his main drift and intention I fear will not ſo eaſily be diſcovered by many : and partly, becauſe I ſhall at once both remove from Antoninus the crime and imputation of being the author of a moſt banious and foul ſlander concerning the Chriſtians, and vindicate thoſe primitive godly Chriſtians innocencie from the malice or ignorance of Heatheniſh tongues. Antoninus then, you muſt know, was of opinion that they were much to blame, who either *paſſionately* or *inconſiderately* (for to theſe two we may refer all his other exceptions by him inculcated in divers places :) did at any time part with their lives ; and inſtead of theſe requireth and preſſeth often theſe two, *rationaly*, and *calmly*, or *meekly*. For the firſt, Τὸ τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον δεῖ λογιζόμενον, μὴ ὀλοχραῶς μὴ δ' ὀϊκτικῶς μὴ δ' ὑπερηφάνως περὶ τὸν θάνατον ἔχειν, &c. *It is the part of a wiſe man, &c.* B. IX. n. 3. μὴ καταφρονῶν, *not contemptibly, or ſcornfully ;*
μὴ

μη ὀργίζομαι, not angrily, or paſſionately, ſaith he elſewhere to the ſame purpoſe, and inculcates the world *ſaſows calmly, & meekly* ſo often, that were it not ſo good a word as it is, hardly would any man have the patience to read it ſo often as he repeats it. But much more ſhall we be induced to bear with Antoninus his many repetitions in this kind, if we further conſider, that all that he did aim at by all theſe words, was meerly to take down the pride and haughty ſpirit of the common Stoicks of his days, and before. Many of whom both by their own practice, and by their doctrine and exhortations, did teach a man generally upon all occaſions, but in matter of Death eſpecially, rather to be deſperately ſtout and reſolute, than rationally and really wiſe: which made Antoninus in almoſt all his exhortations and inſtructions ſo carefully to inculcate *humility* and a *meek ſpirit*. Δεῖ δὲ θάλεε, ἀπλάως δὲ θάλεε, τῇ πάντα διδύσῃ καὶ ἀπλάμχανέσῃ φύσιν ὁ πεπαιδευμένος καὶ αἰδήμων λέγει. λέγει δὲ τοῦτο οὐ καταθραυνόμενος, ἀλλὰ πιπασχὼν μόνον καὶ ἀνοῶν αὐτῇ. Give what thou wilt, and take away what thou wilt, &c. B. X. n. 16. They that are any thing acquainted with Seneca's ſtyle and genius of writing, will eaſily make a Comment upon this. But not to go from this very ſubject of death that we are now upon, how does he ſet out his Cato, his great and almoſt only pattern of wiſdome? *Jam* (ſaith he) *non tantum Caſari, ſed ſibi iratus, nudas in vulnus manus egit, & generoſum illum cancremptioſumque omnis potentia ſpiritum non amiſit, ſed e- jecit, &c. Epiſt. 24.* Is this to die like a Philoſopher or a wiſe man, or rather like a deſperate

wretch? If any man shall answer for *Sen.* that he wrote this as an Orator rather than a Philosopher; I grant indeed that it was wit that he affected more than sound wisdom, (in this and many such passages, I mean:) but yet it is in the person of a Philosopher that he speaks it; and whether it were a good Orator's part to ascribe such a passionate (that I say not desperate) and discontented end to such a perfect wise man as he would have Cato reputed, I leave to others to judge.

The other main condition that Antoninus doth generally stand upon (as hath been said) is, *rationaly, or, not inconsiderately.* A man may undervalue life as well as overprize it. It was Aristotle's opinion, that a man ὅσοις ἂν μάλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχῃ πᾶσαι, the more vertuous he is, and the better furnished with all manner of rare perfections, the more unwilling he must needs be to die. And certainly according to truth and sound Philosophie, for a man to contemn life, and either in a mere bravado (as many duellists and contentious persons often do,) to cast it away, or otherwise easily and slightly, upon no ground of sound reason and good ratiocination, to part with it, must needs be the highest degree of madness and mere brutishness that can be conceived. As on the other side, ὅταν ἐν λόγῳ (as Epictetus upon this occasion speaketh,) *cum exigit ratio*, or, *cum ratio suadet*, (as Seneca in his Epistels,) when apparent reason doth induce us for some greater good, (as either for a better life, or for the performance of some duty which in reason ought to be dearer unto us than life,) not to regard it, for a man then, through either fear of death or love
of

of this world, to linger and to draw back, is great baſeneſs, and greater folly. As for that Antoninus doth here allegè the Chriſtians as an example of that phrenſy that he doth taxe and reprove; the ground of it is, the ſervent zeal of the primitive Chriſtians, whoſe love to Chriſt was ſuch, that they not only were content to ſuffer for him, when they were called to it, but even ſo longed to die for him, that they could hardly by the Church-Canons and diſcipline provided in that behalf be reſtrained from *offering themſelves* to death, and being their own accuſers and promoters. Inſomuch that in Africa at a certain time when they flock'd by multitudes to the Inquiſitors or Judges, the Governour of that Province amazed cried out, *O Wretched creatures! if you muſt needs die, have you no balers or precipices at home?* as is recorded by Tertull. ad *Scap.* laſt chapter. And though this courſe was by the better learned and more ſober Prelats inhibited and reſtrained; yet ſuch was commonly their conſtancie and their readineſs to death, whenſoever they were apprehended and condemned by their perfecutors, yea their joy and exultation ſuch, (*Deo gratias*, or, *God be praiſed*, was their common and ſolemn word, when their ſentence was read;) that that alone was ſufficient to amaze their enemies, and to make them think very ſtrangely of them. Neither indeed were the Chriſtians better known unto the Heathens by any other property than this, that they were a kind of people that did not regard their lives. Before Antoninus, Arrianus had already mentioned them upon the ſame occaſion. For *lib. 4. c. 7. del apoſt.* treating of an undaunted diſpoſition,

ſon, (as Antoninus you ſee doth here allege,) it was commonly termed by the Heathens perſuacia and obſtinateness. *Obſtinatio* indeed was the very word. *Illa ipſa Obſtinatio quam exprobratis*, ſaith Tertull. towards the end of his *Apologeticus*; and *ad Nationes lib. I. c. 18. Reliquum Obſtinationis in illo capitulo collocatis, quod neque gladios, neque cruces, neque beſtias veſtras; non ignem, non tormenta, obduritatem ac contemptum mortis animo recuſemus, &c.* And before him Plinie in his *Epistle de Chriſtianis* written to Trajanus the Emperour, *Neque enim dubitabam, qualecunque eſſet quod faterentur, perſuaciam certe & inflexibilem obſtinationem debere puniri.* Seneca alſo, though not of the Chriſtians particularly he, yet in the ſame ſenſe doth uſe the word *obſtinatio*, in his 76. *Epist.* By which paſſages it doth appear how happily Xylander, profeſſing what he doth in his Notes, did hit upon this word in his Tranſlation, than which he could never have found a more fit and proper, had he ſought never ſo long. But ſome Interpreters of Tertull. it ſeems did not well underſtand it in his *de Spectac.* firſt chapter, where he ſaith, *Sunt qui exiſtiment Chriſtianum, expeditum morti genus ad hanc Obſtinationem abdicatione voluptatum erudiri, &c.* who note that Tertull. doth there uſe *Obſtinatio* in a good ſenſe for *Conſtantia*; whereas he uſeth it in no other ſenſe than the Heathens did, that objected it unto them; and it is as from them that he ſpeaks it, as if he ſaid, *ad hanc quam nobis objicitis*, or, *exprobratis*, (as elſewhere) *obſtinationem &c.* The word *παράταξις* here uſed by Anton. will I think hardly be found in any other

Greek author in this ſenſe, a word nevertheleſs (as all his are) as elegant and proper as may be; importing as much in things civil, as ἀντιθεſις doth in things natural. That which S. Baſil doth elegantly call τῆς ἀντολῆς ἀμείριαν, is much to the ſame purpoſe. But S. Nazianzen will give us a very full and elegant interpretation of this word, which will alſo much conduce to the illuſtration of the matter that hath been ſpoken of. For in his firſt *Inveſtive*, treating of the reaſons why Julian would not ſet upon the Chriſtians with open perſecution, as former Emperours had done, which meant them not ſo ill as he did; he makes this to have been the cauſe of it, becauſe Julian had obſerved, that the Chriſtians the more they were perſecuted, the more reſolute and peremptory they did grow. For, as fire, ſaith he, expoſed to a bluſtring wind, the more it is blown upon, the greater it grows; ſo is it with generous diſpoſitions, the more they are oppoſed with force and violence, the more obſtinate & peremptory is their reſiſtance. φιλονηκοſίεουσ γὰρ ἂν ἡμᾶς γινώσκειν βιάζομενους, καὶ ἀντιβίοντες τῇ πυρρυνίδι τὴν ὑπὲρ εὐταβείας φιλοπρωΐαν φιλεῖ γὰρ τὰ γενναῖα φρονήματα πρὸς τὸ βίᾳ κρατῶν αὐτοαδιδάζεσθαι, καὶ κραδᾶν φλὺξ ὑπὸ ἀνέμου ῥιπίζομένη, ποσὺ τῷ μᾶλλον ἀνὰ πῦρ, ὅταν πρὸς αὐτὸ σφοδρέτερον κραταιωμένηται. Antoninas doth uſe the word again (but in the Verb there, as others uſe it alſo,) in the ſame ſenſe, B. VIII. n. 46. ſpeaking of the liberty of the will of man, Μένειναι (ſaith he) ὅτι ἀκαταμάχητον γίνεται τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, ὅταν εἰς ἑαυτὸ συſτραφὲν ἀρκεῖται ἑαυτῷ μὴ ποιεῖν ὃ μὴ θέλει, καὶ ἀλόγως ἐκταράσσεται, &c. Remember that thy mind, &c. And ſo doth the ſame Nazianzen

in his 2^d *Inveſſive*, ſpeaking of a reſolute and courageous Chriſtian Martyr, *ὡς τῆς θυγῆς ἀπάντησι*, (ſaith he) *καὶ τῶ ἀνὴρ φέρων ἐκείδων χερσὶν ὁ, τι βέλονται, καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῷ χειρὶ παταγόντα δυσκολίαν* as one that had entred the liſt, as it were, to buckle and grapple with the preſent adverſities themſelves.

Ibid. n. V. *After the Tragedie the Comædia venus was brought in*] Horace in his *De Arte Poetica*, having immediately before ſpoken of *Æſchylus* the Tragick Poet, *Succellit versus his Comædia*, ſaith he, *non sine multa Laude, sed in vitium libertas excidit, & vim Dignam lege regi, &c.* They that have read learned *Heinſius* his elaborate notes upon this place, will eaſily ſee what I aim at, by citing this place of Horace; and will acknowledge that Horace is much beholden to this place of Anton.

B. XII. n. IX. *Whatſoever doth happen*] *Τὸ ἕκαστὸν φύσει*. Theſe words may alſo be referred to the former paragraph, or number; as in the Latin tranſlation is to be ſeen. But they fit this place ſo well too, that it is not eaſie to determine to which of the two they belong. Such diverſities may be obſerved in other places too; which ſome, raſhly, may deem overſights or repugnancies: but men of better judgement and ſkill will eaſily ſee what hath cauſed this varietie. But in places of greateſt difficultie, I muſt referre the Reader to my Latin Notes.

F I N I S.

A TABLE OF THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS IN ANTONINUS.

The first or Roman figure every where referres
to the *Book*; the second and ordinary,
to the *Number*, or *Section*.

A.

Abstinence, See Moderation.
Actions how to be examined. IV.
 10. VIII. 2.
All Affectation to be avoided. I.
 4. 13. VII. 32. XI. 14.
 See Sinceritie, ostentation.
Change and Alteration, the beginning and the end of all things.
 IV. 29. 35. 39. V. 13. VII. 15.
 17. 18. VIII. 5. IX. 17. 33.
 X. 7. 11.
Repentance and Amendment not to be deferred. See Repentance.
Anger taxed. I. 1. 6. VII. 18.
 XI. 16. See Meekness.
Apostates from Nature who be. II.
 14. IV. 24. VIII. 32. XII. 7. 18.
Applause, See Fame, honour.
Liberal Arts and Sciences. I. 4.
 13. 14. V. 5. VII. 38. VIII.
 1. See Learning, reading.

B.

Temporal Blessings from GOD. I. 14.

Common both to good and bad. II.
 8. V. 9. VI. 31. IX. 1.
Bodie, the vileness of it. I. 16.
 XII. 18. See Lifes vanitie.
The carriage of it. VII. 32. VIII.
 19. 49. IX. 34.
Changeth often, both in substance and quality, as years encrease.
 X. 7.
The wonderfull making of it to be contemplated. X. 26.
By nature subject unto the minde, and in no wise concurring to the cause of actions either good or evil. VII. 10. X. 39.
Bountie and Liberality. I. 1. 11.
 See Charitie.

C.

Other mens Calamities how they must affect us. V. 29.
Everyone to follow and stick to his own Calling. IV. 26. V. 23.
 VI. 32. VII. 26.
Worldly Cares and distractions to be avoided. II. 11. IV. 3. 20.
 VI.

THE TABLE.

VI. 48. 50. XII. 2.
The danger of them. III. 7.
Cautelousness and circumspection.
 VIII. 57.
Charitie our end. V. 27. VI. 6.
 13. 21. 39. 42. VII. 3. 5. 10.
 16. 42. 43. VIII. 2. 11. 22. 32.
 45. IX. 1. 10. 29. X. 6. 37. See
Meekness, Reconciliation, Pati-
ence.
Children, like leaves of trees. X.
 34. *What to think when we kiss*
them. XI. 30.
Comedies and Tragedies, how first
instituted XI. 5.
A wise man may sometimes in ci-
vility comply with fools. V.
 29.
Condescension in matter of lan-
guage. VIII. 28.
The Connexion and mutual de-
pendence of all things. IV. 33.
 36. VI. 33. 34. 38. VII. 6.
The secret and impartial testimonie
of our own Consciences concer-
ning our selves, more to be stood
upon by us, than others mens
judgments. XII. 3.
Constancie. I. 5. 11. 12. 13.
 See *Perseverance.*
Resolute and courageous Constancie,
in counsels and actions. VI.
 45. VIII. 4. X. 13. 17. XII.
 13.
Contemplation. See *Bodie, Na-*
ture, Universe.
Contentation. X. 23. 31. See
Submission to Gods Provi-
dence. It. Motives to Pati-
ence, &c.
Commendable properties of a gen-
tle and discreet Conversation.
 I. 6. 10. 11. 13. VIII. 49.

Natural Corruption intimated.
 I. 4. 12. II. 1. V. 9. IX. 35.
 XI. 25. 27. 32. See *Men, Hu-*
milicie.
Our finnes, not God or Nature, the
Cause of them. V. 5.
The Court a great trouble and vex-
ation to Antoninus. V. 15. VI.
 10. VIII. 8.
The danger of it. VI. 27.
Courtesies how to be received. I. 5.
How to be conferred. V. 6. VII.
 43. IX. 43.
Curiosity of speech or style taxed.
 I. 4. II. 5.
Curiositie about other mens busi-
nesses, &c. taxed. II. 3. 5. 11.
 III. 4. IV. 15. VII. 29.
Cowardise, See Generositie.

D

Death alwayes to be thought upon,
and readily to be accepted of,
when it comes. II. 8. 15. III. 5.
 8. VII. 40. IX. 3. X. 12. 37.
 XI. 3. 30. XII. 1. 6.
What it is. II. 10. 15. IV. 5. 12.
 VI. 26.
Motives to dispose us to it, as that it
is general and unavoidable, &c.
 III. 3. IV. 12. 38. 39. 42. V.
 4. 10. 13. 30. VI. 41. 42. 44.
 51. VII. 15. 17. 18. 22. 23. 26.
 27. VIII. 16. 18. 19. 24. 29.
 55. IX. 2. 3. 10. 31. 33. X. 7.
 29. 31. 37. XII. 17. 24. 27.
Never unseasonable to a good man.
 III. 8. 9. XI. 1.
Diligence and exactness in publick
affairs commended. VI. 28.
Discretion. I. 13. XI. 16. 51.
Dissimulation and hypocrisie. II.
 14. VII. 40. XI. 14. See *Osten-*
tation, Plainness.

Distracti-

THE TABLE.

Distraction, See Cares.

Uncharitable Division from any one member, separates from God and the whole body. XI. 7.

Division of objects, See Object.

Dogmata. III. 14. 16. IV. 3. 13.

41. V. 9. 16. VII. 2. VIII. 1.

IX. 3. 28. X. 9. 35. 39. XII. 6.

Dreams from God sometimes. I. 14. E.

The Earth. IV. 3. VI. 33. VIII. 19.

End [See Life] that all our actions must tend to some one certain general End. II. 4. 14. VIII. 15. X. 38.

Whatsoever is, is to some end. VIII. 17. IX. 8.

To love our Enemies, See Meekness, Charitie.

The Event no part of a wise mans task or duty; and by consequent, if it prove contrary, no disparagement to his wisdom, nor hindrance to him in his proper end. V. 14. See Hinderances, Minde.

Evil, See Corruption.

Not to render Evil for Evil. See Meekness, Charitie.

Example leads most. IV. 37.

Excess taxed. I. 1. See Moderation.

F.

Fame after death, the vanity of it.

II. 15. IV. 16. VI. 17. VIII. 42.

Fear of the future. VII. 6. 13.

VIII. 34. X. 13.

Flatterie. I. 13. XI. 16. 9.

Antoninus his opinion concerning

Free will. II. 6. 8. III. 4. 13. V.

5. 10. 16. 28. VI. 7. 30. 53.

VII. 2. 29. 30. 39. VIII. 6. 27.

30. 32. 45. 46. 50. 53. IX. 9.

40. X. 15. 33. 34. XI. 15. 13.

XII. 8. 10.

Fugitives who. IV. 24. X. 25. XI. 8. 18.

G.

True Generositie, to love them that oppose us. XI. 8.

God [See Innocency, Dreams, Blessings] not to be doubted of, though incomprehensible. XII. 21.

His nature. V. 26. VIII. 52. IX. 1. X. 1.

His particular providence acknowledged and praised. I. 14. V. 8.

The power of his grace stirring men to piety and vertue, &c. acknowledged. I. 14. II. 1. IX. 40.

God's providence over the world. II. 8. VI. 8. VII. 44. IX. 26. X. 5. 6.

The cause of all things. I. 17. III. 12. V. 8. VI. 37. VIII. 4. 22. 33. IX. 1.

The Justice, wisdom, and equity of it maintained. IV. 8. V. 24. VI. 39. VIII. 6. 48. 53. IX. 33. X. 7. 21. XII. 4. 27.

God omnipotent. II. 8.

But one. VII. 6.

Cannot be unjust. II. 8. VI. 1.

A rewarder of the just and godly. VI. 8.

Most merciful. VII. 41. VIII. 32. 52. IX. 9. XI. 7. XII. 4.

Best worshipped when imitated, [See Merciful] X. 8.

Knowledge of God best learning, See Learning.

What truly good, [See Blessings] V. 12. 14. VIII. 1. 9.

Goodness, [See Meekness, Charitie.]

THE TABLE.

Our end. IV. 8. XII. 21. X. 33.

What it is. IV. 21.

Gravitie. I. 12. II. 2.

*Great men how to be looked upon
& considered through the lustre
of their greatness and authority,
that they may be known to be but
men.* X. 20.

H.

Happiness our end. XI. 15.

*Doth consist in practice of vertue
and piety.* [See Reason, Na-
ture] II. 2. 11. III. 7. 8. 13.
V. 5. 9. 27. 28. VI. 6. VII.
18. 28. 37. 38. VIII. 50. IX. 2.

In submission to God's providence.
II. 11. 15. III. 4. 7. See Sub-
mission.

In every mans own mind. III. 6.
17. IV. 32. V. 2. 15. VI. 46.
VII. 13. 21. 39. VIII. 39. 46.
IX. 24. X. 1. XI. 15.

*Hinderances how to be made fur-
therances.* IV. 1. V. 17. VI. 45.
VIII. 30. 33. 39. &c. See the
Mind not subject, &c.

Holiness. VII. 37. X. 18.

Hope. VII. 20.

Humility, [See Natural corrupti-
on, submission] VII. 41. VIII.
1. IX. 2. 3. X. 16. 30. 37. XI.
16. 41. XII. 4.

I.

Ignorance the cause of sin and evil.

I. 15. III. 12. VI. 20. 25. 52.
VII. 16. 34. IX. 43. XI. 16.
31.

Is mere madness. XI. 31.

Impiety what it is. IX. 1.

Industry. I. 2. 12. 13. V. 1. VI.
18. 27. 31. VIII. 11. IX. 14.
XII. 5.

Ingenuitie. I. 13. IV. 10. VI. 20.

28. VII. 5. 19. VIII. 14. X. 13.

15. See Plainness.

Innocencie the best gift of God. I.
14.

Best comfort to a dying man. II. 15.
17. VI. 28. IX. 2.

*The vanitie and Inconstancy of mens
Judgments.* II. 10. III. 4. IV. 3.
13. IX. 16. 29. X. 35. See
Fame, Conscience.

Justice our end. IV. 10. 18. 30. V.
28. VI. 42. 45. VII. 26. 29. 37.
IX. 29. X. 13. See Unjustice.

The ground of all other vertues.
XI. 9.

K.

Kindred between all mankind. I.
15. III. 4. XII. 19. See Mo-
tives to meekness.

Knowledge [See Nature, God]
to be purchased at any rate. I. 1.

The only true ground of a good life,
[See Opinion, Ignorance]
IX. 28. XI. 4.

L.

Learning, See Arts liberal, Wise-
dome.

*The true knowledge of God, and
acknowledgement of his Provi-
dence, best Learning.* V. 26.

*As also the right use of the Free
will.* VIII. 46.

To Live according to Nature, See
Nature.

*The vanity, fickleness, shortness of
this our mortal Life, and all
worldly employments,* [See Mo-
tives to Death] I. 16. II. 12.
15. III. 10. IV. 34. V. 29. VI.
14. VII. 17. 26. VIII. 2. 23.
24. IX. 22. X. 9. 20. 35. XII.
20. 25.

The

THE TABLE.

The end of our lives, which we ought mainly to intend, notwithstanding any discouragement or opposition, all other things being laid aside. II. 2. III. 4. 7. 10. 13. 17. V. 3. 4. 15. 27. VI. 2. VII. 3. 30. VIII. 6. 7. 25. 30. 41. 43. X. 2. 8. 12. 31. XI. 12. XII. 1. 2. 15. 22. See also Happiness, Society.

As often as we change this end, so often we cease to be the men that we were before. XI. 19.

Lust and Incontinency a greater sin than anger. II. 7.

M.

Magick taxed. I. 3.

Magnanimity. VII. 23. 26. X. 11.

Malice and Uncharitableness taxed. II. 14. See Meekness, Charity.

Meditation, See Thoughts.

Meekness. I. 1. 4. 6. VI. 28. VIII. 7. XI. 16.

Motives to Meekness and patience towards offenders. I. 15. II. 11. III. 12. IV. 3. 6. 7. 21. 23. V. 1. 19. 22. VI. 5. 19. 24. 25. 52. VII. 1. 16. 19. 34. 41. VIII. 4. 13. 53. IX. 9. 20. 25. 37. 43. X. 6. 30. XII. 12. See Patience, Reconciliation.

All or most of these motives recapitulated, and reduced into 10. heads. XI. 16.

Men [See Great men, Bodie] the corruption and ignorance of most men. IV. 31. 37. XI. 13.

Mens judgements, See Judgment.

Mercy and Compassion. I. 6. 8.

Mind. [See Bodie, Soul] some properties of it. V. 18. VIII. 54. 57.

A particular priviledge of the Minde, that it is not subject to be crossed and hindered. VIII. 39. X. 34. See Hindrances how to be, &c.

False Miracles. I. 3.

Moderation of mind. I. 13. VI. 28. VII. 40. XII. 20.

In things belonging to the body, &c. I. 13.

In matters of outward pomp and stateliness. I. 14.

Modestie [See Ostentation] I. 5. 6. 7. IX. 28.

N.

Reason and Nature all one. VII. 8.

To live according to Nature, is happiness, and true Philosophie. I. 6. 14. IV. 41. 43. V. 1. 3. 9. VI. 15. 31. 39. VII. 16. 29. 30. 43. VIII. 1. 11. IX. 24. 43. X. 2. 8. 17. XI. 15. 18. XII. 25.

The true Nature of every particular object, that presents itself to be rationally considered, and penetrated into. III. 11. 12. IV. 9. 18. VI. 3. 11. VIII. 3. 10. 12. IX. 23. XI. 16.

The happiness of this kind of contemplation. X. 9.

Whatsoever is Natural, is beautiful. III. 2. VI. 33.

O.

Objects how to be divided. IV. 17. VII. 21. XI. 2. XII. 7. 14. See Nature.

Obscureness, [See Vertue, &c.]

Opinion and conceit all in all in the world. II. 13. III. 10. IV. 3. 7. 32. V. 29. VI. 47. VII. 11. 13. 14. VIII. 38. 47. IX. 11. 13. 30. 32. XI. 10. 15. 16.

THE TABLE.

7¹⁷. 21. XII. 16. See Ignorance.
Our Opinions, the true and original ground and cause of all our actions. X. 39.

Diversity of opinions, not incompatible with unirie of affections. XI. 8.

Though it be a great vexation to a wise man to converse with wicked worldly men. IX. 3.

Order in all things. IV. 36. V. 8. VI. 34. See World, what it is.

Ostentation and vain-glory taxed. I. 4. 6. VIII. 31. IX. 28. XI. 16. 9¹⁷. XII. 3.

P.

Patience. I. 5. 13.

In afflictions and crosses [See Meekness, Blessings, &c.] motives to it. I. 17. IV. 3. 41. V. 8. 16. 19. VI. 1. 40. 47. 53. VII. 25. 31. 39. VIII. 15. 22. 33. 34. 45. 50. IX. 35. 38. X. 3. 5. 36. XI. 5. XII. 9. 11. 19.

Paine what it is, and how to be born. V. 20. VII. 22. 35. VIII. 26. IX. 41.

Partiality, though it be but in ordinary things as publick fights, &c. not laudable. I. 2.

Perseverance, [See Cōstancy. X. 8.

Philosophie What. I. 3. II. 15. V. 9. VI. 10. VIII. 1. IX. 28. 41.

Piety and godliness our end. See Happiness.

Placability, [See Reconciliation, Ingenuous Plainness and simplicitie.] I. 11. VIII. 58. IX. 28. X. 1. 9. 33. XI. 14. XII. 20. See also Sincerity.

Pleasure carnal not to be desired. V. 1. VIII. 17. 37. IX. 1.

True Pleasure and happiness. [See Happiness.] X. 1. 34.

Praise and commendation, See Honour, &c.

Praiers to be used upon all occasions. VI. 21.

How, and for what to be made. V. 7. IX. 40. X. 36. 37.

Our Present estate is that which we must ever intend, and carefully look to. III. 13. See Souls.

What is truly Profitable. III. 7. 8. VI. 39. VIII. 9.

Providence [See Discretion] I. 13.

Divine Providence, See God.

Q.

Querulousness taxed. VIII. 48. IX. 10. 35. See also Industry, Patience.

R.

Reason. IV. 4. IX. 8.

Reason the end of our lives. I. 5. II. 5. III. 1. IV. 10. 11. 25. VI. 13. 32. 39. 45. VII. 2. 18. 29. 42. VIII. 2. X. 2. XII. 24. See Understanding, Soul.

Much Reading oftentimes a hinderance to devotion. I. 16. 17. III. 15.

Want of it no hinderance at all to vertue. VIII. 7. See Arts liberal, Learning.

Recollection of all things into God. IV. 19. VI. 4. X. 7.

Recompence, See Courtesies, &c.

Reconciliation, I. 4. 10. 12.

Relapse. VI. 27.

The mutual Relation of things humane and divine. III. 14.

Of man to man [See Society] V. 17. X. 6. XI. 16.

of

THE TABLE.

Of man to other creatures. VI. 21.
VII. 30.

Repentance, what it is. VIII. 9.

Not to be differred. II. 1. 3. III. 15.

IV. 14. 21. 30. VI. 9. VIII. 21. X. 18.

Reprove others how we should. I.

7. 11. VI. 30. XI. 11. 16. 9¹7.

See Meekness.

Resurrection glanced at. XII. 4.

*Retire, See Tranquillity, Solita-
rines.*

The best kind of Revenge. VI. 1.

S

Shamefastness, I. 1.

Sin a mans evil and misery IX. 2.

*Sincerity, [See plainness] all in
all.* X. 12.

Society the end of man. V. 15. 19.

23. 24. 29. VI. 49. IX. 7. 21. XI. 19.

Solitariness [See Tranquillity]

much affected by Antoninus. IV. 3.

*Arguments against it, as contrarie
to the end of a mans being, &c.*

V. 15. 23. 24.

Soul, the worth of it in comparison

of all other things. I. 16. VI. 15.

VIII. 44. XII. 15. *See Reason.*

Some properties of it. XI. 1. 11.

XII. 23.

From God. I. 15. II. 1. VIII. 6.

XII. 2. 19.

How wronged. II. 14.

The union of the Soul with God. II.

11. V. 21. VIII. 52. XII. 4.

The present estate of it carefully to

be examined. V. 11. 25. X. 24.

XI. 17. XII. 26.

The state of it after death. III. 3.

IV. 17. V. 27. VI. 22. VII. 7.

22. 27. VIII. 55. IX. 39.

*Spirit: every man hath an in-
ward Spirit in him, which*

be ought to tend and worship. II.

11. III. 5. 13. 17. V. 10. 21.

VII. 14. VIII. 43.

*Sports and pastimes no fit objects
of a wise mans delight.* XI. 2.

Nothing strange. V. 27. XII. 10.

*See worldly things all of one
nature.*

*Submission to Gods providence,
mans duty and happiness.* II. 14.

IV. 19. 21. 28. 41. V. 8. 21.

VI. 15. 35. VII. 25. 29. 31. 33.

37. 39. VIII. 32. IX. 1. 5. 29.

X. 1. 6. 16. 22. 25. 28. XI. 18.

T

*Thoughts considerable in matter
of vertue as well as actions.* I.

1. III. 4. IV. 20. V. 15. VI. 2.

*Our daily Thoughts and medita-
tions, what they ought to be, [See*

Death, Universe.] XII. 6. 18.

Tragedies, See Comedies.

*Perfect rest and Tranquillitie
where best and speediest to be*

found. IV. 3. X. 24. XII. 6.

Truth to be embraced before all

things. VI. 20.

What it is. IX. 1.

In speech to be observed. III. 5.

XII. 1. 13, &c.

V.

*Vertue [See Reason, Happiness]
from God, after an unknown*

and incomprehensible manner.

III. 8. VI. 16.

How amiable & delightfull. VI. 43.

Sometimes without external lustre.

VII. 38.

*The only true object of a wise mans
delight.* XI. 2.

Uncharitableness, See Division.

Our Understanding whence. IV. 4.

Subject to decay. III. 1.

Universe, See World.

THE TABLE.

Our relation to the Universe, See the World as a Citie. Its Relation, Connexion.

The knowledge and consideration thereof, of what use & consequence.
II. 6. IV. 29. VII. 26. VIII. 25.
51. IX. 29. 31. X. 11. 19. XI.
25. XII. 18.

The relation of every particular object to the Universe. III. 11.

Unjustice what it is. IX. 1. 4.
W.

True Wisdome. IV. 30. V. 26.
See Learning.

Worldly Wisdome. IV. 31.

Words and speeches their true meaning to be rationally examined and looked into. III. 16. VII. 4.

Some words observable, and otherwise interpreted than in common acception. IV. 24. 29. V. 8. VII. 14. IX. 8. X. 8. 22. 25. XII. 17.

World, [See Universe, Connexion] what it is. IV. 22. 33. 35.
VI. 8. 23. VII. 6. 26.

As a City. II. 14. III. 11. IV. 3.
4. &c.

Wordly crosses or blessings, as life, health, poverty, sickness, &c. to be esteemed by us as things indifferent of themselves, neither good nor bad. II. 8. IV. 3. 32. 41. VI. 2. 15. 30. 36. VII. 11. 13. 39. VIII. 39. 51. IX. 1. 9. X. 34. XI. 15.

The little continuance, vanity, vileness, uncertainty, &c. of all Worldly things, and of the World it self. II. 9. IV. 27. 28. 39. V. 9. 19. 27. VI. 11. 14. 29. 33. VII. 18. IX. 12. 27. 34. X. 31. XI. 1.

All things in the World of one nature, and nothing new. II. 12. IV. 27. VI. 34. 41. VII. 1. 3. 27. IX. 12. 26. X. 27. XI. 1.

Worldly goods, See Blessings.

The future estate of it. X. 7.

Worse things made for the better.
V. 15. 24. VII. 30. XI. 9. 16.

F I N I S.

*Books Printed for, and sold by Charles Harper at the
Flower-de-luce over against St. Dunstons Church
in Fleetstreet.*

1. **C**ollection of Law Entries &c. by William Rastal. Printed 1670. fol. price 3. l.
2. All the Statutes at large to the year 1670. by Ferdinando Pulson. fol. price 50. s.
3. Coke's Commentary on Littleton. Printed 1670. fol. price 18. s.
4. The whole Office of a Sheriff, by Michael Dalton with very large additions. Printed 1670. fol. price 12. s.

5. Tables

5. Tables to most of the Printed presidents of Pleadings Writs and returns of all the Common law, collected by *G. Townsend*. fol. p. 12. s.
6. The law of Common Assurances, touching Deeds in general, viz. Feoffments, Gifts, Grants, Leases, with two Alphabetical Tables; by *William Sheppard* Esquire. Printed 1669. fol. price. 14. s.
7. The Country Justice, containing the practice of the Justices of the peace, as well in, as out of Sessions &c. with additions by *Michael Dalton* Printed 1666. fol. price 8. s.
8. Collection of all the acts and statutes made in the Reigns of King *Charles* the first and King *Charles* the second with the Abridgments of such as stand repealed or expired, continued after the method of Mr. *Rulton*, with notes of reference one to the other, to which also are added the statutes and private acts of Parliament passed by their said Majesties until the year 1667. with a Table directing to the Principal matters of the said statutes, by *Thomas Manby* of *Lincolnes Inn* Esquire. fol. price 12. s.
9. Lord *Coke's* eleven Reports in French. fol. Printed 1672. price 3. l.
10. Lord *Coke's* Book of Entries. fol. price 3. l.
11. Lord *Hobart's* Reports with additions. fol. Printed 1671. pri. 10. s.
12. Lord *Dyar's* Reports with a new Table. fol. Printed 1672. price 18. s.
- Resolves Divine, Moral, and Politick. fol. price 10. s.
13. The Complete Clark containing the best formes of all sorts of Presidents. 4°. Printed 1671. price 12. s.
14. An Abridgment of all the statutes in force and use from *Magna Charta* to the year 1670. by *Edmond Wrigate*, 8°. price 6. s.
15. *Fitzherbert's Natura Brevium* corrected and amended. 8°. price 5. s.
16. The Terms of the Law with Additions. 8°. Printed. 1670. price 4. s.
17. Doctor and Student 8°. price 2. s.
18. The Complete Justice in 12°. price 2. s.
19. A view of the Laws of England. 8°. by *John Bridal* of *Lincolne's Inn*. price 1. s.
20. *Littletons Tenures* French and English, in 12°. price 2. s. 6. d.
21. The Lord *Cokes* Coppy-holder, whereunto is added a large Treatise by way of Supplement. 8°. price 1. s. 6. d.
22. An Introduction to the holy Scripture by *H. Lakin*. 8°. pri. 2. s.
23. The Queens Closet opened, incomparable secrets in Physick, Chirurgery, Preserving and Candyng &c. the 4th impression with additions in 12°. price 2. s. 6. d.
24. The use and abuse of money. 4°. price 6. d.
25. The Abridgment of the Statutes that relate to the knowledg and Practice of the Common law. 8°. price 1. s.
26. The Compleat Attorney. 8°. price 3. s.
27. *Fortescue* of the Laws of England. 8°. price 3. s.

